(UN)LOCKING THE DOOR? Forces behind Responses to Refugee Crises in Germany and Denmark

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(UN)LOCKING THE DOOR?

Forces behind Responses to Refugee Crises in Germany and Denmark

International Affairs Capstone Project
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Abstract
This paper answers the question of why countries react to refugee crises the way they do and what factors contribute to that response. Germany and Denmark, countries that are similar in many ways, have shown different approaches to refugees and reactions to the Syrian Refugee Crisis. Germany made international headlines last year when it opened its borders and Chancellor Angela Merkel called on other EU-countries to do the same. Denmark, on the other hand, while having developed an extensive and internationally recognized refugee resettlement program, has attracted international attention with a new asylum law that can be seen as a deterrence tactic. This paper argues that the countries’ historical evolvement and past experience with migration and refugees as well as the composition of the countries’ political and social sphere have shaped their responses.

1. Introduction
Refugee crises are an inherent part of the international system. For thousands of years, people have fled their homes for political, cultural, economic, or physical reasons. While the most obvious and most widely recognized reason is political persecution, war and oppressive regimes are not the only times people are displaced or decide to move. Social marginalization and the lack of being able to participate in the social sphere have caused people to leave their countries. Similarly, economic marginalization and the inability to find employment due to discrimination or a lack of skill has led thousands to look for a better life in a usually more developed country. The term “economic migrant” is part of a controversial debate revolving around the legitimacy of migrants’ refugee status. Finally, water scarcity, food insecurity, and climate change displace people and cause climate refugees to move to other regions that are environmentally more stable.
All of these types of refugees and/or migrants can be found around the world, either currently or in the past: Syrian refugees fleeing from the Assad regime (political), Jews fleeing Germany during the Second World War (cultural/religious and political reasons), people from the Balkan countries looking for work in central European states (economic), and Maldivians preparing for having to leave their islands due to climate change (climate). The fact that people are fleeing does not only raise the question of why they are fleeing or how these push-factors can be eliminated. These people are also going to other countries and the other question that arises is how these destination countries will react to the newcomers. It is in this context that this paper is framed.

I argue that analyzing destination countries’ responses and the forces behind those responses is vital for understanding refugee crises and their implications for the host community and the refugees themselves. Issues and policy decisions that are related to refugee crisis such as the question of integration or labor market inclusion can be better addressed when both the refugee and the country itself is aware of the factors that have shaped the response. These responses are shaped by a variety of factors. For this analysis to be successful and accurate, it is necessary to take a holistic and interdisciplinary approach, analyzing each response in a historical, legal, political, cultural, economic, and societal context. Countries’ responses are shaped by their historical exposure to immigration and their demographic makeup, the political climate and specific leaders, as well as social movements and external events.

2. Literature Review

When writing on refugee crises one must take a holistic approach to the topic, exploring different themes and drawing on historical, political, and economic developments. There is a vast
amount of literature on refugees in general: stories about refugees’ lives in camps and shelters (Hugh Eakin and Lauren Feldinger’s *Flight from Syria: Refugee Stories*; 2015), books on integration approaches and resettlement policies (Susan Eaton’s *Integration Nation: Immigrants, Refugees, and America at its Best*), and historical analyses of past refugee crises (Malcom Proudfoot’s *European Refugees: 1939-52; 1956*). In addition, much has been written on topics that are related to migration and refugees such as right-wing movements and multiculturalism. An example for this type of literature is Leonard Weinberg and Jeffrey Kaplan’s *The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right* (1998) which discusses a topic that is often related to the broader ‘refugee’ discourse. Many books and articles focus on specific asylum policies in selected countries such as the book *Germany’s EU policy on Asylum and Defence*, edited by Gunther Hellmann (2006). Finally, another example is *European Multiculturalism Revisited* (2010) edited by Alessandro Silj. This collection of essays takes a country-specific approach to multiculturalism. Among the countries analyzed are France, Great Britain, Germany, and Denmark.

