India is Hungary for Trump: Contextualizing the Rise of Xenophobia in Right-Wing Parties

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India is Hungary for Trump:
Contextualizing the Rise of Xenophobia in Right-Wing Parties

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Abstract:

In a climate of intensifying globalization, the rise of political parties and leaders that espouse xenophobic ideas challenges the ability of the nation-state to live up to multicultural ideals. Such parties and their leadership prey on the fears of those who are part of the national majority group by claiming that “outsiders” entering or within the country pose a threat to their well-being and the sanctity of their national identity. While many scholars have analyzed xenophobic parties within specific countries or regions, few have sought to find commonalities over regional and cultural boundaries. This paper analyzes three contemporary instances in which xenophobic sentiments have become popular among right-wing party leaders from across the globe. Through analyzing the rise of Donald Trump in the United States, Viktor Orban in Hungary, and Narendra Modi in India, it provides insight into which circumstances allow for xenophobic rhetoric to become popular within right-wing parties. It demonstrates that while each country has a unique historical background, the rise of right-wing parties with xenophobic sentiments can broadly be interpreted as resulting from a combination of charismatic leadership with a perceived cultural/economic crisis, pressure from outside groups, and disillusionment over the policies or system represented by previous liberal leaders.

Introduction:

“...if we are driving a car, we are a driver, [or] someone else is driving a car and we’re sitting behind...then...a puppy comes under the wheel, will it be painful or not? Of course, it is. If I’m a Chief Minister or not, I’m a human being. If something bad happens anywhere, it is natural to be sad.”

Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India
Interview with Reuters on the 2002 pogrom against Muslims in Gujarat

“Those arriving have been raised in another religion, and represent a radically different culture. Most of them are not Christians, but Muslims...Europe and European identity [are] rooted in Christianity...Is it not worrying in itself that European Christianity is now barely able to keep Europe Christian? There is no alternative, and we have no option but to defend our borders.”

Viktor Orban, Prime Minister of Hungary
Editorial to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung September 9, 2015

“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending the best. They’re not sending you, they’re sending people that have lots of problems and they’re bringing those problems [to] us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists... And some, I assume, are good people.”

Donald Trump, US Presidential Candidate
Presidential Candidacy Announcement Speech June 15, 2015

Each of the above quotes is from a current leader of a right-wing party. The first, from India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, refers to the death of over 790 Muslims in religious violence that took place under his tenure as Chief Minister of Gujarat. Modi failed to deploy the
police in a timely manner, and when police arrived many stated they had no orders to intervene to stop the violence (Sing 2009). In the quote, Modi downplays the incident as being regrettable, but denies culpability, comparing the deaths of Muslims to being like hitting a puppy with a car. The second, from the current Prime Minister of Hungary refers to the over one million people seeking refuge in Europe from the violence of the Syrian Civil War (Nolan and Connolly 2015). The third, from Republican Presidential candidate Donald Trump, refers to over 11 million undocumented Mexican immigrants in the United States, most of whom came to the United States fleeing violence from drug cartels or seeking economic opportunity (Pew Reaseach 2015). Trumps frames them first and foremost, not as people, but as criminals, rapists, and drug dealers.

While each of these leaders targets a different group of people, all their rhetoric dehumanizes that group because of their identity, whether it is their religion, nationality, or race. They frame that group as not belonging inside the borders of their nation because of some aspect of who they are or what they represent. As sociologist Evelyn Nakano Glenn wrote:

“citizenship is not just a matter of formal legal status; it is a matter of belonging, which requires recognition by other members of the community. Community members participate in drawing the boundaries of citizenship and defining who is entitled to civil, political, and social rights by granting or withholding recognition.” (Glenn qtd. Hughey and Parks 2014:28)

National political leaders, who have the privilege of a platform and followership, have an immense power to shape conceptions of who can have both social and legal citizenship in their country. In an era when people are becoming increasing interconnected through social media, travel, markets, and globalized conflict, such dehumanization threatens cooperation across borders, and can perpetuate conflict within them. This paper seeks to better understand how leaders who espouse such divisive sentiments can become popular in such differing contexts. Through examining the rise of right wing parties and their xenophobic leaders across the globe, it
shows the differing national contexts that shape xenophobic right-wing parties, while shedding light on commonalities that allow for their rise across geographic and cultural boundaries.

Literature Review: Xenophobia, Nationalism, and Right-Wing Parties

*Xenophobia and Nationalism*

Xenophobia is a concept that is inextricably linked to ideas of national identity and citizenship. The nation as an “imagined community,” is built upon shared understandings of political and social membership (Anderson 1991). Deciding membership in that community is a constant negotiation between groups competing over the power to define what it means to belong. Over time, through social interactions, definitions of “in-group”—people who belong, and are typically part of a majority group—and “out-group”—people who do not belong, and are typically part of a minority group—become built into conceptualizations of national identity.

While most modern democracies have adopted constitutions that define citizenship based upon civic rather than ethnic identity, these two definitions of the state—blood/ethnicity/religion vs. legal citizenship/pluralism—are in constant contention (Hjerm 1998; Omer and Springs 2013).

Definitions of xenophobia are still contested within the literature, and vary based upon social contexts and geography (Yakushko 2009). While acknowledging these differing understandings, for purposes of this paper, xenophobia is defined using the UNESCO definition: “attitudes, prejudices, and behavior that reject, exclude, or vilify persons based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society, or national identity” (UNESCO 2016). This broad definition allows for a greater comparison across regions, cultures, and disciplines. Other scholars may contest this definition and point to different cultural understandings of xenophobia, but, in large part, xenophobia has been used as an umbrella term,
which covers or intersects with ideas such as racism, ethnocentrism, ethno-nationalism, nativism, and extreme nationalism or patriotism (UNESCO 2016; Wimmer 1997; Yakushko 2009; Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Omar and Springs 2013).

The topic of whether or not xenophobia is “natural,” while still somewhat debated across disciplines, is more widely agreed upon within the social sciences. Some socio-biologists and primordialists contend that xenophobia could be a natural, protective human social adaptation built from a need to form groups with people like themselves, therefore out-casting others. However, among the social sciences, xenophobia is primarily understood a social reaction to perceived threats from changing power dynamics within and between nation-states (UNESCO 2016; Merkl and Weinberg 2003; Appadurai 2006).

Right Wing

The origins of the term “right-wing” can be traced back to the first stages of the French Revolution when the Assemblée Constituante was asked whether to allow the King to have veto power. Those who wanted to conserve the King’s power stood to the right, those who wanted change it stood to the left. From that point forward, to be referred to as politically “right” held connotations of desiring to conserve some sort of previous social order. However, definitions of right wing have changed based upon historic context. After the fall of fascism in Europe the 1980s, the rise of the New Right transformed what it mean to be "rightist" (Ignazi 2003).

Today, variants of the term “right-wing” can refer to many sub-cultures, parties and movements (Merkl and Weinberg 2003). Some equate right-wing with ideas of neo-conservatism, namely an emphasis on individualism and moral traditionalism, a skepticism about the growth of post-material movements like environmentalism and feminism, and an unease with the growth of multicultural society (Ignazi 2003). This unease with the growth of multi-
culturalism often leads neo-conservatives to claim that states have a "right to difference," or "national exceptionalism." They use this logic to justify xenophobia, rather than fall back upon previous socio-biological justifications (Ignazi 2003).

