

Skidmore College

Creative Matter

International Affairs Senior Theses

International Affairs

Spring 2016

From Cuba Libre to Hind Swaraj: Structure and Agency in the Struggle for Self-Determination

Maria Mayboeck
Skidmore College

Follow this and additional works at: https://creativematter.skidmore.edu/inter_aff_stu_schol



Part of the [Asian Studies Commons](#), [Latin American Studies Commons](#), and the [Peace and Conflict Studies Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Mayboeck, Maria, "From Cuba Libre to Hind Swaraj: Structure and Agency in the Struggle for Self-Determination" (2016). *International Affairs Senior Theses*. 4.
https://creativematter.skidmore.edu/inter_aff_stu_schol/4

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the International Affairs at Creative Matter. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Affairs Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of Creative Matter. For more information, please contact dseiler@skidmore.edu.

FROM *CUBA LIBRE* TO *HIND SWARAJ*

***STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF-
DETERMINATION***

Skidmore College

International Affairs, Senior Capstone Project

Spring 2016

Maria Raphaela Mayböck

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT 3

INTRODUCTION 3

CONCEPTS “CUBA LIBRE” AND “HIND SWARAJ”..... 4

LITERATURE REVIEW 4

TWO ICONS IN COMPARISON 11

SIMILAR IDEOLOGICAL STARTING POINTS FOR GANDHI’S AND CHE GUEVARA’S STRUGGLES..... 12

RESEARCH QUESTION 12

HISTORICAL AND STRUCTURAL CONTEXT OF VIOLENCE AND NONVIOLENCE 13

India: Colonialism in Juxtaposition with India’s Traditions and Past..... 13

Latin America: A Violent History..... 16

THE INFLUENCE OF TRAVEL ON THEIR PERCEPTION OF INEQUALITY AND EXPLOITATION

20

Gandhi: From an Inexperienced Lawyer to the Mahatma..... 20

Che Guevara: The Motorcycle Diaries..... 22

SIGNIFICANT TURNING POINTS 25

Gandhi: South Africa..... 25

Che Guevara: Guatemala..... 29

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 33

REVOLUTION 33

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 43

FROM CUBA LIBRE TO HIND SWARAJ

STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION

Abstract

What explains the violent or nonviolent nature of a social movement? While much literature exists on both phenomena separately, this essay compares the charismatic leaderships of two liberation movements, one violent and one nonviolent, to attempt to identify the determinants for the respective violent or nonviolent strategy. The two case studies, Mahatma Gandhi in India and Che Guevara in Cuba, show similar starting points, characterized by a deep compassion for disenfranchised and marginalized people in their regions suffering from an exploitative foreign power. This paper identifies three main factors that influenced Mahatma Gandhi and Che Guevara to join or lead a nonviolent and a violent movement, respectively: 1) the historical and structural context of the countries and regions, 2) the influence of travel on the development of ideology, 3) Che Guevara's witnessing of the overthrow of Arbenz' government in Guatemala, and Gandhi's time in South Africa as significant turning points. As a result, both movements will be studied in comparison and the conclusion drawn that both Gandhi and Che Guevara a) had unique, larger visions for their people and struggles; b) had well-defined, short-term goals of self-determination; c) shaped their revolutionary strategies with unique ideological aspects, which then led them to opt for violent or nonviolent tactics.

Introduction

Historically, physical strength has led to power. Charles Darwin's theory of 'survival of the fittest' confirmed that those that can assert themselves physically and biologically are more likely to survive than the physically weak. Violence, thus, is equated to power. Abuse of the power exemplified in physical strength by a leader, however, can lead to horrifying realities. Power, therefore, has historically been understood in these terms, disregarding the importance of mental strength, discipline and persistence.

Violent resistance movements striving for self-determination mostly mirror the abusive superior power or government in trying to defeat it through the same means. Nonviolent resistance movements, however, rely on the power and strength of the mind, having morals on their side. Historically, both types of resistance movements have led to success and bitter failures, but emphasis on the outcomes, rather than the factors and events that led to the outcomes overshadow the possible answer to the bigger questions of why one movement went this or the other way.

So what influences a movement or a leader to start a violent or a nonviolent movement? What are the structural conditions that provide for one or the other, and what role does the leaders' agency play in this decision (*if it really is a decision free to make*). Due to a

gap in literature comparing the factors that explore the forces behind the strategic or ideological choices of using nonviolence or violence in a resistance movement, this paper will explore these forces by studying two resistance movements in comparison: Gandhi's civil disobedience in India, and Che Guevara's guerrilla revolution in Cuba. The paper will investigate both structure and agency allowing for the rise of the two leaders, followed by a comparison of the intricacies and striking similarities of the two movements and their leaders, to contribute to scholarship trying to explain the employment of violence or nonviolence when faced with an exploitative and superior foreign power.

Concepts “Cuba Libre” and “Hind Swaraj”

To begin, clarification on the terminology in the title may be necessary. “Cuba Libre” is Spanish for “Free Cuba” and insinuates the nature and motivation of Che Guevara's struggle in Cuba, as well as the broader vision of freeing Cuba and Latin America from US imperialism and Cold War interventionism. “Hind Swaraj” stands for “Indian Home Rule,” a concept coined by Gandhi, who also wrote an eponymous book, in which he laid out his idea of freedom. Gandhi understood *swaraj*, which literally means self-rule, both in the political, as well as the spiritual sense, though he was of the opinion that individual self-rule needs to precede Indian political self-rule (Heredia, 1999).

Other foreign words and concepts that will be frequently used and referred to are *ahimsa* (nonviolence), *satyagraha* (lit.: holding firm to truth), and *revolución* (revolution) (Dalton, 1993).

Literature Review

Conflict, violence, forms of insurgents and revolts, and, to a lesser extent, nonviolence, have been studied extensively and countless theories exist as to what factors contribute to the outbreak or emergence of one or the other. However, when trying to

determine why some social movements develop into violent conflicts and some into mass nonviolent campaigns, it appears that these two very connected phenomena have been studied separately; there is a lack of literature on the strategic approach of a movement. Not all violent resistance movements consist of armed fighting and conventional or unconventional warfare, and not all nonviolent movements stay entirely nonviolent, where sporadic outbreaks of violence are likely. However, as will be discussed later, a clearly defined vision is essential for the longevity and/or success of a movement, and choosing violence or nonviolence as a tactic is an important and central part of that vision.

Gandhi is celebrated as the founding father of nonviolent resistance, an interesting detail, as that indicates that nonviolent resistance did not exist before the early 20th century. Indeed, Seferiades and Johnston (2012) confirm that “until the mid-twentieth century, those scholars who paid attention to collective action took for granted that mass protests were associated with violence or the threat of violence” (Seferiades and Johnston, 2012). Violence seems to be a more exciting research focus; crime and brutality are active, horrendous and cause outraged fascination. Talk about wars, or terrorist attacks has become so normal that we are desensitized to it and think that it is necessary for political change to occur. Thus, in Erica Chenoweth’s words, in an activist’s perspective, violence, though tragic, is logical for people to use to seek their change (Chenoweth, TedxBoulder, minute 1.28).

Nonviolence, on the other hand, is considered weak, is oftentimes confused with passivity and, “well-intentioned, but dangerously naïve” (Chenoweth, TedxBoulder, minute 1:42). According to Chenoweth’s and Stephen’s extensive, quantitative study on nonviolent resistance movements, however, nonviolent movements from 1900-2006 were twice as likely to succeed, and are almost four times as likely to usher in democracy (Chenoweth, TedxBoulder). So why do some movements choose violence over nonviolence, and vice versa?

Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham is amongst the few scholars who have attempted to answer this question. Her research focuses on movements seeking self-determination in oppressive regimes, and answers the question “Why do groups with similar grievances challenge the state in different ways?” (Cunningham, 2013). She identifies three ways towards self-determination: 1) conventional political channels, 2) violent struggle, 3) nonviolent campaigns. Presenting her argument, Cunningham identifies multiple factors that help us understand the strategic choice, which either leads to the occurrence of a large-scale civil war or mass nonviolence. Cunningham’s research only covers a small area of a largely understudied field of research, which she recognizes, and points to directions for future research.

As already mentioned, little attention has been paid to the strategic choice of nonviolence or violence; instead, both have been studied independently. Considering social movements and nonviolence, Gene Sharp has received considerable recognition and public attention; he boasts a number of books on nonviolent resistance, amongst which “From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation,” a handbook to starting a revolution. The following will attempt to find overlap between studies on violence and nonviolence.

According to Sharp, the main reason why individuals, groups, or movements perceive violence to be the only plausible way to fighting an oppressive regime is as a reaction of political violence exercised on the population by oppressive regimes. As a regime inflicts violence on its citizens and destroys any possibility for its population to bring the regime to justice through civic institutions, violence, to many, seems to be the only option (Sharp, 2010). This argument would explain numerous violent revolutions, and/or struggles for independence or self-determination, in which the rebels consider the costs of a violent struggle low enough, or do not see an alternative way to reach their goals. However, as Sharp

notes, “violent rebellion can trigger brutal repressions that frequently leaves the populace more helpless than before” (Sharp, 2010: 4). Violent revolutionary movements or secessionist groups are likely to cause the outbreak of civil wars, especially under an oppressive regime that is unashamed in its use of violence on its own population. Popovic, a prominent nonviolent resistance fighter in the Serbian struggle makes the point clear by stating: “If you’re going to compete with David Beckham, why choose the soccer field? Better to choose the chessboard” (Rosenberg, 2015).