The concept of “multiculturalism” deserves a separate discussion in the context of refugee crises. A country that is experiencing a high influx of refugees always has to address the question of whether, and if so, how to integrate migrants. Multiculturalism is one approach. It can be defined as “the embrace of an inclusive, diverse society,” viewing each citizen’s culture as equal (Malik: 2015). But it needs to be seen in context of assimilation and integration. Assimilation is achieved when an immigrant “renounces his or her claim to a distinct national, ethnic, cultural or religious identity and blends into the identity of the host country” (Silj: 2010, 1). Integration, on the other hand, “is a loose concept that stands between the other two [assimilation and multiculturalism] and is common to both … it assumes that the immigrant fully
participates in the socio-economic life of the host country” (Id.). The discourse on multiculturalism does not only include books on different theories of multiculturalism, such as George Crowder’s *Theories of Multiculturalism: An Introduction*, but also pieces criticizing the concept and analyzing its consequences (Susan Moller Okin’s *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women*?). Finally, case studies discuss multiculturalism in different countries. Examples for this approach are Alessando Silj’s *European Multiculturalism Revisited*, John Berry, Rudolf Kalin, and Donald Taylor’s publication *Multiculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada*, and Rochana Bajpai’s article *Multiculturalism in India: An Exception*?. In the midst of a refugee crisis, multiculturalism is almost always part of the political debate, prompting journalists and politicians to either promote a multicultural model or call it a failure.

Looking at the very basic topic of refugee terminology and definitions Emma Haddad’s book *The Refugee in International Society* (2008) serves as a starting point. Haddad poses three questions: *Why do we get refugees? When did the ’problem’ emerge? And how can the refugee ever be reconciled with an international system that rests on sovereignty?* In the first part of the book, she takes a theoretical approach to the role of the refugee in the international community by placing it into the broader international system theories of constructivism and The English School (inevitable and unintended consequences of the system of separate sovereign states). She continues by analyzing the term ‘refugee’, pointing out that there are a variety of phrases used to describe migrants such as “economic migrants, illegal immigrants, asylum-seekers, displaced persons, political refugees, bogus asylum-seekers, stateless persons, B-refugees, de facto refugees” and more (Haddad: 2008). Haddad also thoroughly analyzes the role of refugees in a historical context, pointing out the different policies and their evolvement. The third and final part of the book focuses on a more contemporary study of refugee policies including EU policy.
Apart from Haddad’s book, it is journal articles that deal with the topic of migration and refugees and especially more recent developments. Here the newly-founded German journal *movements- Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung* (movements – journal for critical migration and border regime research) offers an important contribution to the existing literature. The piece *Zwischen nützlichen und bedrohlichen Subjekten* (in English: inbetween useful and threatening subjects) by Philipp Ratfisch analyzes the Stockholm Program, “a five-year plan outlining the EU’s justice and home affairs policy from 2010 to 2014” (Ratfisch: 2015). He specifically discusses the ways migration is addressed, from desired legal migration to undesired illegal migration and finally the case of the refugee. He thus offers an analysis of refugee terminology and categorization on a supranational level in form of an EU plan.