Another branch of right wing-ism is the "populist right-wing." Right wing populists depart from the traditional rightists in that they emphasize the importance of lower parts of society in their rhetoric. They often refer to the "common man," who has been disenfranchised by elitist institutions. In so doing, they tacitly acknowledge that by the "common man" they usually only mean poor members of a national majority group, who conform to their ideas of homogeneous national personhood. Right-wing populists generally are antagonistic toward big government institutions, especially when leaders have liberal tendencies (Ignazi 2003). The term "extreme" or "hard" right-wing can encompass aspects of all the aforementioned terms, but also connotes ideas of strong-nationalism, elements of racism or xenophobia, and a desire for a strong, militaristic state (Ignazi 2003). This paper will draw on these various aspects of modern "right-wing" thinking to characterize the leaders and parties in its three case studies, while acknowledging that moderations and variations exist within these classifications.

Debates and Theories about Xenophobia and Right Wing Parties

While scholars widely agree that xenophobic sentiment becomes more prominent when a majority group becomes threatened by the presence of an “other,” there is much debate over how that “other” becomes perceived as a threat in the first place. The following section synthesizes common theories that have been used to explain both how xenophobic actions and rhetoric become popular generally, as well as circumstances that allow right-wing leaders come to power.
Economic Explanations

Some scholars contend that xenophobia and the rise of right wing leaders is more likely during times of increased economic competition (Merkl and Weinberg 2003; Wimmer 1997; Yakushko 2009). These theorists claim that “out-group” minorities create increased competition for limited, collective resources, and cause xenophobic movements when the “in-group’s” control of these resources is threatened (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Yakushki 2009). According to a subset of this theory, “split labor market theory,” xenophobia is most likely to occur against groups that directly compete with the native population’s job market opportunities. For example, they low-skill low-wage native laborers only become xenophobic if immigrants entering the country are also low-skill and would work for lower wages, increasing competition for their jobs and lowering their wages (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011). However, critics of this theory hold that it does not matter whether or not an outside group poses a real economic threat, but only if they are perceived as doing so (Yakushko 2009; Wimmer 1997). Applied to the rise of right-wing parties, this school of thinking contends that in times of relative deprivation, right-wing parties that scapegoat economically competing “outgroup” populations for economic problems will be more likely to come to power (Merkl and Weinberg 2003).

Cultural Explanations

Rather than explaining xenophobia as stemming from economic forces, other scholars have favored focusing on culture and social institutions as the primary drivers of xenophobic attitudes. Functionalists, for example, contend that cultural differences from the native-born population can lead to increases in xenophobia, as groups become threatened by potential losses of political, economic, or social power (Wimmer 1997; Yakushko 2009). Others have critiqued this theory, explaining that measuring cultural difference of an "out-group" people is very
subjective. Instead, they argue that xenophobic movements are less attached to the cultural composition of the "other" group than they are about the perception of that “other” group is a threat. This threat can be symbolic if, for example, the native population believes that the “out-group” endangers their way of life with their moral, religious, or cultural beliefs (Yakushki 2009). In addition, some have critiqued the socio-biological overtone inherent in the functionalist school of thought, which, at least to some extent, must equate culture with natural traits people that cannot change or adapt in order to measure it as a cause (Wimmer 1997). Applied to right-wing parties, this means that right-wing leaders who are able to frame the minority population as a symbolic threat will be more successful in passing xenophobic policies.

Another school of thought, phenomenology, contends that xenophobia is the result of a crisis within the host society, and is a way for the host population to reaffirm its national "self" during times of identity crisis (Wimmer 1997; Appadurai 2007). These scholars contend that societies revert back to basic definitions of "self" and "other" as defined by national historic myths, which look back to a better and simpler time, when their way of life was not challenged by groups they see as outsiders. This sense of cultural nostalgia allows xenophobes to justify claims that the presence of new "others" is the cause of national problems, and policies that call for their disenfranchisement or removal (Wimmer 1997).

**Political Explanations**

Rather than focusing on the cultural explanations, others have sought to explain why xenophobic right-wing parties rise through focusing on power-dynamics. Discourse theory holds that discourse, and those who control it, have a great influence in deciding whether xenophobic parties become popular (Wimmer 1997). Some theorists in this school contend that the amount and type of attention that the media or high profile leaders give to xenophobic ideas shapes
whether these ideas will become popular and prevalent in political debates (Wimmer 1997). For example, an ill-proportionate media focus on extreme right-wing leaders can make them more popular, even if the coverage is negative. Similarly, negative coverage of groups targeted by xenophobic leaders can help to mobilize groups toward xenophobic right-wing parties and their leadership (Merkl and Weinberg 2003).

Rather than focus on institutions like the media, others have claimed that leadership within right-wing parties plays a large role in shaping whether or not these parties become elected. The "charismatic leader thesis" holds that media-oriented, charismatic leaders allow for the rise of right-wing party-members by giving a positive face to their movements. Charismatic leadership allows for the right-wing to rise because they create wide-spread, popular appeal that becomes associated with party and helps to bring coalitions together. Such leaders often become charismatic because their backgrounds or personalities resonate with national traditions or ideals (Merkl and Weinberg 2003).

Others contend that the greatest factor that determines whether a xenophobic party will succeed is political opportunity. They contend that right-wing parties tend to come to power when mainstream, more liberal opponents fail. For example, when mainstream parties fail to deliver on their promises or become perceived as corrupt, this opens the door for parties offering a viable alternative to those who want to protest the current state of affairs. Often these parties are right-wing, and pair ideas of strong ethno-nationalism with promises of economic growth (Merkl and Weinberg 2003)

**Integrated Approaches**

While all of these theories offer insight, many prefer to use a multifaceted framework to understand xenophobia. For example, the integrated theory of prejudice shows how multiple
types of perceived threats can lead to the creation of prejudices such as xenophobia. These include realistic threats (the loss of political/economic power), symbolic threats (challenges to morals or beliefs), intergroup anxiety (fear of difference), and negative stereotypes (that others are different, more aggressive, or inferior) (Yakushko 2009). Scapegoating certain groups as an integrated threat can help right-wing groups to become popular because this creates a concrete group to blame for more abstract societal problems.

Other theorists have shown how interdisciplinary processes such as globalization have contributed to the rise of xenophobia and right-wing parties because of the challenge they present to traditional understandings of the nation-state and national identity. Authors such as Arjun Appadurai contend that the increased interconnectedness of groups (including diaspora communities) and the growth globalized institutions such as banks and transnational corporations since the 1990s have contributed to xenophobia and ethnic conflict by creating fear and uncertainty within the nation-state. The knowledge of the increased interconnectedness of minority groups globally creates a fear of changing power dynamics, as national minorities come to represent larger, global majorities or ideas such as terrorism. It is through this logic that comparatively small numbers of minority groups can become the objects of fear, and are perceived as threats to the national well-being. Their identities and very existence represent a threat to the power of the state. As nation-states have lost dominion over their own territory to transnational forces and actors, majority groups become anxious about losing their traditional place of status and belonging within their own country. They begin to seek means of controlling forces outside of their control, often by lauding their dominion over minority groups within their nation-state. Groups that play on this "fear of small numbers," such as right-wing parties,
become popular as they are able to provide certainty and a group to blame for an increasingly complicated and changing world (Appadurai 2007).

Problems and Research Question:

While xenophobia and right-wing movements have been examined in a variety of ways, few studies have examined trends in the rise of xenophobia across geographic and cultural boundaries. While global institutions such as the UN recognize xenophobia as something needing to be addressed at a global level, going as far as to form international conferences to address xenophobia (ILO, IOM, OHCHR 2001), few studies on the topic are global in nature. While many articles address recent surges of xenophobia in India, Europe, South Africa, Japan, and the United States, for example, very few have drawn connections between them (Klotz 2016; Taras 2009; Yamaguchi 2013). Those that have primarily compare countries in the same region, or with similar cultural influences (for example Anglo-countries in different regions) (Hjerm 1998; Hogan and Haltinner 2015). Lack of research comparing otherwise dissimilar countries fails to acknowledge the possibility of there being connecting contexts which could explain the rise of xenophobic right-wing parties globally. Through comparing the rise of right-wing leaders and parties in seemingly dissimilar countries, this paper seeks to answer the questions: How have xenophobic right wing parties become electorally successful in countries across the globe? Which contexts allow for the increased popularity of xenophobic right wing parties?