In contrast, nonviolent resistance meets the regime on a different battlefield where the regime does not have a military advantage and does not enjoy the moral high ground (Chenoweth, 2011). Sharp dedicates his fourth chapter in “From Dictatorship to Democracy” on dictatorship’s weaknesses, and how one should counter them. He writes, “disciplined courageous nonviolent resistance in face of the dictators’ brutalities may induce unease, disaffection, unreliability, and in extreme situations even mutiny among the dictators’ own soldiers and population” (Sharp, 2010: 35). A movement’s decision to withstand a regime’s violence by engaging in civil disobedience, therefore, causes a regime to lose its authoritative status. The regime, if unwilling to give in to the movement’s demands, is forced to show its ugly face, meet the movement with brutality and thus stir national and international attention and contempt concerning Human Right violations. The movement’s task, then, is it to identify the regime’s weakness(es) and act upon them accordingly. Every dictatorship has an “Achilles” heel, exploiting those weaknesses, thus, “tend to make the regime less effective and more vulnerable to changing conditions and deliberate resistance” (Sharp, 2010: 28).

Sharp notes that nonviolence requires courage and patience (Sharp, 2010). While the notion of power will be discussed later in this paper, it should be said that weapons provide the holder with a power that, superficially, cannot be compared to the empty hands of a nonviolent activist. Too often, nonviolence is equated with pacifism and passiveness

(Chenoweth, 2011). However, the absence of weapons does not equate to passiveness or pacifism; nonviolence is active and the participation entails quite a lot of risks. As Erica Chenoweth puts it, “potential recruits to the resistance need to overcome fear, but not their moral qualms about using violence against others” (Chenoweth, 2011). It is this fear that Gandhi addressed in the foundations of his movement. Dalton writes, “It was the willingness of Indians to cooperate with the British Raj out of fear what troubled Gandhi” (Dalton, 1993: 7), which is why central to Gandhi’s fundamental teachings was the teaching of fearlessness and truth in action (Rudolph and Rudolph, 2006).

Despite the respect Gene Sharp enjoys for his work on nonviolence, scholars have voiced critique, amongst them Sean Chabot. Chabot is mainly concerned with the lack of “finer-grained explorations of *social movement* pronesis to gain better sense of *how* activists become proficient and virtuoso performers” (Chabot, 2015: 252). According to Chabot, the line between violence and nonviolence is not as clear as Sharp argues (Chabot, 2015). While Sharp tries to establish a grand and universal theory, Chabot considers it too general, and too abstract in order to be useful in practical terms: “by appealing to ‘the head,’ Sharp dismisses ‘the heart’ of nonviolent action and activists” (Chabot, 2015: 250). Thus, Chabot advocates for a more nuanced analysis of nonviolence, which includes a more practical approach and accounts for cultural differences. While he recognizes Gene Sharp’s influential work as useful for the earlier stages of nonviolent resistance, he criticizes the emphasis on theory, rules, and universal solutions. According to Chabot, Sharp’s work lacks in providing a practical rulebook to action. Emphasizing *pronesis*, rather than *episteme* and *techne*, Chabot highlights the importance of resisters’ development of skills, practical wisdom and learning-by-doing: While it is essential to have an “abstract understanding and technical skills, (...) only practical wisdom can ensure that available means are used for beneficial ends” (Chabot, 2015).

Charismatic leadership is oftentimes considered “mysterious” (Conger, 1989: 21) and interpreted in many different ways, fitting the respective context charismatic leaders emerge in. It is not clearly defined whether charisma can only be attributed to persons of a certain position, or whether charismatic individuals can exist throughout society. Discourse on charisma and charismatic leadership mostly celebrates Max Weber’s discussion as groundbreaking, and his theory of sources of authority essential. Since then, scholars have criticized, expanded on and changed his definition in search for a more complete and universal one.

Charisma, according to Weber, is the “certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities” (Weber, 1968: 48). Charisma being one of Weber’s three sources of authority/power, can thus “revolutionize political authority (...) by the sheer force of his or her personality” (Conger, 1989: 22).

While personality and the individual are important factors in a charismatic leader, Weber also notes that only through the recognition on the part of those subject to authority can a charismatic leadership be validated (Weber, 1968: 49). In other words, a charismatic leader is not a leader until he has a respected following. Similarly, Douglas F. Barnes (1978) writes, “charisma is not an individualistic phenomena hinging only on the extraordinary quality of a leader’s personality” (Barnes, 1978: 15), implying that emergence of a charismatic leadership is dependent on a complex web of factors, which, in synergy, provide for a charismatic leadership. The leader and his followers, therefore are engaging in a mutually benefiting relationship, where the leader relies on his following to be recognized as a leader, and the following relying on the leader for showing the way.

It is impossible to find a universal set of factors that lead to the emergence of a charismatic leader, as they differ greatly depending on the specific historical, geographical,

political, social, economic circumstances. Barnes identifies four basic propositions, which describe variables or conditions necessary for the emergence of a charismatic leader. Since his article, “Charisma and Religious Leadership: An Historical Analysis,” includes religion in his discussion on charismatic leadership, three out of the four propositions focus on religion. His second principle, however, is helpful in the present analysis.

Barnes’ second principle reads: “they [charismatic leaders] will live during a period of social change or be members of a minority group” (Barnes, 1978: 3). Thus, social change or the identity of a minority group, are important factors when considering the emergence of charismatic leaders. According to Barnes, charismatic leaders arise in times of chaos and promise to resolve the issue by providing innovative solutions, which find resonance amongst the populace that is disillusioned with those in power. Interesting to note is that, according to Barnes, a breakdown in traditional authority is necessary for a charismatic leader to emerge in the chaos that is consequently created. In contrast, Weber, who considers charisma one of three sources of authority, does not include the necessary break down of the traditional authority in his discussion. Thus, the question is whether charismatic leaders could *cause* the chaos which then provides for their popular rise to power.

In his discussion on subjective conditions (=leadership) and objective conditions (=structural context) that allow for the emergence of revolutions, Che Guevara seems to answer exactly that question. He writes that “(...) leadership, can accelerate or delay revolution, depending on the state of their development” (Guevara, 1969: 91). Therefore, the argument can be made that it is either the objective conditions that lead to the rise of a (charismatic) leader, or the presence of a (charismatic) leader, who can make the context happen, in which he or she rises to power and leadership.

Despite Jay Conger’s application of charismatic leadership in the context of (corporate) organizations, his very practical outline of the term is beneficial to this analysis of

charismatic leadership in a political context. In his view, charismatic leaders carry within themselves a restless dissatisfaction with the status quo, which then leads to a constant intention to challenge the status quo (Conger, 1989). This view expands Barnes' argument, who considers a radical (social) change in the status quo necessary for the emergence of a charismatic leader. While Barnes does not specify whether charismatic leaders can also *cause* that social upheaval in which they consequently arise, Conger does allow for this more ample approach, where he considers charismatic leaders to be seeking for opportunities to challenge, and possibly overthrow, the status quo. Interestingly enough, Seferiades and Johnston state that a change in status quo is also necessary for violence to occur in a movement. Possibility for an interesting parallel is thus provided between charismatic leaders and violent movements (Seferiades and Johnston, 2012).

In addition to Barnes' necessary condition of social change, James M. Mohr, drawing on Nadler and Tushman, identifies three much more personal components of charismatic leadership: envisioning, energizing, and enabling (Mohr, 2013). According to Mohr, the presence of social change is not sufficient for a charismatic leadership to arise. In accordance with this argument, a well-articulated vision will allow for a more consolidated movement and following. Similarly, Conger states that a strategic vision "provides a certain clarity at a time when things may not be very clear" (Conger, 1989: 5). Especially during times of social unrest, the population longs for stability, yet not for a return to the previous status quo. A charismatic leader, who provides an innovative solution as part of a broader vision, can conceptualize and promote a better future. In that sense, charismatic leaders are seen as opportunists stepping in when the population longs for a savior (Conger, 1989).

Two Icons in Comparison

Considering the aforementioned discussion on charismatic leadership, both Gandhi and Che Guevara can easily be considered charismatic leaders. A superficial overview of the

two individuals and their iconic nature, followed by a note on their very similar ideological starting points, serve as justification for their study in comparison as case studies.

Both Gandhi and Che Guevara were educated professionals – Gandhi a London-educated lawyer, and Che Guevara a doctor of medicine. Due to their professions, and Che Guevara’s European ancestry, they enjoyed a superior social status in their regions. Despite their comfortable economic and social situations, however, they both decided to leave, give up any kind of comfort and luxury and lead two struggles with the goal of self-determination from a superior, foreign power. Upon the (more or less) successful revolutionary movements, neither Gandhi nor Che Guevara emerged as the leading political figures, being second to Nehru and Fidel Castro, respectively. Fast-forward to their deaths, both leaders were assassinated but live on in people’s memories until today, whether remembered for their ideologies and dedication to social reform, or simply for their iconic pictures, adorning bumper stickers, t-shirt, and even tattoos.

Similar ideological starting points for Gandhi’s and Che Guevara’s struggles

Upon closer examination of Gandhi’s and Che Guevara’s starting points in their quest for a mission and purpose in life, a similar sense of compassion for the disenfranchised and marginalized people in their regions, who were suffering from the exploitation of a superior, foreign power can be identified. This similarity in ideological starting point in the context of the studies of nonviolent and violent movements leads to the following Research Question.

Research Question

Considering that Gandhi and Che Guevara had similar ideological starting points and motivations influencing and informing their subsequent struggles, why did Gandhi lead a nonviolent movement, and Che Guevara a violent one?

Historical and structural context of violence and nonviolence

India: Colonialism in Juxtaposition with India's Traditions and Past

India was subjected to the rule of the British Raj, when, during the years leading up to the turn of the century, the world underwent serious militarization. According to Misra, “intense competition between European states and Japan to build and expand their empires gave aristocratic military elites in Europe and Asia enhanced power and prestige” (Misra, 2014: 691). The industrial revolutions that rippled through Europe also increased the physical ability of weapon manufacturing, which in turn increased their dependency on and the importance of their colonies to provide raw materials. An increase in both weapon manufacturing and strong European nationalist sentiments led to a destabilization of the world and a global glorification of military might. The West characterized its physical superiority through modernization and military might. Pro-militaristic sentiments were common also in India, where Britain, following the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857, turned to favoring the land-controlling warrior groups (Misra, 2014). Indians proudly supported the successful employment of the Indian National Army in various conflicts; for many, the Indian National Army, in its glorification of Western ideals, represented India's path forward.

Indian appreciation for violence, thus, was an attempt to imitate the West in its physical might. While the East looked longingly towards the West, Western depiction of Indians and their culture was studded with derogatory language and a sense of superiority. The West, thus, viewed the Indians as an inferior people, overemphasizing and oversexualizing the “exotic,” rather than appreciating India in its comprehensiveness. This orientalist rhetoric to describe Indians intensified Indian sense of inferiority, a rhetoric they adopted and in turn strived to be as Western as possible. The obsession and glorification of military might, thus, did not spare India in its quest for Western imitation (Sen, 2005; Doniger 2009).

Quite similarly, Wendy Doniger identifies some of the characteristics, or stereotypes, the East and West are ascribed with – East: Religion, spirit, nature, the exotic, adventure, danger Romanticism (including Orientalism), myth, feminine; West: Science, materialism, the city, boredom, comfort, safety, the enlightenment, logos, male. Besides the aggrandizement of stereotypes, the problem with Orientalism and Occidentalism is the internalization of those stereotypes. Thus, Indians accepted the unidimensional and oversimplified readings of India and Indians as true, internalized the feeling of inferiority, strived for a more Western lifestyle and, out of shame tried to cover up the aspects of Indian culture and religion they deemed filthy and barbarian – a concept Doniger refers to as “a kind of colonial and religious down-syndrome” (Doniger, 2009: 384 - 385).

This typical colonial exploitative relationship, however, is in contrast with India’s context prior to colonialism. The Indian Subcontinent, due to its wealth in resources, had been invaded and conquered numerous times, resulting in the rich diversity in cultures, ethnicities, languages, and religions. However, the difference of the British to the Mughals, for example, was that the Mughals came to stay. Although violence may have been used to establish themselves, once in power, India’s conquerors allowed for much independence amongst its population, which coexisted relatively peacefully.

It can be argued, therefore, that the Indian cultures had a past of nonviolent traditions, a tradition the British Raj supported and nurtured. As Rudolph and Rudolph point out, “even while British rule was making clear that Indians lacked power, it strengthened the non-violent dimensions of Indian culture by providing educational and related service opportunities that required the skills and temperament of the office rather than the scepter and sword (Rudolph & Rudolph, 2006). Willingly or not, by emphasizing its own military superiority, and “male” traits, and attributing Indians with feminine traits, Britain strengthened Indians’ institutional competencies, necessary for the establishment of democracy. Amartya Sen’s famous “The

Argumentative Indian” further supports the traditional Indian ideas of conflict management in a purely non-violent, argumentative manner. In his argument he outlines that Indians enjoyed an old tradition of public discussion and conflict resolution focusing on deemphasis of overt clashes, compromise, consensus, evidence and morality (Sen, 2005; Rudolph & Rudolph 2006). Mogul ruler Ashoka seems to have united these two virtues in his rule over the vast Indian Subcontinent, by raising nonviolence as well as argumentative nature to the state level (Sen, 2005).

Many of India’s traditions and virtues are rooted in the teachings of its ancient religions that were either born in the Indian Subcontinent, or brought from the Middle East or Europe. Obviously, I cannot go into all of them, and neither do I have the knowledge to do so. Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism all religions value nonviolence high in their virtue and if not a way to become closer to God, see nonviolence as a path to salvation and an inner transcendence of human being (Kozhuvanal, 2013; Chekki, 1993).

Therefore, the argument can be made that overt militarism to such a grand scale was a consequence of the British colonial legacy. Numerous scholars, however, point towards the “unique character“ of India’s culture and its “pervasive influence throughout history” (Roy, 1976: 4). It is in this “unique character” that one can find traditional roots of non-violence. The combination of Gandhi’s application and adoption and of numerous Indian traditions, “the result was a principle that evoked rich religious symbolism contributed to a dynamic method of action unique in Indian history” (Dalton, 1993: 14).

However, it would be erroneous to look only at these structural circumstances to explain why Gandhi’s movement of civil disobedience was successful, especially taking into account the militant sentiments and Indian cowardice and inferiority mentioned earlier. It is thus important to look at Gandhi’s agency to see how his ideology evolved from one that

supported the British unconditionally, to one that rallied mass support for Indian nationalism against British colonialism.

Latin America: A Violent History

In contrast, Che Guevara was a product of complex Latin American exogenous and endogenous factors and dynamics that were partly rooted in its past, as well as exacerbated during the 20th century. Spanning from the violent Spanish conquest, over the violent independence movements, to the replacement of Spanish foreign control by US imperialism, violence has dominated Latin American assertion to politics and the transfer to power (Pinto Soria 1999). Economic interest has historically characterized foreign interventionism in Latin America, however, the independence wars and revolutions did not bring about the desired liberation from foreign elitist rule. Instead, a new economic elite, the *mestizos*, led the wars of independence, out of which they emerged as the political elite, and thereby prevented major social changes that would have undermined their status (Gabbert, 2012). In an effort to establish a more homogenized society and acting upon new, liberal economic ideals of commercial agriculture, indigenous communities suffered from systematic violence employed against them (Gabbert, 2012). While stating that Latin America has historically always been violent is a sweeping generalization, political violence did establish itself and was made use of more often than not. Che Guevara would stated in his *Guerrilla Warfare: A Method*, “At the outset of the past century, the peoples of America freed themselves from Spanish colonialism, but they did not free themselves from exploitation. (...) Latin America today is under a more ferocious imperialism, more powerful and ruthless, than the Spanish colonial empire” (Guevara, 1969).

Similarly, William S. Stokes writes, “The history of Latin America from independence to the present time is a history of violent struggles” (Stokes, 1952: 461). He

outlines the numerous approaches¹ to organize, maintain and change governments by using force that had established themselves in Latin America (Stokes, 1952). Interesting to note is that Stokes' views represent an important time in Latin America's history. His article was published in 1952, the year Batista took power through a coup d'état in Cuba. In his discussion on revolutions, Stokes considers revolution to be the most democratic of the forceful ways of changing power – due to its inclusive and popular character, however, he claims it to be rare and unlikely to establish itself as a viable method in Latin America for regime change: “It is an obvious and inescapable fact that revolution is too big and too difficult a power mechanism to employ in Latin America with any frequency” (Stokes, 1952: 461). Almost to defy the argument, only one year after the publication of the article, Fidel Castro would lead the failed attacks on the Moncada Barracks, four years later the yacht Granma with Fidel and Raúl Castro and Che Guevara, amongst others, would reach the Cuban shores, and seven years later, Fidel Castro would start consolidating his regime.

Following WWII, American imperialism was not only characterized by economic interests, but also by the ideological power struggle initiated by the Cold War. The red scare gave the United States reason for brutality and pre-emptive military actions. In the name of defending their liberal, capitalist-based model of democracy, the US went both the dirty route and the more diplomatic route. The elephant in the region, the US founded multiple treatments and agreements to ensure commitment amongst the American nations to protect themselves from communism, and ensuring US control over Latin America; amongst them are the Platt Amendment, the Good Neighborhood Policy, and the TIAR (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), the equivalent of the NATO to the Western hemisphere (Pinto Soria, 1999). Consequently, Latin America was not only victim to the US' short-temperedness on the American continent, but also saw itself required to provide troops for

¹ The author lists: *machetismo*, *cuartelazo*, *golpe de estado*, revolution, *imposición*, *candidato único*, *continuismo*, and elections (Stokes, 1952).

vvarious proxy wars the US was fighting. According to Gerassi, “Roosevelt is the most intelligent imperialist the United States has ever seen (Gerassi, 1967: 414), because he was able to make US interventionism in Latin America invisible; while claiming to practice the policy of a ‘Good Neighbor,’ Gerassi argues, Roosevelt simply got more skillful at hiding his traces. Julio C. Pinto Soria refers to the resulting relationship between the United States and Latin America as one of “vassalage” (Pinto Soria, 1999: 111).

Finding themselves in a paradoxical position of militant tutelage, Latin American people were robbed of their ability to oppose the United States on moral and even democratic grounds and to call attention to Human Rights violations being committed – directly or indirectly – by the United States. Any government trying to implement agrarian or social reforms were repeatedly cracked down upon and replaced by a government that was more conducive to American economic interests. The United States opposed the very liberal democracy they pride themselves with amongst its southern neighbors, consequently preventing democratic, economic and political growth. The US gave its support most readily to countries with a military leadership as CIA director Allan Dulles was cited, “these regimes are most successful in resisting the communist subversion” (Pinto Soria, 1999: 118). As a result, regimes curbed their populations’ freedoms significantly, persecuted and outlawed communist parties and their members, foreign control of major economies and corporations persisted. In short, structural, as well as physical violence dominated and unsettled the region. In a context where political violence is a norm, foreign intervention harms economic development and the establishment of healthy democratic system, and where social and agrarian reforms are much overdue, the turn to radical ideologies is a natural consequence. Those advocating for economic equality, political freedoms and a new social order, in Latin America, were militant socialists and communists. It was only reasonable that they would look towards the Soviet Union for a role model. The combination of the Russian Revolution

that ushered in communist UUSR, and the Marxist claim that armed struggle is necessary for a successful revolution made violence the only viable solution in the Latin American context.