METHODOLOGY:

The cases of India, Hungary, and the United States were chosen based upon the criteria that they are all contemporary examples of right-wing parties and leadership which have gained popular support. All three countries have democratic systems, and two--India and Hungary--have popularly elected right-wing national leaders. While the United States is an exception, in that
Donald Trump has not yet been popularly elected at a national level, he is the likely winner of the Republican Party's nomination. This indicates that Trump has at least the popular support within registered members of Republican Party. In addition, India, Hungary, and the United States are diverse examples in that they exist in three different continents, and have varying cultural influences. They did not share a colonial history (though the United States and India were both colonized by Britain, the nature of the colonization was different). The United States is considered a "Western" country, Hungary is considered an "Eastern/Central European" country, and India is considered a "Non-Western/Asian" country. All three countries also vary in the type of xenophobia they are experiencing, as will be shown in the subsequent sections.

Using secondary sources, the rise of right wing-leaders was examined within each country's historic context. The first section of each case study explores historic factors which have shaped xenophobic sentiments within that nation. The second section explores the contexts in which each party has come to power in the past, and analyzes the rhetorical appeals used by the party during those elections. For the purposes of this study, past success of the Republican Party were not analyzed, as the United States' two-party system differs from the parliamentary systems in Hungary and India, and popular discourse on Trump sees him as more representative of "Tea Party" and "Birther" movements than the establishment Republican party. As will be shown, the Republican Party has only recently appropriated the rhetoric of those two movements. The last section of each case study analyzes the most recent election of each leader, as well as how each leader's background has shaped their party's brand and appeal to voters. For the two case studies which have elected national leaders already it also analyzes xenophobic actions taken since their election. Using this analysis, common themes and explanations were
drawn in order to make a claims about more universal contexts which allow for the rise of xenophobic right-wing parties.

CASE STUDIES:

India:

**Historical Context**

**Pluralistic Democracy vs. Hindu Nationalism**

India is the world's largest democracy with an estimated 1,251,695,584 people. Of these, 79% are Hindu, and 14% are Muslim, 2.3% are Christian, and 1.7% are Sikh (CIA World Factbook 2016). While India is often highlighted for its pluralist and multi-cultural values inherited from the legacy of Gandhi and his non-violent social movement, this conception of Indian nationhood has been contested since its independence. The idea of India first and foremost as the Hindu motherland, manifested in the ideas of Hindutva, contradicts Gandhi's ideals, and challenges an accepting and pluralistic Indian state.

Hindutva, an ideology based upon the 1920s writings of Vinayak Savarkar, holds that that Hindus share a common nation, race, and culture. Hindutva forms the basis for the idea of Hindu nationalism, mainly that India is a nation that was built by and should serve Hindus (Bose 1998; Nussbaum 2007). During debates around independence, groups such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), founded by H.S. Hedgewar, an independence activist, contested Gandhi's non-violent path. Instead, they claimed non-violence only emphasized ideas of Hindu weakness. To the majority of this group the only way to win back the Hindu holy land was to fight for it and prove their dominance. Early writings from the RSS emphasize that anyone foreign to Hinduism should have to convert, or agree to its values, in order to be part of the nation (Nussbaum 2007). As written by prominent RSS member Golwalker: "There are only two
courses open to the foreign elements: either to merge themselves in the national race and adopt its culture, or to live at the sweet will of the national race...that alone keeps the national life healthy and undisturbed" (Golwalker qtd. Nussbaum 2007: 162). In 1948, Nathuram Godse, a member of the RSS, assassinated Gandhi, believing that in doing so he was protecting the purity of Hindu nationalism from a leader who was “pandering” to the Muslim minority (Dalrymple 2014).

The RSS, which continues to operate as quasi-military and social organization today, was a precursor Hindu Nationalist parties such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP was created in 1980 as a more moderate political branch of the Hindu nationalist movement, but has openly accepted Hindutva ideology since 1989 (DiSilvio 2001; Nussbaum 2007). Today, the BJP and RSS operate under an umbrella of political and social organizations representing the Hindu Nationalist agenda called Sangh Parivar (Nussbaum 2007). The RSS has roughly 40 million members, organized under 40,000 district centers across the country. In fact, Modi got his start in the RSS chapter in Gujarat, and he largely attributes the organization to shaping him as a leader. As he stated in an interview in 2014, “I got the inspiration to live for the nation from the RSS...I learned to live for others, and not for myself. I owe it all to the RSS” (Modi qtd. Dalrymple 2014).

Muslims as " Outsiders"

The perception of Muslims as outsiders also has a long history within India that can also be dated back to its independence. Though Gandhi never advocated partition, in 1947, as part of the terms of Independence, the British Raj was split into two separate territories—Muslim-majority Pakistan, and Hindu-majority India. This resulted in one of the largest and most bloody migrations in human history. By 1948, more than fifteen million people had been uprooted, and
between one and two million were dead. Subsequent wars between the two countries have caused even more bloodshed, and the deaths of hundreds of thousands. Today, the border between India and Pakistan is one of the world's most heavily guarded (Dalrymple 2014).

Partition has had profound implications on perceptions of Muslims as untrustworthy outsiders to Hindus in India today. Partition created an association between Muslims in India and negative feelings about Pakistan. Hardline Hindus in India often harbor feelings that Muslims who stayed in India are secretly spies or traitors to the state, and belong in Pakistan (Singh 2009). This plays out in the de-facto segregation of many Muslims to separate, less desirable neighborhoods in many more conservative states in India. For example, in Ahmedabad, a city in Modi’s home state of Gujarat, many Muslims live in the less well-off neighborhood of Juhapura, often referred to as "mini-Pakistan" (Singh 2009). In recent years, terrorist attacks by radical Islamic groups both abroad and in nearby Kashmir have furthered this perception of Muslims as dangerous outsiders (Appadurai 2007).

The Rise of the BJP

After independence, and until the late 1980s, India was almost exclusively ruled by members of the Indian National Congress Party (DiSilvio 2001). The Congress Party traces their roots back to India's independence and its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who studied directly under Gandhi. Linking back to Gandhi’s tradition, the Congress Party stands for a secular Indian state and acceptance of social pluralism. However, in recent decades, the dominance of the Congress Party has been challenged. The BJP has been able defeat opponents from the Congress Party in areas they traditionally won seats. In elections in 1989, the BJP was effectively able to take 85 congressional seats, and since has been increasing their numbers in
parliament. Their growing influence was most recently demonstrated in Modi’s election as Prime Minister Modi in 2014 (DiSilvio 2001).

Part of the reason scholars point to for the rise of the BJP since the late 1980s is their ability to exploit failures of the Congress Party. The Congress Party, as the establishment party, has been blamed by the BJP for the rampant corruption and economic failures in India since the late 1980s. After Nehru, subsequent Prime Ministers from the Congress Party largely come from his family or close associates, including his daughter Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv Gandhi. This has allowed the BJP to frame the Congress Party as a party of “princelings,” who use their association with Gandhi to keep themselves in power, and care little about the people (Dalrymple 2014).