The success of the Cuban Revolution introduced a new era of US-Latin American relations. Sick of the constant American stick policy, the mentality ‘to meet the stick with the stick’ (Pinto Sorio, 1999: 117) became popular among Latin Americans. Especially guerrilla warfare, a hitherto unconventional route to obtain power, was a process that “deviated from traditional Latin-American practice” (Kling, 1962: 44). It allowed Fidel Castro and Che Guevara to take advantage of the dissatisfaction amongst the rural population in Cuba and the mountainous terrain hostile to conventional warfare, and assume a David-vs-Goliath image by taking on the big “octopus” (the United States itself (Guevara, 1969). Consequently, “nearly every Latin American guerrilla movement of the 1960s adopted Guevara’s theory” (Childs, 1995: 595). The Latin American opinion, therefore, was that the US octopus needed to be hit in each and one of its “imperialist tentacles” (Gerassi, 1967: 426), overthrown and completely replaced with a new, more egalitarian system.

In Che Guevara’s words: “Generally on this continent there exist objective conditions which propel the masses to violent actions against their bourgeois and landlord government. (...) In other countries where these conditions do not occur, it is right that different alternatives will appear and out of theoretical discussions the tactic proper to each country should emerge” (Guevara, 1969: 92). Following this argument, therefore, the Indian objective conditions did not provide for a violent struggle. Considering the increasing militaristic sentiments in India during that time period, however it is important to look at agency to further explain the two leaders’ success.

The influence of travel on their perception of inequality and exploitation

Gandhi: From an Inexperienced Lawyer to the Mahatma

India would not have its Mahatma now, hadn't Gandhi embarked on travels that took him to two countries that would shape his ideas, ideals, morals and ideology. Gandhi's travels are characterized by the search for truth and morality and led to the transformation of a London-educated law student into one of history's most powerful leaders. Gandhi, a shy young man, lacking in self-confidence and the necessary skills in public speaking, did not seem to be the best candidate for the profession of a lawyer. Gandhi was amongst those Indians that bought into the idea that the British were superior, that Indians ought to dress, speak, behave, and adapt as much as possible to modernize. He engaged in a systematic, disciplined way of trying to assimilate and "playing the English Gentleman" (Gandhi, 1983: 44). He writes in his autobiography: "While in India, the mirror had been a luxury (...). Here (in London) I wasted ten minutes every day before a huge mirror" (Gandhi, 1983: 45). Soon, however, Gandhi realized that he was pursuing a "false idea" (Gandhi, 1983: 46) and he started to return to his more ascetic ethic, as well as dedicating his time and energy to his studies.

Religion proved to be a major influence on Gandhi's intellectual development. He engaged with religions in two ways: First, he had been subjected to various forms of faiths as a child, which proved rather second nature and a way of life to him than a subject of intellectual and philosophical discipline of study. It was back home in India that the seeds were planted for Gandhi's later rejection of the caste system and the persistence of the "untouchable" status, as the Bhakti faith taught him "God is accessible to all regardless of social standing and cultural background" (Rudolph & Rudolph, 2006: 186). In addition, Gandhi's mother in many ways set an example for the practices her son would later embrace to the fullest and make central to his path to swaraj. She was a deeply religious woman who painstakingly observed all rituals of her faith. Taking vows and fasting, as well as praying

were part of her religious observance (Gandhi, 1983: 2). Self-suffering and self-sacrifice – often in the form of fasting – were central in young Gandhi’s life and he learnt very early on to make use of them and find retreat, truth and *ahimsa* in them (Gandhi, 1983: 24).

Second, the interaction with and study of different religions and religious texts was central to Gandhi’s self-discovery during his time before his historical return to India. Both in London and South Africa he experimented with and studied all kinds of different faiths that influenced him in a certain way – Christianity, arguably, being amongst the most influential. Joining the theosophical circles in London, Gandhi embarked on a religious path in which he read the Quran, the Old and New Testament, numerous Hindu texts, and the *Gita*, the “book *par excellence* for the knowledge of truth” (Gandhi, 1983: 59). His critical engagement with the different faiths led him to the ability to identify their various shortcomings. While Hinduism still resonated best with him, he took much of his later conception of *ahimsa* from Christianity; in fact, the famous quote “If someone slaps you on one cheek, turn to them the other also” is often attributed to Gandhi, while it actually is derived from the Bible (Gandhi, 1983). In addition, Gandhi’s correspondences with various philosophers and writers, both Eastern and Western, point to his active search for the ultimate Truth.

Apart from his intellectual experiments with religions, he also assumed many habits that eventually led to the self-reliance, self-suffering, and experiments on his own body, which would become central to his personal conception of *swaraj*. Whether it was mainly financial pragmatism or his spiritual quest, Gandhi embraced vegetarianism and gradually reduced his dietary needs to mostly fruits, nuts, and milk; he eventually also ventured into giving up the latter (Gandhi, 1983). In South Africa, especially once he started taking on civil cases in South Africa, Gandhi aimed to reduce his dependency on others. He thus trained himself in the practice of self-reliance, an idea, which characterized his economic viewpoints. He taught himself how to wash and iron his own clothes, how to cut his hair, and would not

rest until he thought himself capable of assisting the birth of his children, anticipating any complication during labor (Gandhi, 1983). The foregone attributes culminated in Gandhi's later vision of India as a self-reliant nation based on village-economies, rather than industrial modernization. In terms of economic development, therefore, Gandhi and Nehru had significant divergences. Gandhi's travels are thus heavily influenced by new ideas and ideologies, whether that be through critics of the Western path of development and modernization,² Religions, or a passion to revive virtues from his own traditional roots.

Che Guevara: The Motorcycle Diaries

Ernesto Che Guevara is probably best known for his agency in the Cuban revolution, however his extensive experiences and his documentation of his travels through Latin America have received much attention; the most popular of which probably is the cinematization of his 'Motorcycle Diaries.' Director Walter Salles captures Latin America's breathtaking natural beauty with stunning visuals. Che's written accounts show a limited political understanding and projected activism, but capture his deep compassion for the marginalized, poor, and the sick, as well as his insatiable hunger to learn more (Guevara, 2004). His travels, widely considered the making of a revolutionary, served as a soul-searching journey, where he developed his own fundamental understanding of morality, experienced, if not on his own body through conversations with those affected by it, the continued exploitation of Latin America under the United States, and developed an understanding and interest in the political dynamics of the subcontinent.

During the course of his first travels through Latin America, both Castañeda and Elena identified the travels less in terms of a political awakening, than months of personal

² E.g.: Ruskin, Tolstoy (Gokhale, 1972)

growth (Elena, 2010). While still in Argentina, Elena points to his difficulties in orientating himself as a tourist in his own country, struggling with his privilege as a middle class, European-looking medicine student, and visiting those tourist places advertised by the Peróns. Guevara saw himself as different from the rest of the Argentines travelling, “as someone dedicated to the serious business of investigating the inner workings of society” (Elena, 2010: 29). He constantly searched for a more authentic experience, authentic interactions with his country-men and fellow South Americans, whom he claimed to understand better than any North American (Elena, 2010). Both his and his travel partner Granado’s background in medicine justified and allowed their interaction with the sick and marginalized, and granted them entrance to places ordinary travellers would either be refused access, or simply avoid in the first place.

Whilst his time in Argentina may be called an attempt to struggle with his own status and privilege, Chile, as Drinot puts it, washed over him and his “main desire were ease, sex, and wine,” (Schell, 59). Generally, his first travels are said to be politically fairly ambivalent (Elena, 2010; Schell, 2010; Castañeda, 1997), though Guevara dedicated significant portions of his diary to Bolivia’s political turmoil, as well as to Bolivia’s and Peru’s indigenous populations. Having sought out encounters with the poor, the criminals, and the sick, Guevara and Granado were forced to even more intimate contact with the local populations after their motorbike, *la poderosa*, broke down in Peru (Schell, 2010). A fraternal relationship, still characterized by a feeling of superiority, between the two travelers and the local populations developed on communal trucks, the road, etc. While Che Guevara characterized the local Indians as “a defeated race” and “somewhat animal-like” (Drinot, 2010: 102, 103), the general exploitative relationship that existed between them and their – mostly white – superiors did not escape Guevara’s attention and written accounts.

Although not grand enough to consider it a political awakening, Che Guevara's time in Bolivia in 1953 can be referred to as a "political coming of age (...), together with a powerful anti-American anger" (Castañeda, 1998: 58). Amazed by the revolutionary spirit in Bolivia, Che Guevara did not fail to notice the shortcomings of the revolution, especially pointing to the unequal treatment of the indigenous by those in power. While Castañeda writes that "Guevara's stance is still fundamentally ethical, devoid of political depth," (Castañeda, 1998: 60), Drinot discerns Guevara's increasingly political and radical ideological developments in Peru: "Guevara's understanding of the indigenous experience provoked a desire for action." (Drinot, 2010: 106). Indeed, Drinot cites an excellent example, telling of Guevara's ideological evolution, if not political still intellectual: Conversing on the topic of indigenous exploitative conditions, Granado suggested to lead the Indians in a nonviolent, democratic revolution towards their empowerment. "Guevara's reaction to Granado's comment ridicules his travel companion's disingenuousness at believing a nonviolent revolution possible: ' Revolution without firing a shot? You're crazy, Petiso.'" (Drinot, 2010: 107) Today, it is impossible to say whether Guevara seriously started to toy with the idea of armed rebellion (though evidence rather confirms the opposite) or whether he held a romantic view of the revolutionary life and its righteous cause. Nevertheless, one can interpret this simple comment prophesying his future development.