Another successful strategy was politicizing events that brought conflicts between Muslims and Hindus to the forefront. After losing badly in 1984 elections when they took a more moderate stance on Hindutva, and loosened their ties with the RSS, the BJP shifted its strategy. It rejoined with the RSS, openly embraced Hindutva, and formed an alliance with the even farther right party, Shiv Sena. Further, it exploited issues that pitted the Hindu population against Muslims. One contentious issue that the BJP politicized was the Shah Bono Case. The Shah Bono Case was a Supreme Court Case in which a Muslim woman won the right to receive alimony from her divorced husband. However, the case was overturned after Parliament passed the Muslim Women Act in 1986, which denied Muslim women this right. The BJP took a strong stance against the act, framing the Congress as panderers to patriarchal Muslim men. More broadly, they used the case to point out contradictions of secularism and the Uniform Civil Code. In contrast, they framed themselves having a strong moral center as being as protectors of women’s virtue (Seshia 1998; Appadurai 2007).
In 1992, the BJP also widely publicized the Babri mosque issue in Ayodhya. Hindus claimed that a mosque on the Hindu holy site of the birthplace of the god Rama should be demolished, and the BJP signed a declaration of support for the cause. While the government never got behind the cause, in 1992, a group of radical Hindu nationalists destroyed the mosque. In the subsequent riots, about 2,000 people were killed and were 8,000 injured, but the police did little to intervene (Dalrymple 2014). The rebuilding of the area was a widely contentious issue. Eventually, in 2010, a court decided the Ayodhya land would be divided into 3 parts, with 1/3 construction of the Ram temple, 1/3 going to the Islamic Sunni Waqf Board, and the remaining 1/3 going to a Hindu religious denomination Nirmohi Akhara (Metacalf 2012). However, the BJP’s strong pro-Hindu stance on the mosque issue won them over 20% of the popular vote in the subsequent elections in 1996 (Seshia 1998; DiSilvo 2001).

Similarly, the BJP took a strong stance when, in 1999, Pakistan invaded the Northern state of Kashmir. During the violent conflict, the BJP even went as far as to threaten nuclear warfare. Then National Secretary of the Party, Modi publically stated, “we will respond to a bullet with a nuclear bomb,” showing a strong protectionist stance (Modi qtd. Dalrymple 2014).

Besides taking a strong pro-Hindu stance, the BJP has also exploited Congress government failures in order to frame themselves as providers of economic development. For example, after an earthquake in Latur in 1996, the BJP collectively donated a day’s salary to the relief efforts and mobilized members of Sangh Panvar to provide direct relief to the victims. This stood in stark contrast to Congress Party’s slow, minimal reaction to the event (DiSilvio 2001).

Similarly, today, a large part of the BJP’s success has rested on its promise to provide stability and economic growth. In the years prior to Modi’s election as Prime Minister, the Indian economy had a dismal performance. India’s economic growth dropped from 9% between 2010
and 2011 to less than 5% by 2014. In addition, the between 2004 and 2013, the price of food increased 157% (Dalrymple 2014). The BJP promises to provide electricity to every city, and that all of India will be “lit up like Gujarat,” (Modi’s prosperous home-state) (BJP website 2016). Despite having only 5% of India’s population, Gujarat accounts for 7.6% of India’s GDP (Economist 2015). Such promises for economic prosperity during economic downturns have made the BJP seem like an attractive alternative to the Congress Party.

In summary, the rise of the BJP and Modi since the late 1980s has rested on their ability to 1.) Effectively blame the establishment Congress Party for economic failures, government inefficiency, and corruption within the Indian State 2.) Connect these woes with the idea that the Congress Party lacks the moral center because of its secularism 3.) Bring contentious issues that pit Muslims against Hindus to the forefront while forming coalitions with other Hindu Nationalist groups 4.) Emphasize promises of development and economic growth (Seshia 1998; DiSilvio 2001; Appadurai 2007).

**Modi: Progroms, Beef, and Sedition**

Modi’s unique backstory has played a large role in the changing more recent perceptions of the BJP. In 2014, with Modi’s election, the BJP won a majority in the Lok Sabha, the first time any party has done so since 1984. In stark contrast to the “princeling” image of the Congress Party, Modi grew up the third of six children in a lower-caste family. Growing up poor, he worked at his father’s tea stand in order to make money after school. In his early teens, Modi joined the RSS, which is where he was first exposed to ideas of Hindu nationalism. In 1987, after finishing college, he joined the BJP, quickly rising to become its national secretary in 1995 (Dalrymple 2014). He went on to become the first non-Congress Chief minister to be re-elected
two times in his home state of Gujarat. He served in that role from 2001, until he was elected Prime Minister of India in 2014 (Dalrymple 2014).

Modi’s “rags-to-riches” tale, and the economic prosperity he has brought to his home state of Gujarat have inspired many to join to the BJP, seeing in Modi hope for their own future economic success. While prior to Modi, the BJP was largely perceived as an elitist party that drew votes primarily from the upper-castes, Modi has brought a wider swath of the population into the BJP’s fold (Jaffelot 2013).

Modi’s campaign strategies have emphasized ideas of high-tech populism and patriotism, overshadowing the divisive Hindutva rhetoric within his party. Modi’s election campaign was more personalized than previous ones. He projected himself as an embodiment of Gujarat’s success and the future success of the Indian nation (Jaffrelot 2013). His clean-cut image and archetypal saffron kurta embodied his promises to “clean up” the corruption in Indian politics, and restore morality to the state. Further, his promises to modernize India were reflected in campaign. Modi has tapped into social media with Twitter #ModiMantra, even going as far as to use over 100 holographic shows to communicate directly with constituents during his campaign. In doing so, he simultaneously made himself into both a “man of the people” and a symbol of modernity (Jaffrelot 2013). He has used the rapid industrialization of his home state of Gujarat as a model for what he can do for the Indian state (BJP website 2016; Jaffrelot 2013). Modi’s emphasis on economic development and modernity has overshadowed the xenophobic far-right elements within his party.

While Modi is inspiring to some, to others he represents a threat to ideas of pluralism and secularism. He has a close association with Amit Shah, the BJP’s party president, who was arrested, and later acquitted, for his role in the extrajudicial killing of accused Pakistani spy
Sohrabuddin Sheikh and his family (Jaffrelot 2013). However, one of the greatest stains on Modi’s image has been his handling of the 2002 riot in Gujarat. In 2002, a train carrying 58 Hindu pilgrims returning from Ayodhya mysteriously caught on fire. Hindus immediately claimed the incident to be an attack by Muslims, a characterization that Modi supported at the time (Dalymple 2014). In the subsequent backlash, 790 Muslims and 254 Hindus were killed, 2,500 people were injured non-fatally, and 223 more were reported missing (BBC 2005). As Chief Minister, Modi was slow to deploy the police, and when the police arrived many stated they “had no orders to intervene” (Singh 2009). While the Indian Supreme Court cleared Modi of having direct involvement in inciting the riots, he has been widely criticized for his neglect in the incident (Dalrymple 2014). When asked about the incident in interviews, Modi has whether refused to answer questions, or expressed only minimal remorse, comparing the incident to being regrettable like hitting a puppy with a car (Dalrymple 2014).

Since Modi’s election, far-right Hindutva elements in India have been emboldened. For example, in 2015, hardline Hindus resurfaced demands for a national ban on cow slaughter. A 50-year-old Muslim man was lynched after rumors that his family ate beef for dinner. That same year, 10 to 12 BJP legislators attacked a state assembly member named Abdul Rashid after he held a "beef party" in protest of the proposed beef ban (Mogul 2015). In February of 2016, the police arrested a college student, Kanhaiya Kumar, the president of J.N.U.’s student union, on sedition charges, after he was supposedly heard shouting, “Long Live Pakistan” at a rally protesting the BJP. The footage capturing Kumar yelling “seditious” sayings was later found to be doctored (Calamur 2016). While since the events Modi has stated that, “the country has to stand united. Harmony, brotherhood, and peace will lead us to development,” his neglect to
prosecute or subdue more radical elements in his party shows a shift in Indian politics (Gowen 2016).

_Hungary:_

**Historical Context**

**Ethnicity, Religion, Migration and Ideas of Hungarian Nationalism**

Ethnicity has played a large role in shaping Hungarian ideas of nationalism. Today, over 85% of the country recognizes as belonging to “Hungarian” ethnic group (CIA World Factbook 2016). After the Austro-Hungarian Empire fell in World War I, the Treaty of Trianon broke up the Hungarian territory. This left over 30% of Hungary’s population living in the newly formed neighboring states of Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine (Csepeli and Örkeny 1998). This included over 3 million people from Hungary’s major ethnic group—the Magyar (Ramet 1984). The Magyar ruled over the Hungarian territory for most of its history, and are linguistically unique compared to Slavic-speaking peoples in the region. The Treaty of Trianon led to a fear of absorption or loss of Magyar culture and language to surrounding Slavic population (Cseplei and Örkeny 1998). Since then, a large focus of Hungary’s immigration policy has been attracting Magyar people back to the Hungarian state, including creating a special worker programs for “ethnic Hungarians” (Ramet 1984). Most recently, a 2001 law provided special privileges to ethnic Hungarians living abroad who were seeking jobs in the fields of education, employment, travel, or culture, and gave them financial aid to alleviate costs to enter the country for work or study (Juhász 2003). Such laws reflect the desire to preserve Magyar culture, and bring back Hungarians separated from the country since the Treaty of Trianon.

Religion has also greatly influenced ideas about who belongs in the Hungarian nation. Catholic King Saint Stephan founded the Hungarian Kingdom in the year 1000 AD. Hungary’s
choice to adopt Catholicism and Calvinism separated it from the Eastern Orthodox Church under the Byzantine Empire. Later, Hungary suffered harsh treatment under the rule of Muslim Turks under Ottoman Empire from 1541 to 1699, which compounded ideas of a Christian state (Csepli and Örkeny 1998). During the Soviet era, the Catholic Church played a large role in resisting harsh Communist Party rule. For example, when the Soviet Union tried to secularize Hungary by removing Christian heroes from Hungary's national history, Catholics like Cardinal József Mindszenty took a strong stance against the Soviet Union. Mindszenty loudly promoted ideals of religious freedom, and fought for Hungarian independence until he was jailed in 1949, following a Soviet show trial (Ramet 1984). Today, such figures are viewed as national heroes and shape ideas that Hungary has and should be a Christian state. The Catholic religion remains one of the few ways to identify ethnic Hungarians living in the primarily Orthodox surrounding states (Ramet 1984).

Xenophobia against people of non-Christian or non-Magyar origin has a long tradition in Hungary. For example, from 1938 to 1944 legislation barred Jews from citizenship, making them non-persons, and leading deportation and mass killing of over 600,000 Jews (Csepli and Örkeny 1998). Under Soviet rule from 1947-1989, Hungary's borders were almost completely closed, except for brief period in 1956 following an anti-Soviet uprising led by Imre Nagy (Juhász 2003). However, after the fall of the Soviet Union, xenophobic sentiments in Hungary became especially prominent as it transitioned from being an emigrant nation to receiving large numbers of immigrants from Eastern Europe. Its central location made it a point of transit for migrants from Eastern satellite nations who sought to move West. Reflecting its experience today, in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Hungary had to build refugee camps to accommodate the massive influxes of migrants. Xenophobia against immigrant groups from
surrounding Eastern European states was especially prominent during this time. Slavik migrants from the Soviet Union, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Translyvania were seen as competing against the native population for jobs, and were often subjected to xenophobic attacks (Csepli and Örkeny 1998).

Seeing non-ethnically or religiously Hungarian peoples as outsiders has continued through the post-Soviet era. Hungary maintained geographic limitations to adopting the United Nations’s 1951 Status of Refugees until 1998. Until that year, refugee status in Hungary could only be granted to migrants from Europe (Cahn 2016). In 1993, Hungary passed the Minorities Act, which encouraged these groups to form their own associations and local governments based on cultural autonomy rather than integration (Csepli and Örkeny 1998). Such acts show an institutionalization of the belief that state should primarily function for ethnic Hungarians, and that others should be on their own.

Public opinion about immigration and non-Christian peoples has been consistently negative in recent decades. A study from 1999 found that 73% of Hungarians believed that immigration increased criminality, and 52% believed immigrants took jobs from locals. A survey of over 3,000 Hungarians conducted in 2000 found that over two-thirds of respondents thought that there were “too many foreigners in Hungary” (Nyíri 2003). Studies using surveys from 2005-2009 found that 24% of Hungarians wouldn’t want to live near foreigners and 29% viewed Jews as unfavorable to the nation (Horn 2015). Recent terrorist attacks in Europe have also likely negatively influenced perceptions of Muslims migration within Hungary. These have included the bombing of Madrid’s commuter rail in 2004, the suicide bombing of London’s subway in 2005, and the firebombing of Charlie Hebdo (a French magazine that published a cartoon of the prophet Muhammad) in Paris in 2011 (Onyanga-Omara 2015). Such events, as well as existing
biases against non-Christian and Hungarian people have made it politically expedient to espouse negative opinions about immigration (Nyíri 2003).

**The Rise of Fidesz**

The Fidesz Party was founded in 1988 as the party of the Hungarian anti-Soviet youth opposition movement. However, its ideological standing has shifted over time. At its conception, it was a more liberal party representing libertarian, anti-communist views, and the youth. After performing badly in elections in 1994, it changed its stance to reflect more socially conservative views, and utilized the right-wing voting bloc. Subsequently, Fidesz, under Viktor Orban, became the ruling power in Hungary for the first time in 1998 (Andor 1998).

The Fidesz Party's success in 1998 hinged on its ability to exploit failures in the Hungarian Socialist Party, and shift support from other right-wing parties. In the 1998 elections, Fidesz campaigned on promises to aid the poor by restoring benefits that were abolished by Socialist Party, and restrict the influence of foreign capital in the Hungarian economy (Andor 1998). Fidesz focused on the Bokros economic stabilization package, which was passed 1995 under the Socialist government, and had lowered interest rates on foreign capital, while cutting social benefits. Though the Hungarian Socialist Party was expected to win in 1998 because the country had experienced significant economic growth, the first round of voting was marked by low voter turnout, with only slightly greater than half the population going to the polls. This played to Fidesz’s advantage, as most of the third-place right-wing candidates dropped-out, giving their constituencies to Fidesz. Fidesz beat the Hungarian Socialist Party in a narrow race of 134 to 148 mandates (Andor 1998).

Fidesz remained in power until 2002 when it lost to a leftist coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party and Liberal Free Democrats. The center-left coalition continued to win the
majority in national elections until 2010, when Fidesz gained a landslide victory, winning over a
two-thirds majority in Parliament, and it has remained in power since (BBC 2015).

A large reason for Fidesz’s large victory in 2010 was the perceived corruption of the
Hungarian Socialist Party. In 2006, after the Hungarian Socialist Party won elections, a tape was
leaked wherein the newly elected Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány admitted to having lied on
the campaign trail about Hungary’s economic success. Gyurcsány was quoted saying "… we
screwed up. Not a little, a lot. No European country has done something as boneheaded as we
have… Evidently, we lied throughout the last year-and-a-half, two years. It was totally clear that
what we are saying is not true” (Gyurcsány qtd. BBC 2006).

After the statements aired, thousands of Hungarians took to the streets to demand
Gyurcsány’s resignation. Gyurcsány promised to resign if the reputation of his party could not
recover in four years (BBC 2006). Two years later, the 2008 global financial crisis struck
Hungary harder than any other Eastern-block European country, shrinking its economy by nearly
5% in 2009. Gyurcsány resigned with an 18% approval rating, the lowest ever for a Prime
Minister since Hungary became a democratic nation (Freeman 2009). Orban, who already had
associations with strong, moral Christian leadership from his first term as Prime Minister,
quickly filled the gap left by Socialist Party in the 2010 elections.