Castañeda, staunchly holding on to his argument that Che Guevara's travels had little impact on his political and military thinking, he does admit that Che Guevara recognized "a causal link between the deplorable destiny of 'the proletariat around the world' and an 'absurd sense of the case' – that is, the economic, social and political status quo."(Castañeda, 1998: 47). Che Guevara, besides seeking out the sick and criminals, always tried to establish a fraternal relationship with disenfranchised workers, who lived and worked under exploitative conditions, mostly created by foreign masters. In these masters, Che Guevara

increasingly saw the “yankee imperialism” (Castañeda, 1998: 56) that had taken Latin America into its grip like “capitalist octopuses” (Castañeda, 1998: 62). These experiences, as already mentioned, caused in him a desire for action – even if only intellectually, rather than physically. Citing Guevara’s own words, Castañeda writes: “(...) I will not rest until I see these capitalist octopuses annihilated” (Castañeda, 1998: 62). Similarly, upon his return to Argentina before he would leave his homeland on a second trip that would have him return as el Che, rather than Ernesto Guevara de la Serna, he is quoted writing: “I will be with the people; I will dip my weapons in blood and, crazed with fury, I will cut the throats of my defeated enemies. I can already feel my dilated nostrils savoring the acrid smell of gunpowder and blood, of death to the enemy.” (Castañeda, 55). Castañeda’s own disregard of these words as “ranting and raving” (Castañeda, 1998: 55) seems fairly out of place at this point. Though Guevara may not have joined the communist movement yet, may not have had personal experience with the armed struggle, his ideological development does speak to a radicalization, if only in intellectual terms that was impossible to reverse again, and had to find an outlet somehow – in Guevara’s case it was the violent struggle.

Significant Turning Points

Gandhi: South Africa

Both Gandhi’s and Che Guevara’s travels culminated in events that can be analyzed as significant turning points in their lives. In Gandhi’s case, this turning point is somewhat difficult to discern, as the events and developments leading up to his final decision to dedicate his life to civil disobedience are spread across his stay in South Africa.

Gandhi extended his stay in South Africa from a mere couple of years to 21 long years. His stay would turn a shy young lawyer, lacking public speaking skills, into a respected civil

rights activist, on the forefront of all Indians living and working in South Africa during that time. The following will highlight some significant events and external influences that would lead to Gandhi's disillusionment with the British and the Western world, resulting in "a principle that evoked rich religious symbolism and contributed to a dynamic method of action unique in Indian history" (Dalton, 1993: 14).

As Gokhale put it, "The degeneration of Western values was demonstrated to him (Gandhi) through his experience of European racism in South Africa and British imperialism in India" (Gokhale, 1972: 217). Starting with his first arrival in South Africa, Gandhi experienced continuous acts of racial discrimination against himself by the Whites who saw themselves as superior. However, neither the infamous train scene, in which he was refused the right to travel in First Class based on his color, despite his holding of such ticket, nor his barring from various hotels, or the visible unequal treatment of indentured Indian labourers based on skin tone could galvanize him into rejecting the British just yet (Gandhi, 1983).

Nevertheless, being the only Indian attorney in South Africa, Gandhi was almost forced into contact with indentured labourers who had suffered from abusive treatments by their masters. One of his first cases was representing Balasundaram, an Indian indentured labourer who had been severely beaten by his master. Through this case, Gandhi was brought closer to the sufferings of indentured Indian labourers in South Africa, and he became known among their community; more and more individuals sought out his help and advice on how to proceed against the injustice done to them. Interestingly enough, therefore, Gandhi started to fight injustice trying to work *through* and *with* the British legal system and reveal, through belligerently fought court cases, the discriminatory, racist and exploitative nature that led to the Indians' status as second class citizens. (DiSalvo, 2013).

However, admiration for the British and loyalty to its system and modernity was not easily disregarded. During the second Boer War between 1899 and 1902, Gandhi famously

served by establishing an Indian ambulance corps, which, due to the Boers' unexpected persistency, was direly needed. Sources are unclear whether Gandhi initially wished to enlist in the army as a soldier and the British refused him on the grounds of his skin tone, yet Gandhi fully supported the British during the war (DiSalvo, 2013). He stated, "I held then that India could achieve her complete emancipation only within and through the British empire (...) The average Englishman believed that the Indian was a coward." (Gandhi, 1983: 188). Thus, Gandhi clearly still held the view that by mirroring the British might and militaristic virtues, the Indians would be able to assert themselves as a courageous people.

What he could not have known is that once Britain, supported by a number of foreign powers, annexed the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State, discrimination against Indians would continue and to a certain extent even increase. By volunteering his service in the ambulance corps, Gandhi had hoped that through showing their loyalty and dedication, Indians would attain egalitarian status with the British. When the British revolutionized the transportation system in Johannesburg by introducing new tramcars running on electricity, people of color were barred from the use of the new tramcars. This prompted Gandhi's embryonic experiments with civil disobedience. Intentionally getting Indians arrested by insisting on their right to ride the tramcars, Gandhi would then represent them in court, trying to appeal to the judges' morality by presenting them with the absurd discriminatory practices against Indians (DiSalvo, 2013). While some of these cases led to success, the court cases were very time-consuming and had little effect. Additionally, Gandhi helped found the Natal Indian Congress, which aimed to fight discrimination against Indians in South Africa, as well as founded the newspaper *Indian Opinion*, where he would share his ideological changes in writing (Gandhi, 1983).

One of the underlying reasons that explain the British behavior towards the Indians is the latter's ascension to influential business and trading positions, after having been brought

to South Africa to merely work in the sugar cane plantations. Alarmed by their growing share in the economy, the British tried to limit the Indians' time in South Africa by passing laws that would introduce registration papers and taxes punishing those that failed to re-register in time. Both the 25£ tax, which was then reduced to 3£, introduced in 1894, as well as the Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance of 1906 are influential events in Gandhi's growing anti-British mentality and spurred his development of civil disobedience as a form of resistance. More and more, he would realize that trying to resist the British system by using its own legal system the Indians found themselves in a disadvantage (DiSalvo, 2013).

1906, thus is seen as the final straw for Gandhi; the Indian community reacted to the Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance with indignation – previous laws and regulations, as well as the day-to-day racial discrimination were humiliating enough, now the requirement of fingerprints on registration papers equated them with criminals.³ The fight against the Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance marked the breakdown of the distinction between Gandhi as a lawyer, as a politician, and as a person. Deeply concerned by the discriminatory law, he emerged as the ultimate and clear leader of an Indian resistance movement that refused to comply. As DiSalvo writes, “The Law provided him with confidence. The law made him a leader. The law gave him his voice.” (DiSalvo, 2013: xiv). Gandhi fought tirelessly against the implementation of the law, gave speeches attended by thousands of outraged Indians who looked to him for guidance and leadership, wrote pieces published in the newspaper *Indian Opinion*, and represented as many Indians in court as he could.

Dalton writes, “What Gandhi did to South Africa was less important than what South Africa did to him” (Dalton, 1993: 15), showing how important Gandhi's time in South Africa was to his ideological development. He had started his religious and moral attitudes in

³ Indeed Gandhi argued that fingerprints were only required by law from criminals – equating Indians to criminals was therefore even more discriminatory and insulting (DiSalvo 186).

London, but they took definite shape in South Africa as he started to become more involved in ascetic practices of self-reliance – cutting his own hair, washing his own clothes, and learning how to assist his at his own children’s birth (Gandhi, 1983; Dalton, 1993). Gandhi found his mission and purpose in the Indians’ struggle in South Africa for egalitarian treatment; he started to call for communal noncooperation, encouraging jail sentences as a way to exercise leverage over the British, while subsequently creating the foundations on which India’s liberation struggle would be fought on: *swaraj*, *ahimsa*, *satyagraha* (DiSalvo, 2013). Gandhi the revolutionary was born.

Che Guevara: Guatemala

In contrast to Gandhi’s long-winded path to his final rejection of Western ideals, Che Guevara’s ideological turning point is easier to discern. Attracted by the overwhelming indigenous population of Guatemala, which had intrigued him already in Bolivia and Peru, “Guevara sought and found a reform process similar to that in Bolivia – but perhaps more radical and, in any case, fresher and more defiant toward the United States” (Castañeda, 1997: 62). Guevara’s time in Guatemala can also be referred to as a political awakening, as much of his political thought and political expression found root in what he saw unfold in Guatemala during his time there.

Guatemala saw itself prosper in during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Having overthrown a ruthless dictator in 1944, presidents Arévalo and Árbenz tried to establish a more egalitarian, nationalist government, that followed the path of capitalist development. The United States, supportive of the development of Third World states, welcomed those changes, only until their interests were not affected (Immerman, 1980). As large-scale agrarian reforms put into place by Árbenz threatened and caused the expropriation and redistribution of land, owned to a large extent by the United Fruit Company, the United

States, under President Eisenhower and Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, feared for the interests of the American owned corporation (Immerman, 1980-81). Subsequently, American corporate interests were phrased in politico-ideological terms, and the State Department accused Guatemala of communism, which allowed them to declare Guatemala a threat to national security. As Richard H. Immerman puts it, “(US) government officials brought with them an outlook on world politics that was fashioned by the cold war ethos” (Immerman, 1980-81: 638). What followed was one of America’s most successful, but also most controversial Cold War involvements in Latin America. While the CIA trained and financed a team of Guatemalan exiles and prepared them for the overthrow of Árbenz’ government, its direct strategy was much more psychological than militaristic: the State Department planted news stories on Guatemala’s communist threat, dropped anti-government leaflets from aircrafts, as well as penetrated and influenced the Catholic Church to spread anti-Arbenz pastoral messages, amongst other tactics (Immerman, 1980-81). Disguising the actual military strength of the insurgent group lead by Castillo Armas, the strategy worked and Árbenz saw himself forced to resign in the midst of chaos ensued by US efforts.