Another reason that Fidesz was so successful in 2010 was its ability to adopt rhetoric of
emerging hard-right wing parties. In the years prior to the 2010 elections, Jobbik, a hard-right
student-based party was gaining momentum. In 2006 it captured only 2.2% of the popular vote,
but by 2010 it had captured over 16%. Jobbik’s platform rested heavily on anti-Gypsy, anti-
Semitic rhetoric, and a strong anti-European Union stance. By adopting the strong ethno-
nationalist rhetoric of Jobbik, Fidesz was able to co-opt some its voter base, and keep itself in power (Nagy, Boros, and Vasali 2013).

In summary, Fidesz’s electoral success since its beginnings has hinged on its ability to 1.) Draw from the rhetoric and electoral blocks of other right-wing parties in Hungary 2.) Blame its Socialist Party opponents for economic and social woes 3.) Exploit the mistakes and corruption within the Socialist Party 4.) Offer itself as a strong, nationalistic alternative using its history tracing back to 1989 (explored in the subsequent section).

**Orban: Censorship, Fences, and the Refugee Crisis**

Viktor Orban’s background has also played a role in the rise of the Fidesz Party. Orban was one of the founding members of Fidesz when it was only a student organization 1988. However, he didn’t arise as the group’s undisputed leader until 1989 when he gave a speech at the re-burial of Imre Nagy. Nagy was the executed leader of the failed 1956 uprising against the Soviet Union, and is widely considered a national martyr. In his speech, Orban called for a full removal of Soviet troops and free and fair elections, both of which occurred by 1991 (Encyclopedia Britannica 2016). Orban’s legacy dating back to his 1989 speech has associated him with ideas of patriotism and Hungarian nationalism.

However, since his rise to power in 2010, Orban has been criticized for having authoritarian tendencies. In 2011, Orban and his supermajority tried to pass a law that would require media outlets to the register content with the state. After public and international outcry, the proposed law was scaled back, but Orban has continued to be criticized for influencing the content of state-owned media (Dunai 2014; Encyclopedia Britannica 2016). Since the law passed, Klubradio, a liberal radio station, has lost its broadcasting frequency, and Index.hu, a
popular online news portal, was banned from reporting on parliament after giving critical coverage (Economist 2012).

In addition, Orban has been criticized for making Hungary's new constitution more exclusive and religious. In 2011, Orban used his supermajority in Parliament to pass a series of laws that allowed for the adoption of a new constitution. The new constitution places special value on Christianity, stating that “[Hungarians] recognize the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood” (Fundamental Law 2011). The new constitution was criticized by groups such as Human Rights Watch for its religious rhetoric, which only includes traditional families as being protected by the state (Human Rights Watch 2011). The constitution states:

Hungary shall protect the institution of marriage as the union of a man and a woman established by voluntary decision, and the family as the basis of the survival of the nation. Family ties shall be based on marriage and/or the relationship between parents and children (Fundamental Law 2011).

Such rhetoric establishes a heteronormative definition of family and marriage, which ties back to Christian values.

Most recently, Orban has been criticized for his harsh handling of the Syrian refugee crisis. Orban has vocally refused to take Syrian refugees, especially those who are Muslim. As a frontier member of the Schengen free travel zone, Hungary has been an entry point for the over one million refugees seeking refuge in Europe from Syrian Civil War coming through the Balkan route (BBC 2016; Figure 1). According to European Union law, if denied asylum in their country of destination, refugees are to be sent back to their country of entry to be processed. In response, in fall of 2015, Orban ordered a barbed wire fence to be built along the Serbian and Croatian borders and patrolled by the military to prevent refugees from entering the country (Feher 2015).
Treatment of refugees who are able to enter Hungary has been especially harsh. In September, police were deployed to stop refugees from boarding trains in Budapest bound for Germany, which has adopted an open-door policy for Syrian refugees. Orban has used Dublin Agreement, which is a part of EU-law that requires anyone who wishes to travel in the borderless Schengen free-travel zone to hold a valid passport and visa, to justify his actions. Orban’s government has held refugees at ill-equipped camps to be processed, until German Prime Minister Angela Merkel temporary lifted the Dublin agreement to allow refugees to travel there (Nolan and Connolly 2015).

Orban’s use of religion as the reason to deny refugees entry to Hungary, and Europe more generally, has drawn his harshest criticism. For example, at news conference with the President of the European Council, Orban stated:

“We don’t want to and I think we have a right to decide that we do not want a large number of Muslim people in our country. We do not like the consequences of having a large number of Muslim communities that we see in other countries, and I do not see any reason for anyone else to force us to create ways of living together in Hungary that we do not want to see.” (Orban qtd. Mackey 2015)

While whether or not Orban’s reaction to the refugee crisis has gained him additional support from hard-right constituents is yet to be seen, it is clear his actions have come at a high human cost for those fleeing areas stricken by violence from the Syrian War.

United States:

Historical Context

Racism, Nativism, and Islamophobia in the United States

Racism and nativism have a long history in the United States. Racism was first used in the United States as an ideological justification for the enslavement of non-European peoples during the colonial era, but continues to perpetuate views of non-Whites as inferior outsiders
today (Fields 1990). Dating as far back as the 1860s, political parties like Dixiecrats used racialized political messaging to portray non-Whites as hyper-sexual, violent, and lazy to try to prevent abolition. Today, political appeals to racism in the United States rarely take such a blatant form. Instead, they are often more subtle, such as attacks on affirmative action programs which are set up to equalize economic opportunities between minorities and Whites, or “political correctness,” that prevents Whites from lauding their privilege over minorities (Hughey and Parks 2014).

Similarly, nativism—the belief that the culture of native-born or established inhabitants needs to be protected from national outsiders—can be found in politically-organized groups in the United States as far back as the early 1800s. Groups such as the Know-Nothing-Party, American Protective Association, and the Ku Klux Klan, all adopted nativist rhetoric to justify their appeals (Knobel 1995). Inherent in their claims was a belief in the myth that the United States is not a nation of immigrants, but a nation of “founders.” As such, all those who came after the Anglo-Saxon-Protestant forefathers were expected to adopt their cultures, habits, and beliefs to conform (Huntington 2004). The ideologies of nativism and racism in the United States shape beliefs that Protestant White males are the “standard” and “normal” representatives of American citizenship (Hughey and Parks 2014: 83).

Islamophobia has only more recently come to the forefront in American discourse. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, fear of Muslims and Arab peoples grew within the country. Both public symbols of Islam such as mosques as well as “Muslim-looking” (usually Arab or Southeast Asian) peoples became unprecedented victims of backlash in the form of hate crimes. President Bush’s subsequent invasion of Iraq relied heavily on rhetoric that framed Muslim rulers and Arab peoples as being barbaric threats to ideals of freedom and virtue. Patriotism in
the post 9/11-era has relied heavily on the “other”ing of Muslim and Arabs (Khawly 2004). Such rhetoric continues to shape American perceptions of Muslims today.

**The Rise of the Birthers and Tea Party**

The Birther and Tea Party Movements can both be seen as recent manifestations of racism and nativism in the United States. The Birther movement began in 2008 as a reaction to the popularity of Black presidential candidate Barrack Obama. The Birther movement demanded that Obama release a copy of his birth certificate in order to prove he was eligible to run for president. Birthers believed that Obama was born in Kenya, to a Kenyan father, and, therefore, ineligible to run for president. However, their demands did not end after Obama released a copy of his certificate that year (Hughey and Parks 2014). One of the lead voices that kept the movement alive was Donald Trump, who leveraged his celebrity status to keep the issue in the news cycle. After hearing news that Obama had released his birth certificate Trump stated:

> “We have to see. Is it real? Is it proper?...Because it’s rather amazing that all of a sudden it materialized…The word is, according to what I’ve read, is that he was a terrible student when he went to Occidental. He then gets into Columbia, and then gets to Harvard…How do you get to Harvard if you’re not a good student…Why doesn’t he release his Occidental records?”