Witnessing these developments was crucial in Che Guevara’s development of his political and anti-American thinking. Empathizing with the Guatemalan people by identifying as one of them – a fellow Latin American, and regarding Árbenz as influential in the 1944 revolution, Che Guevara was fascinated as well as exasperated by the unfolding events. In the time leading up to the coup and throughout it, Che Guevara became increasingly interested in communist thought, sought out and surrounded himself with like-minded and inspirational people, and expressed the intent to eventually join the communist party or movement “somewhere in the world” (Castañeda, 1998: 72). Although he started calling for concrete (armed) action (Forster: 2010), Che Guevara’s time in Guatemala was still characterized by the life and study of an intellectual. He tried to deal with and make sense of the unfolding

events by spending hours studying in the library and talking to more or less influential, communist scholars or thinkers that had sought refuge in Guatemala (Forster, 2010). Especially influential in establishing these contacts and fueling his communist developments was Hilda Gaeda, a Peruvian communist militant in exile. According to various sources, the relationship was more fraternal than romantic or erotic (Forster, 2010; Castañeda, 1998), yet she was influential in both keeping him economically afloat, as well as connected with various influential, communist contacts.

Amongst those many contacts were a disproportionate amount of Cubans, many of which were exiles, having escaped Cuba's Batista after the failed attacks on the Moncada Barracks, led by Fidel Castro. In Gaeda's words, "the Cubans were different" (Forster, 2014), and their stories, excitement to return to the struggle, and their description of Fidel Castro caught fire in Che Guevara. Their camaraderie and enthusiasm left a deep mark on him and undoubtedly contributed to his future development, even though he may not have known it then.⁴ During the more dangerous time of the US invasion leading up to the coup, Guevara sought asylum in the Argentinian embassy, where he developed a deeper appreciation for and connection with communism, and, arguably, also radicalized in his views on the necessity of armed struggle against American imperialism in Latin America (Castañeda, 1998). As Forster put it, "Guatemala was a magnet for people committed to social justice" (Forster, 2010: 213). Che Guevara, partly because he sought them out, but partly also because they found themselves in similar stages of life, was thus surrounded by communist, militant exiles.

If Che Guevara's time in Guatemala was characterized by a political awakening, Mexico was, until he met Fidel Castro, a time of political ambivalence, indifference for the country's beauty, and confusion regarding his new responsibilities as a husband and soon-to-

⁴ During this period, Che Guevara still held true to his plans to travel to Mexico, and then leave for Europe and possibly China. Although his political views took on shape and radicalized, he still had not taken on the persona of a revolutionary (Castañeda, 1998).

be father. However, the surprising reencounter by coincidence – or maybe destiny – with a Cuban exile he had met in Guatemala, Níco Lopez, Che Guevara was introduced to Raul Castro, a Cuban student leader, recently released from a Havana jail. A few days later, Raúl’s brother, Fidel arrived – an encounter that would change Che Guevara’s, and perhaps the world’s history forever. Castro provided Che Guevara with a sense of purpose that he had been searching for throughout his travels (Zolov, 2010) He found passion in the discipline that the life and training of a guerrillero requires, threw himself into more studies of Marxism, established contacts with Soviet individuals and started learning Russian. Despite his asthma, he embraced the physical training the group of revolutionaries received from a Mexican wrestlers – finally, in Mexico, the year-long intellectual preparation, made up of personal experiences as well as intellectual studies and conversations, found a physical expression. Guatemala and Mexico can be seen as the culmination of Guevara’s travels and therefore his search of purpose, which he found in the armed, revolutionary struggle. The events in Guatemala were insofar a significant turning point in Che Guevara’s ideological thinking, as he was directly confronted with a situation of clear US intervention to defend American corporate interests in the country, under the disguise of fighting the threat of communism in its backyard. Che Guevara, who through his travels had identified with a transcontinental Latin American identity, was deeply marked by this injustice, and through the interactions with communist exiles, he transformed from the medicine student Ernesto to “el Che”⁵ the CIA would have one of the biggest files of.

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

In summary, Che Guevara's and Gandhi's struggles originated from similar ideological starting points, but the influences that determined their revolutionary movement were insofar different, as that they resulted in a violent and a nonviolent outcome. Interesting to note is that despite the divergences in their influences and the nature of their social movements, many parallels can be drawn between the movements themselves.

The following section lays out the argument that violence and nonviolence are simply tactics employed in the grander scheme of a revolution, and not the defining factor when considering the Cuban Revolution and the Indian road to independence. Investigating the two movements shows a strikingly similar organization, vision, and moral obligation and determination amongst the charismatic leadership to improve the situation for the better by establishing a new social order.

Revolution

The definitions of a revolution in the context of social movements, according to Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, can be summarized by “an activity or movement by many people designed to effect fundamental changes in the socioeconomic, political situation, aimed at the replacement of government or ruler” (Merriam Webster Online Dictionary). Many definitions, however, also include the aspect that the acquisition of power, or the overthrow of the existing power structure, requires “violence” (Dictionary.com; Cambridge Dictionary Online). Some of the most famous revolutions (Mexican revolution, Russian revolutions, Cuban revolution) were violent ones; this has led to the common perception that revolutions, as in a political struggle, need to be violent.⁶ In the broader sense of the definition, revolution is merely a sudden and radical change to the existing order; both

⁶ Other revolutions, which may include the fundamental way of thinking about or visualizing something, is not included in this definition (Merriam Webster Online Dictionary).

the Cuban Revolution *and* Gandhi's *Satyagraha* fit this category perfectly. The following will identify the similarities between the two movements, demonstrating that they both are revolutions. In addition, a closer look shows that they have much more in common than only their goal of self-determination and liberation.

Social Reform

Neither of the two movements merely aimed for a change in the political leadership; instead, both Che Guevara and Gandhi had a bigger vision in mind: the transformation of the socio-, politico-, and economic situation. For Gandhi, nationalism was not the ultimate goal, and neither did he trust the state, whose power he thought needed to be curbed (Gokhale, 1972). Gandhi's vision was much greater than the replacement of the British system by an Indian one. He envisioned a self-reliant, village-centered economy, far from Western modernization and industrialization, as he, one of the first environmentalists, predicted the destructiveness of Western modernization. For him, the problem of exploitation was not necessarily one of power relations, but of modern industrial civilization and capitalization, which lead to self-destruction, as they disregard morality and religion (Gokhale 220). In addition, he disregarded colonialism as immoral, by claiming that "multiplication of wants is theft" (Kozhuvanal, 1999: 445), emphasizing the need for nonviolence to transform the society through active service. He believed in the Indian people to make that change collectively, based on ancient Indian traditions, which he reinterpreted in such a way that revolutionary ideas, clothed in familiar expression, could be readily adopted and employed towards revolutionary ends" (Kozhuvanal. 1999: 440).

Similarly, the Cuban revolution not only fought the unjust Cuban dictator, Batista, but saw as its enemy the neocolonial control the United States exerted over the entire region of Latin America. Cuba's struggle was a symbolic one, exemplifying the century-long

exploitative reality Latin Americans had had to endure, and its success was supposed to be a wake up call to all the other states to join in on it. Che Guevara's, amongst others, leadership was essential in bringing about the revolution. As a factor for Che Guevara's success, Pinto Soria identifies his unorthodox thinking, his way of assuming full responsibilities of his actions, and, most importantly, proposing solutions to the existing problems, while leading as an example (Pinto Soria, 1999). Moreno writes, a guerrilla fighter needs to be a "social reformer, a man who fully dedicates himself to destroy an unjust social order to replace it with something new" (Moreno, 1970: 116). However, in contrast to Gandhi, Che Guevara was looking for less of a fundamental change. Che Guevara did not consider modernization as destructive, rather, he rebelled against the inequalities Latin Americans had been subjected to since the arrival of Columbus. His goals were aimed at a makeover of the economic structure of Cuba, and a more equitable society towards a prosperous future. Looking towards the Soviet Union as an example, communism was a plausible response to the seemingly failing free market system in the West

Organization

Important similarities can also be drawn between the organizations of the two movements. Neither guerrilla warfare, nor civil disobedience, can be successful without mass support; indeed, the strength of both lies in the participation of the masses. While guerrilla warfare, due to its violent nature, needs to fight for its recognition and consequent mass support, nonviolent action does not need to hide, but its very strength lies in the open confrontation of the enemy. Essential to the mass struggle, however, is a center of a well-trained and disciplined group; in the Cuban case it is what Che Guevara coined the *foco* group in his renowned *foco* theory, comparable to Gandhi's *ashramites*. The *foco* is a small group of fighters, operating in the rural areas and under the protection of the mountains and

peasants, with supporters and sympathizers in the cities. They are what Guevara refers to as the subjective conditions that can speed up the revolutionary process; it is the vanguard, and also the political and military center of the revolution (Moreno, 1970). The masses start siding with the *foco* as their armed attacks bear fruit, and expose the government's weakness and likelihood to employ indiscriminate violence against its own population to maintain power. Che Guevara's attempt to lead Bolivia towards a successful revolution on the blueprint of Cuba's revolution shows the importance of a strong *foco*, and the necessary support of the peasantry. Bolivian's, compared to the Cubans, were not as disciplined and well-trained, and although the Bolivian mountains would have provided the ideal objective conditions, the peasantry did not side with the guerrillas – which would lead to Che Guevara's doom.

In contrast to Gandhi's civil disobedience, however, the employment of violence did not allow for an inclusive movement. Cuba's guerrilla group was mostly limited to physically fit men, determined to dedicate all their energy to one cause, putting themselves and their family in grave danger. While the group accepted some women into its ranks in the Sierra Maestra, the vanguard of the revolution was carried by one type of man, relying on the support of the population for survival and success. In addition, Che Guevara's and Fidel Castro's ideology – socialism, which turned into communism – further alienated a part of the population, and to an extent they also aimed for that alienation in order to establish the social order they envisioned. In this social order, the bourgeoisie was an obstacle to the construction of socialism, and due to their general rejection of agrarian reform widely did not support the revolution (Childs, 1995).