(Trump qtd. Hughey and Parks 2014: 45-46)

Such demands blurred line between ideas of de facto and de jure citizenship. Obama had not only to prove that he was a legal citizen, but also that he had earned his place as a presidential candidate, and was not the “free-riding” affirmative action recipient. In addition, Birthers claimed that Obama could not be American by pointing to his middle-name--Hussein. Using his middle name and pictures of Obama wearing traditional garb on a visit to Kenya as evidence, Birthers claimed that Obama was a "secret Muslim." Lumping together claims about Obama's identity and politics to frame him as a free-riding, Muslim, Socialist, Birther's claimed that
Obama's identity disqualified him for the White House. While the Birther movement largely died out after Osama Bin Laden was assassinated under Obama's presidency (Hughey and Parks 2014), elements of its "othering" rhetoric can still be seen in this year's election.

In tandem with the Birther movement was the rise of Tea Party movement. The Tea Party began to organize after Obama's election in 2009, under the pretense that a political revolution like the 1776 Boston Tea Party was needed to protect America from the growth of big government. As the Tea Party movement grew, it split into several sub-organizations. Each of these sub-organizations can be linked to nativist or race-based groups. For example, TeaParty.org, ResistNet, and the Tea Party Patriots all have connections to the Minutemen, a paramilitary nativist group which sends armed guards to protect against illegal immigration (Hughey and Parks 2014: 31). While the Tea Party movement claimed to primarily be promoting a return to traditional small-government of the founders, its rallies quickly revealed racialized ideology. For example, many protesters carried signs of portraying Obama as an African witchdoctor, or that read "Save White America" (Hughey and Parks 2014). In taking on such rhetoric, the Tea Party showed fear that “White America” was losing its social and economic prowess. Such claims resonated with reports that America would become a majority minority nation by 2044, meaning over half the population would belong to a non-white ethnic group (Hughey and Parks 2015; NPR 2015). The rhetoric of the Tea Party showed a protest not only of the growth of government, but the changing identity of the nation, represented by President Obama.

In contrast to the Birther movement, the Tea Party more officially entered institutionalized politics. The Tea Party began to support candidates in the run-up to mid-term elections in 2010, in hopes of derailing any legislation that Obama tried to pass. The Tea Party
endorsed 139 congressional candidates in 2010; 50% of their endorsed candidates were elected to the Senate and 31% were elected to the House. It is estimated that the Tea Party increased Republican voter turnout for the House elections by 2.7–5.5 million votes (Madestam et al. 2013). The effectiveness of the Tea Party to mobilize previously non-voting, mostly poor, White American people allowed its rhetoric to be absorbed into the GOP. An echo of the Tea Party's rallying cry "Take It Back, Take Your Country Back" can be found Trump's popular campaign slogan "Make America Great Again" (Hughey and Parks 2014: 31; Trump campaign website 2016).

**The (Potential) Rise of Donald Trump: Violent Rallies, Walls, and Muslim Bans**

Unlike the previous two leaders, it is unknown whether or not Donald Trump will have electoral success. However, the potential for Trump to become president of the United States is a very real possibility. As of this publication date, Donald Trump has just become the only Republican left in the primary race.

Donald Trump diverges greatly from the stories of Modi and Orban in that he has had little experience within his party before running for president. Through Trump flirted with the idea of running for president in 2000 as third-party candidate in Reform Party, he quickly withdrew his bid (Diamond 2016). Prior to running for office, Trump was known primarily as being an archetypal, flashy businessman. The multi-millionaire son of New York real estate developer Fredrick Trump, Donald Trump made a career of putting his namesake on various real estate development projects including golf courses, hotels, sport complexes, and, most famously, the golden Trump Towers in New York City. Trump further gained name recognition and association with wealth and business by appearing on various entertainment programs, including creating his own show *The Apprentice* from 2004-2015, and writing his own book *The Art of the
Deal. Trump has effectively used his personal wealth to self-fund his campaign and frame himself as a political outsider. Further, he has used his celebrity status and name association to justify claims that he will be able to "run America like a business" (Scherer 2015). Such claims likely appeal to former Tea Partiers who are frustrated by the growth of government, and want to see a businessman in the White House.

While Trump's association with business and wealth has helped him to portray himself as the pinnacle of the American success story, his willingness to be "politically incorrect" has attracted a large portion of his voter bloc. Like the Tea Party, Trump's biggest voting block is among poor, uneducated, White males. According to a study by the Washington Post, Trump’s support remains strongest among those who earn less than $50,000 a year, those who identify themselves as conservatives, white non-evangelicals, and those who do not have a college degree (Ross 2015). In a time when many White Americans feel threatened by the rise of post-material movements like feminism and Black Lives Matter, and changing demographics from immigration (Scherer 2015), Trump personifies desires of many White Americans who want to be able to "say what they want," even if that is at the expense of a marginalized group. As one supporter stated: “He doesn’t care who he pisses off…He says what everyone wants to say but are afraid to say.” (Trump supporter qtd. Scherer 2015: 108). Trump’s adoption of common language has helped make him relatable to lower-class, uneducated Whites, despite his upper-class background.

Since running for president, Trump has adopted many xenophobic policies and shown authoritarian characteristics. One of Trump’s most controversial plans has been to build a wall along the entire US-Mexico border. In his presidential announcement speech, Trump stated:

“I would build a great wall, and nobody builds walls better than me, and I’ll build them inexpensively. I will build a great, great wall on our southern border."
And I will have Mexico pay for that wall. Mark my words” (Trump qtd. Drew 2016).

When former Mexican Vicente Fox bluntly stated on Fusion, “I’m not going to pay for that f#@%ing wall,” Trump replied in the following Republican debate, “The wall just got 10 feet taller, believe me” (Trump qtd. Drew 2016). Trump claims that he will make Mexico pay for the wall by holding remittances to Mexico, and increasing fees for all visas for Mexicans, but this is unlikely to make Mexico pay for the estimated over $15 billion it would take to construct such a wall (Trump campaign website; Drew 2016). In addition, his platform claims he will create a nationwide e-verify program, increase penalties for visa overstays, triple the number of Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers, and, end birth-right citizenship for children of undocumented immigrants (Trump campaign website 2016). In justifying such harsh positions, Trump has widely used claims that Mexican immigrants are criminals and job-stealers. Such characterizations scapegoat immigrants as both the cause social problems and economic woes of working class Whites, who have not seen the benefits of recent US economic growth since the recession.

Trump has also played on fears of Muslims in the United States following terrorist attacks in Europe. In December of 2015, Trump called for a nation-wide “shut-down” of Muslims entering the United States. Trump wrote:

"Until we are able to determine and understand this problem and the dangerous threat it poses, our country cannot be the victims of horrendous attacks by people that believe only in Jihad, and have no sense of reason or respect for human life."(Johnson 2015)

Not only that, but he has called on increasing US intervention in Syria by “bomb[ing] the sh-t out of the Islamic State” and “tak[ing] out their families,” which would be a blatant violation of international law (Trump qtd. Scherer 2015).
Perhaps more worrisome has been Trump’s unwillingness to denounce violent and radical elements at his rallies. For example, in an interview with CNN Trump refused to disavow the endorsement of David Duke, a White nationalist and ex-Ku-Klux Klansman, claiming that he “didn’t know him” (Bradner 2016). Further, Trump has encouraged violence against protesters at his rallies, saying that he would pay for the court fees for those who punch protesters, though he later took back his promise (Bump 2016). Failing to condemn the violent and radical elements at his rallies legitimizes xenophobic rhetoric and violence against political opponents.