It is important to note that Gandhi's civil disobedience was far from peaceful and free of dangers. Again, nonviolent resistance is often being romanticized, without taking into account its great risks for the participant. Thus, the general conception that nonviolent

resistance is accommodating of all and everybody is not necessarily right. Women mostly constituted the support group for the men engaging in civil disobedience, and the social repercussions from participating could be detrimental; death, imprisonment, injury, hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and dismissal on the grounds of participation in anti-government movements are only a few consequences participants took upon them (Misra, 2014). Nevertheless, the confrontation between the resistance and the government does not require hideouts in the mountains and sporadic, hit-and-run attacks. Its strength lies in the open and direct confrontation, in which it ties the government's hands by assuming the moral high ground. To this effect "Gandhi held that anything that millions can do together is charged with a unique power, the magical potency of collective *tapas* (= asceticism) and moral fervor, the cumulative strength of generally shared sacrifices" (Kozhuvanal, 1999: 447). Both struggles, therefore, relied on mass support for their success; due to their violence or nonviolent nature, the form of the mass struggle differed.

Discipline

No matter the difference in organization of the mass struggle, central to both revolutions is an ideology informed by similar motivations and values. In both contexts, social reform in terms of a change in government or economic policies is not enough. What Gandhi and Che Guevara both strived for was a transformation of the revolutionaries themselves. Since both leaders had found their purpose in their respective struggles, they required equal dedication and discipline from their followers. An interesting parallel can be drawn between their ascetic lifestyles.

While in London, Gandhi, disillusioned with the West and its lifestyles that seemed incompatible with his values, started experimenting with dietetics by reducing his dietetic needs to the bare minimum, and self-reliance by learning how to cut his own hair, wash his

own clothes and deliver his own children (Gandhi, 1983). In South Africa and India he would then take these values to an extreme, first on himself and then requiring iron discipline that was closely related to soldierly conduct and restraint from his followers (Misra, 2014). Influenced by Jainism ascetic conception of *ahimsa* and other religious traditions, regarded preparation as important as the ‘battle’ itself (Kozhuvanal, 1999).

Maria Misra points to Gandhi’s obsession with values associated with soldiers and heroism, most likely to have originated in Gandhi’s early admiration of British military might (Misra, 2014). Other than a peaceful, non-structured lot, Gandhi’s *satyagrahis* were not only encouraged to the ascetic lifestyle Gandhi had taken on, but he also drilled them in an almost militaristic fashion: “*Satyagrahis* should train their bodies through strict religious austerities by taking vows of celibacy, control of the palate (...), and the determination to avoid ‘overstimulation’” (Misra, 2014: 703). To this effect Gandhi emphasized that “There must be no raw recruits at big demonstrations, and only the most experienced should be at the head” (Misra, 2014: 702). Indeed, superior discipline amongst the followers was necessary, as Gandhi saw it as the *satyagrahi*’s duty to die for the people, should the time arise (Misra, 2014). Following their leader, the *satyagrahis* were expected to place the struggle above all selfish/personal needs; in contrast to Che Guevara’s guerrilla movement, however, the *satyagrahis*’ ultimate goal was not necessarily political self-determination, but self-rule and self-restraint, out of which nationalism and self-determination would arise.

As already established, Che Guevara’s travels were characterized by a search for morality and a purpose. In contrast to Gandhi, Che Guevara did not lead a self-reliant life of non-attachment to material things because he wanted to and found spiritual and religious meaning in it; rather, he did so due to financial hardships. Both Forster and Castañeda repeatedly mention Che Guevara’s meager financial means and difficulty to find a job (Forster, 2010; Castañeda, 1998). Due to the lacking opportunities to work in the medical

field, he even grew dissatisfied, disillusioned and disinterested in his profession. In addition, his refusal to wear a suit and a tie out of principle did not help his unemployed status (Castañeda, 1998).

This is not to say that Che Guevara was necessarily lazy or weak. Ofttimes bedridden due to his frequent asthma attacks especially in high altitudes and humid environments, Che Guevara felt defeated by his own medical condition (Guevara, 2004). Nevertheless, he tirelessly challenged his will power and his body by climbing Machu Picchu, diving for a dead bird Granado had shot in a freezing cold glacier (Guevara, 2004), or took on inhumane shifts in the Atlantic Highway Project, unloading barrels of tar from 6pm until 6am (Forster, 2010), less out of monetary needs but because he wanted to be able to empathize with the poor, marginalized populations.

Once having joined Fidel Castro's group in Mexico, Che Guevara submitted himself readily to the harsh physical training that was to prepare the future revolutionaries for the struggle against the Batista dictatorship (Zulov, 2010). It was as if he had finally found his calling, his purpose in life – the accumulation of his intellectual development and thinking throughout his struggles had found an outlet: armed revolutionary battle. In Cuba's Sierra Maestra mountains, Che Guevara and Fidel Castro would insist on "train(ing) the men into a school of discipline, self control and endurance facing physical exhaustion are part of the everyday routine (...)" (Moreno, 1970: 122). This discipline would ensure a well-trained, deadly *foco* group. Similar to Gandhi's civil disobedience, the Cuban guerrilleros were trained to resist physically and mentally the hardships of a guerrilla life (Guevara, 1969). Che Guevara considered the ideal type of guerrilla as "a man who leads an ascetic life with impeccable morality with strict self-control and who seeks to introduce social reforms through personal example" (Moreno, 1970: 116). Surprising parallels can thus be drawn between the ideal *satyagrahi* and the ideal *guerrillero*.

Visualizing the difference between the violent and nonviolent movement, however, discipline was strictly enforced in the Sierra Maestra; three crimes were punishable by death: insubordination, desertion and defeatism”(Moreno, 1970: 121). The violent nature of the guerrilla struggle, thus, was not only applied against the enemy, but also against the own following should they deviate from the expectations.

The aforementioned comparison of both movements does not only show how similar they are but how perfectly they fit the definition of a revolution. So, the sole aspect in which the two revolutions differ is the use of violence and nonviolence. The question, thus, arises: Is violence a strategy or a tactic? If they are both revolutions that can be identified as ideological strategies, then violence and nonviolence are the tactics emerging from the strategies. The following is an attempt to understand this logic and explain why it is significant.

Tactics, strategy, and goal are largely analyzed in a linear form, which may allow for some well-fitting models and arguments, but for the most part disregard any flexibility in the subjective conditions of a social movement. While one could argue that both Gandhi's and Che Guevara's goal was self-determination, their strategies were nonviolence and violence, respectively, and their tactics were mass civil disobedience and guerrilla warfare, this paper has shown that tactic, strategy, and goal for these two movements are not as clean cut. Instead of identifying the employment of violence or nonviolence as a strategy, this paper shows that they were ideological choices, not decided upon following a clear rationale.

Although also limited, a better approach to strategy and tactics is the following: First, both Gandhi and Che Guevara had a vision, which was much greater than a simple goal. Instead of self-determination only, they envisioned a fundamental revolution (for the lack of a better word) of the social, political, and economic sphere. In addition, neither of the two considered

their struggle to be limited to India and Cuba only, but called for the internationalization of their struggles, as they saw their strategies as correct for countries and populations in similar conditions.

Gandhi's vision for India and for the entire world was so much bigger than only self-determination, or *swaraj* in its political connotation. Rather, Gandhi envisioned *swaraj* to come from within each and every individual, only then a truly just society can be established. Rudolf Heredia writes, "*swaraj* was not something given by the leaders, Indian or British, it was something that had to be taken by the people for themselves" (Heredia, 1999). The word's spiritual meaning of freedom, therefore, is important to precede the political meaning of freedom (Dalton, 1993). Political self-rule without individual self-rule, in Gandhi's view, is not sufficient. In addition, Gandhi also claimed the universal application of his civil disobedience. Much contested are his views on the Jewish holocaust, on which he is quoted saying: "(...) the Jews should have offered themselves to the butcher's knife. They should have thrown themselves into the sea from cliffs... It would have aroused the world and the people of Germany... As it is they succumbed anyway in their millions" (Teacher Forum, 2014). This quote shows the "almost magical powers" (Misra, 2014) he ascribed to his *satyagraha* and his deep conviction that nonviolence is superior to the violent struggle.

Che Guevara saw the Cuban Revolution to be only the beginning of a much larger movement: "The Cuban Revolution sounded the bell which gave the alarm" (Guevara, 1969: 99). His vision was the continuous struggle in all parts of the world threatened by US imperialism and the growing threat of the European Common Market (Guevara, 1969). Che allowed for and expected shortcomings to arise, and emphasized the need to never lose sight of the bigger struggle: "The outcome of today's struggle does not matter (...) what is definite is the decision to struggle which matures every day, the consciousness of the need for revolutionary change, and the certainty that it is possible" (Guevara, 1969: 102).

Second, the short-term goal of self-determination from the direct and indirect control of foreign powers is thus subordinated to the greater vision in both movements discussed.

Third, other than arguing that nonviolence and violence are the strategies of both movements, I would argue that revolution in its broader context is the strategy the two leaders employed to reach their goal and come closer to realizing their vision. Although the similarities between the two revolutions led by Gandhi and Che Guevara have been identified above, it is important to emphasize that each had its own unique ideology to it. An ideology, and the clear formulation of which, is essential, as revolutions strive for a fundamental change and restructuring of the status quo establishment. Without an ideology, there is no revolution; in other words, the strategy to achieve the goal and, in the long run the vision, would be lacking.

In contrast, Gallagher Cunningham discusses the “strategic choice” of a group seeking self-determination by hypothesizing that “groups use nonviolent strategies when there are barriers to conventional politics and when they anticipate being able to overcome the challenges to mobilization of a mass nonviolent campaign (...) and groups use violence when there are barriers to conventional politics, and when they anticipate being able to impose costs on the state through violence” (Cunningham, 2013: 294). However, Cunningham’s argument is an analysis of a cost-benefit-analysis, which assumes that leaders make a conscious decision of whether or not to employ violence in their movement. Cunningham does not take into account the fact that actors and leaders in movements are influenced by their ideologies. These movements (or campaigns, as she also calls them) are not rational politics, which can be weighed according to the extent to which costs can be afflicted on the existing government. The decision to fight against the established political system is not one like that. As this paper has shown, structure and agency need to be taken into account to understand the development of an ideology.

As Che Guevara points out, “The task of the revolutionary forces in each county is to initiate the struggle when the conditions are present, regardless of the conditions in other countries. *The development of the struggle will bring about the general strategy*”⁷ (Guevara, 1969: 98). Violence, therefore, is not the strategy, but the tactic. The strategy itself is the revolutionary struggle, on the basis of Che Guevara’s and Fidel Castro’s ideology and leadership. He claims, “The political and military chieftains (...) will learn the art of war during the course of the war itself. (...) the struggle itself is the great teacher” (Guevara, 1969: 94).

And finally, this then leads to the tactics of both struggles: nonviolence and violence, which are contingent upon the ideological strategy – the revolution. Instead of treating violent and nonviolent movements as different, therefore, they are two sides of the same coin. This contextualization may help future scholarship to study nonviolence and violence in comparison.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES

While the structural context did not leave Che Guevara with much of a choice but to opt for a violent tactic, Gandhi’s case is less clear. India’s context did not provide for nonviolence as clearly as Latin America’s did for a violent tactic. Thus, Gandhi’s agency appears to be of greater significance. Making use of Che Guevara’s argument that subjective conditions (=leadership) can accelerate revolution and provide for the ripening of objective conditions (=structural context) conducive to revolution, Gandhi’s agency and his formulation of an ideological strategy is exemplary (Guevara, 1969: 91). Barnes writes: “Without proper social conditions the society would regard the potential leader as an eccentric getting excited over nothing.” (Barnes, 1978:4). The same author goes on to cite

⁷ Emphasis not in original.

Friedland (1964): “While charismatics are continually being generated, their ‘charisma’ can frequently be unrecognized or indeed be considered peculiar, deviant, or perhaps insane” (Barnes, 1978: 4). Thus, there is a very fine line between a successful, charismatic leader and a lunatic. The ideas of a revolutionary leader, such as Gandhi, may seem crazy and over the top in times of political stability and prosperity. Are the structural conditions right, however, a lunatic with the same ideas can very well become the man or woman at the forefront of a revolution. As Jay Conger points out, “(charismatic) leaders (...) are masters of change, who can inspire us to take risks, and who possess a keen sense of strategic opportunity” (Conger, 1989: 8). Both Che Guevara and Gandhi realized the strategic opportunity that presented themselves, though in light of India’s more complex structural context, Gandhi was more successful in inspiring the Indians in South Africa and India to take the risk of noncooperation.

Considering the aforementioned finding that violence or nonviolence are tactical choices, the following topics are worthy of closer investigation in the future: The case studies mentioned in this paper both represent a struggle for self-determination from an exploitative, foreign power. What tactics, therefore, are most conducive in strategies other than revolutions with the goal of self-determination from a foreign power? What influences the tactical choices of a movement with the goal of stopping the practice of animal testing? Or an environmental movement aiming to decrease the deforestation in erosion-prone areas? All these movements have clearly defined goals and ideologically informed strategies; however, it would be interesting to investigate the tactical choice of using nonviolence or violence as a result of the ideological strategy in order to achieve a goal other than self-determination.

Second, Nelson Mandela would be a perfect intermediary case study between Gandhi and Che Guevara, as his tactics did not stay the same but switched according to outside events and influences, which impacted his strategy. Interesting to investigate would be the

exact reasons that led him to adopt one and abandon the other, and perhaps the findings would contribute to the delicate difference between nonviolence and violence.

In conclusion, the comparative study of violent and nonviolent movements remains fairly understudied. Much research needs to be done towards the understanding of tactics and strategies and the endogenous and exogenous influence on the decision to adopt one or the other.

Bibliography

- Barnes, D. F. (1978). Charisma and Religious Leadership: An Historical Analysis. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 17(1), 1-18.
- Castañeda J. G. (1998). First Blood: Navigating is Necessary, Living Is Not. *Compañero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara*. New York: Vintage Books. 44-77.
- Chabot, S. (2015). Making Sense of Civil Resistance: From Theories and Techniques to Social Movement Phronesis. In *Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on Nonviolent Struggle*, Kurt Schock (ed.). University of Minnesota Press, 2015.
- Checkki, D. A.. (1993). SOME TRADITIONS OF NONVIOLENCE AND PEACE. *International Journal on World Peace*, 10(3), 47–54. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20751913>
- Chenoweth, E. (2011). Think Again: Nonviolent Resistance. *Foreign Policy*, Retrieved from <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/24/think-again-nonviolent-resistance/>
- Chenoweth, E. (2013) The success of nonviolent civil resistance: Erica Chenoweth at TEDxBoulder.” YouTube video. Published November 4, 2013. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YJSehRIU34w>
- Childs, M. D. (1995). An Historical Critique of the Emergence and Evolution of Ernesto Che Guevara’s Foco Theory. *Journal of Latin American Studies* , 27(3), 593-624. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/158485>
- Conger, J (1989). *The Charismatic Leader: Behind the Mystique of Exceptional Leadership*. San Francisco: Jossey-Brass Publishers.
- Cunningham, K. G.. (2013). Understanding strategic choice: The determinants of civil war and nonviolent campaign in self-determination disputes. *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(3), 291-304. DOI: 10.1177/0022343313475467
- Dalton, D. (1993). *Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- DiSalvo, C. R. (2013). *M.K. Gandhi, Attorney at Law: A Man Before the Mahatma*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Doninger, W. (2009). *The Hindus: An Alternative History*. New York: Penguin. 382 - 546.
- Drinot, P. (2010). Awaiting the Blood of a Truly Emancipating Revolution: Che Guevara in 1952 Peru. In *Che’s Travels: The Making of a Revolutionary in 1952 Latin America*. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 88-126.
- Elena, E. (2010). Point of Departure: Travel and Nationalism in Ernesto Guevara’s Argentina. In P. Drinot (Ed.), *Che’s Travels: The Making of a Revolutionary in 1952 Latin America*. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 21-52.
- Forster, C. (2010). “Not in All of America Can There Be Found a Country as Democratic as This One”: Che and Revolution in Guatemala. In *Che’s Travels: The Making of a Revolutionary in 1952 Latin America*. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 210-244.
- Gabbert, W. (2012). The long durée of Colonial Violence in Latin America. *Historical Social Research*, 37 (3), 254-275. Retrieved from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41636608>
- Gandhi, M. K. (1983). *Autobiography*. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.

- Gerassi, J. (1967). Violencia, revolución y cambio estructural en América Latina. *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, 29(3), 407-427. DOI: 10.2307/3539104
- Gokhale, B. G.. (1972). Gandhi and History. *History and Theory*, 11(2), 214–225. <http://doi.org/10.2307/2504587>
- Guevara, E. (1969). *CHE: Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara*. R.E. Bonachea & N. P. Valdes (Eds.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Guevara, E. (2004). *Diarios de Motocicleta: Notas de Viaje por América Latina*. New York: Ocean Press.
- Heredia, R. C. (1999). Interpreting Gandhi's Hind Swaraj. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 34(24), 1497-1502. Retrieved from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4408073>
- <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/revolution>
- <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/revolution?s=t>
- <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/revolution>
- Immerman, R. H. (1980-81). Guatemala as Cold War History. *Political Science Quarterly*, 95(4), 629-653. DOI: 10.2307/2150608
- Kling, M. (1962). Cuba: Case Study of a Successful Attempt to Seize Political Power by the Application of Unconventional Warfare. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 341, 42-52. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1034142>
- Kozhuvanal, A.. (1999). Gandhi's Satyagraha and Its Roots in India's Past. In P. Brock & T. P. Socknat (Eds.), *Challenge to Mars: Pacifism from 1918 to 1945* (pp. 440–454). University of Toronto Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3138/9781442672796.34>
- Misra, M. (2014). Sergeant-Major Gandhi: Indian Nationalism and Nonviolent “Martiality.” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 73(03). 689-709. DOI: 10.1017.S0021911814000485
- Mohr, J. M. (2013). Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Harmful Leadership with a Moral Façade. *Journal of Leadership Studies*, 7(1), 18-21.
- Moreno, J.A. (1970). Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare: Doctrine, Practice and Evaluation. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 12(2), 114-133. Retrieved from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/177959>
- Pinto Soria, J. C. (1999). Orígenes Y Destino de las Revoluciones Latinoamericanas: Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Mario Payeras y Guatemala. *Mesoamérica*, 102-133. Retrieved from <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2401143>
- Rosenberg, T. (2015). How to Topple a Dictator (Peacefully). *New York Times* Accessed March 8, 2016. Retrieved from http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/a-military-manual-for-nonviolent-war/?_r=0
- Roy, G. C. (1976). *Indian Culture: The Tradition of Non-Violence and Social Change in India*. New Delhi: Ajanta Publications
- Rudolph, L. I., Rudolph S. H. (2006). *Postmodern Gandhi and Other Essays: Gandhi in the World and at Home*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 177-252

- Schell, P. A. (2010). Beauty and Bounty in Che's Chile. In *Che's Travels: The Making of a Revolutionary in 1950s Latin America*. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 53-87.
- Seferiades, S., & Johnston, H. (2012). *Violent Protest, Contentious Politics, and the Neoliberal State*. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2012.
- Sen, A. (2005). *The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Sharp, G. (2010). *From Dictatorship to Democracy*. East Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution.
- Sharp, G. (2012). *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*. New York: New Press.
- Stokes, W. S.. (1952). Violence as a Power Factor in Latin-American Politics. *The Western Political Quarterly*, 5(3), 445-468. DOI: 10.2307/442605
- Teacher Forum. (2014). *Famous Social Reformers & Revolutionaries 1: Mahatma Gandhi*. Lulu Press, Inc.
- Weber, M. (1968). *On Charisma and Institution Building*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.