However, adopting such positions and making such controversial remarks has gotten Trump a swarm of media coverage. According to data from media firm mediaQuant, Trump has over twice the free media coverage of his leading Democratic opponent Hillary Clinton, and over five times the coverage of his former Republican opponent Ted Cruz (Confessore and Yourish 2016; Figure 2) This free coverage has increased name and brand recognition, and helped to mobilize groups that would not normally vote to vote for him in primary elections.

In summary, Trump’s success thus far has relied on in his ability to 1.) Mobilize the voter base of previous xenophobic movements like Birther movement and Tea Party 2.) Brand himself as being the pinnacle of the American success story, and equate his wealth with expertise and know-how 3.) Get ill-proportionate media coverage by making controversial, often racist and xenophobic remarks or claims 4.) Portray himself as a political "outsider" with simple, tangible solutions for the anxieties facing poor Whites who fear changing demographics and power structures within the United States.

Analysis:

While each country's unique history has shaped how xenophobia has manifested itself within the right-wing party, several common contexts for the rise of xenophobic right wing
parties are found in this research. The first is that economic downturns or perceived economic injustice open up political opportunities for xenophobic right wing leaders to come to power. In India, a decade of rising food prices led to the increased salience of Modi’s promise to make India a high-tech modern country, and bring electricity to every Indian city. This promise of economic prosperity was the driving force of Modi’s campaign, making it overshadow xenophobic tendencies within the BJP. In Hungary, the 2008 financial crisis increased discontent with an already perceived-to-be corrupt Socialist party, and led to increased salience of Orban's message to return Hungary to its former glory, using rhetoric appealing to its Christian roots. Similarly, in the United States, economic inequality paired with existing racism and nativism after the election of Obama led to increased salience of Trump's message that groups such as Mexican immigrants and "cheating" China are to blame for poor economic opportunities for uneducated Whites.

In addition to economic woes, in Hungary and the United States, the perception of an imminent cultural crisis opened political opportunity for xenophobic right wing parties. Both Orban and Trump's rhetoric has largely been a reaction to a perceived cultural shift within their societies. In Hungary, fear of losing Christian Magyar culture dating back to the Treaty of Trianon paired with recent influxes of refugees representing a different religious and cultural background have made xenophobic appeals politically expedient. Similarly, in the United States, the election of President Obama, a Black man, to the highest office in the United States, paired with changing demographics from immigration, has led to a fear among Whites (especially poor Whites) that they are losing their privileged place in society. This had led to increased salience of appeals that promise to "take the country back" to its former glory, namely by removing or oppressing groups that they believed to have caused the changes in the first place. Both Orban
and Trump promise to return their nations to the greatness of the past, in which power structures and demographic trends better favored the majority group. It is possible that this perceived cultural shift is understood as more imminent in Hungary and the United States than India because xenophobia in both these two countries has been mostly geared toward immigrants, whereas xenophobia against the Muslim population has existed in India since Independence, but further empirical research on this topic is needed before concretely making this claim.

In addition, in both Hungary and the United States, xenophobic rhetoric was adopted by leaders of right wing parties because of the influence of harder right wing social movements or parties within each country. In Hungary, the increased popularity of the extremely xenophobic party Jobbik led Orban to adopt its rhetoric and positions in order to co-opt its base. In the United States, Trump has largely taken on the xenophobic rhetoric from the Tea Party, likely because of its past electoral success in 2010.

In contrast, in India, Modi has risen to power largely despite xenophobic the tendencies within his party, as this type of rhetoric has become less popular in recent years as India has opened up to the global economy under his neoliberal vision. However, this does not mean that farther right groups have not had an influence on the BJP. Under Modi, more radical members of the BJP, influenced by farther right groups such as the RSS and Shiv Sena, have become emboldened, leading to an increased demands for controversial Hindutva polices, like banning the slaughter of cattle.

In all three cases, disillusionment with a liberal party helped to give rise to the right-wing alternative. In India, the failed economic policies of the largely dynastic Congress Party helped to increase the salience of Modi’s contrasting neoliberal underdog message, and allowed the BJP to frame the Congress Party as uncaring "princelings." Hungary is perhaps the most obvious
example of disillusionment leading to the rise of the right wing. Ferenc Gyurcsány's leak stained the image of his party and disillusioned people with idea of secular liberalism in general. This led voters to seek a moral, strong, and religiously rooted leader like Orban as an alternative. In the United States, where the election is still unfolding, this is more difficult to observe. However, at least among Trump supporters, Obama's failure to deliver growth which benefitted the uneducated lower classes has allowed Trump promises that he is a businessman who knows how "get things done" to become more resonant.

Finally, the leadership of all three parties was able to effectively embody a national desire, or connect themselves to an idealized founding principle of their nation-state through their personal backgrounds. In India, Modi's identity and clean-cut image made him embody hopes that India could go from "rags to riches" through neoliberal economic development. In Hungary, Orban's connection to the national martyr Imre Nagy helped him to embody Hungarian ideals of the strength, conviction, and perseverance, which people felt were needed after the country fell victim to corruption and economic woes. Finally, Trump, through his celebrity status, promoted himself as having reached the pinnacle of American dream.” In addition, Trump’s outlandish antics and outbursts have given him disproportionate media attention, and gotten positive feedback from his constituents. To his constituents, Trump likely represents the absolute freedom that many Americans desire and feel they are losing because of rising post-material movements like Black Lives Matters and the feminist movement which demand “political-correctness.”

Future Research Suggestions:

In order more directly understand the reasons why people vote for right wing parties, more empirical studies involving polling on voter motivations is needed in all three contexts in
order to make comparisons. In addition, comparing other examples of xenophobia across the globe such as in Japan or South Africa for example could add to richness of this type of comparative thinking. Finally, comparing rhetoric in the speeches of right wing leaders across the globe could be useful in understanding the types of appeals being used by right wing leaders. This study largely relied on quotes from Western media outlets because of language barriers, but future studies with translators could add to discourse on this topic. Such studies could more directly prove or contest the claims made in this paper.

Conclusion:

Regardless of how xenophobic right-wing leaders have come to power, their rise is worrisome in a time when the world and its people are becoming increasingly interconnected. Groups that build walls—both literal and metaphorical—between groups threaten the ideals of global cooperation, and help to perpetuate conflict within countries. Understanding the contexts that allow these types of leaders and their parties to come to power may help us to identify when populations will become vulnerable to divisive rhetoric, but this is only one step in understanding the root causes of xenophobia.

In theory, in democratic societies, people have the agency to choose leaders that they believe reflect their best interests. While India and Hungary have both already elected right-wing leaders and have seen the results—arrests on sedition charges, violence on the floor of parliament, censorship of the media, a religiously restrictive constitution—citizens of the United States still have a choice to make. They can choose to build walls or build bridges. They can choose to be governed by fear, or to embrace a changing and complicated world. To quote Ernest Becker:
“It is [fear] that makes people so willing to follow brash, strong-looking demagogues with tight jaws and loud voices: those who focus their measured words and sharpened eyes in the intensity of hate, and so seem capable of cleansing the world of the vague, the weak, the uncertain, the evil. Ah to give oneself over to their direction—what calm, what relief.” (Becker 1971)
APPENDIX:

Figure 1: Number of Migrants Entering Europe Illegally (Balkan Route highlighted purple)

(BBC 2016)

Figure 2: Free vs. Paid for Media Coverage by Candidate in Millions of Dollar by March 2016

(Confessore and Yourish 2016)
Work Cited