Another article published in *movements, Kämpfe ums Recht* (Struggle for the Law) by Matthias Lehnert, discusses recent developments in European refugee and border protection law. He analyzes different European political frameworks starting with the Qualification Directive that was implemented in 2003 and reformed in 2011. The Qualification Directive’s starting point is the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees which also served as the basis for the distinction between ‘real refugees’ and ‘economic refugees’ (Lehnert: 2015). Generally, the Qualification Directive discusses the term ‘refugee’ and its subsequent legal status in the EU. Among the other discussed policies are the Reception and Procedures Directive and its reforms which establishes the concept of ‘secure third states’ whose migrants are not considered refugees (Lehnert: 2015), as well as the Dublin III-Agreement. According to this agreement, a refugee or asylum seeker can only apply for asylum in one state which should generally be the first EU-state he enters (Lehnert: 2015).
Many articles and books/book chapters have been written on asylum policies and refugee history in specific countries. The above-mentioned book *Germany’s EU policy on Asylum and Defence*, edited by Gunther Hellmann (2006) serves as an example, as does the book chapter *Deportation Deferred – ‘Illegality,’ Visibility, and Recognition in Contemporary Germany* in “The Deportation Regime,” edited by Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz (De Genova and Peutz: 2010; 245-262). Additionally, the article *Die Asyldebatte in Deutschland: 20 Jahre nach dem ‘Asylkompromiss’* (The Asylum Debate in Germany: 20 years after the “Asylum Compromise”) by Hendrik Cremer looks at the basis of asylum law in Germany, migration statistics, the political and societal climate in relation to the asylum debate, as well as addresses the controversial status of the ‘economic refugee’ (Cremer: 2013). An article that is even timelier than the other country-specific literature is *Representing the “European Refugee Crisis” in Germany and beyond: Deservingness and difference, life and death* by Seth Holmes and Heide Castaneda. Writing in light of the Syrian refugee crisis and its impact on Europe, the authors specifically look at Germany’s response and, rather than focusing on the legal and policy framework, pay special attention individuals’ responses (Angela Merkel) as well as popular movements (PEGIDA and Refugees Welcome). Moreover, the article also discusses the implications of terminology: ‘refugee’ versus ‘migrant’, ‘voluntary migration’ versus ‘involuntary migration’, and ‘political’ versus ‘economic’ refugee.

As the Syrian refugee crisis is a widely-discussed and current topic, many new journal articles examine the general issue and themes that are related to it. Many of the articles deal with countries’ responses; here, not only Syria’s neighboring countries are analyzed, but also European countries which have been receiving refugees who take the route over the Mediterranean Sea or via Turkey and the Balkan states. Francois Heisbourg’s article *The
Strategic Implications of the Syrian Refugee Crisis (Heisbourg: 2016) as well as Philippe Fargues and Christine Fandrich’s piece The European Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis – What’s Next? (Fargues, Fandrich: 2012) deal with the crisis’ effects on Europe. While Fargues’ and Fandrich’s article was published in 2012 and much has changed since then, it historically examines displacements from Syria and Europe’s humanitarian and political response to the Syrian refugee crisis – at least up to 2012. By providing statistics, the article thus gives important background information. Heisbourg’s very recently published article does not offer as much background information but places the Syrian refugee crisis into Europe’s current political and economic situation. It discusses “Europe’s triple crisis” (Heisbourg: 2016): Greece’s economic dilemma, the rise of radical right-wing and left-wing movements in EU member states, as well as the UK’s uncertain role in the EU (Heisbourg: 2016). In addition, the article briefly examines Germany’s role in the crisis, Merkel’s open-door policy, and the subsequent responses by other EU member states.

An even more specific approach is taken by Nicole Ostrand who examines four different countries’ responses to the Syrian refugee crisis in her essay The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Apart from comparing the different countries’ responses she also outlines the limitations of comparing different countries, pointing to differences in legal framework, definitions of ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum-seeker’ and their implications, and a lack of information available (especially in the US) (Ostrand: 2015). Moreover, Ostrand outlines the impact of the refugee crisis in Syria’s neighboring countries Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt as well as the international community’s response. Ostran thus offers a practical approach to the crisis,
examining actions taken (financial support or numbers of asylums granted, for example) rather than the legal framework or specific policies.

Additional country-specific analyses are also provided by the German Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (Federal Agency for Civic Education) in form of country profiles. While the profiles provide general information on the respective countries, the focus is on migration. Each of the country profiles discusses historical developments of migration, current migration trends, migrant demographics, irregular migration, integration, migration, and asylum policy, as well as current challenges and future developments (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung: 2015). The agency has a variety of country profiles ranging from Germany, other EU countries and the EU in general to the Gulf States, Japan, Senegal, and Brazil. Most of the country profiles were updated in 2015, allowing for a thorough analysis in light of the current Syrian refugee crisis.

I. Gaps and Problems

As the literature review has shown, the existing literature offers in-depth insight into the causes, developments, and impacts of refugee crises as well as discusses different policies and related topics. Analyses of refugee terminology is not as common but still exists, especially with a focus on the supranational level (EU, for example). Most articles focus on policy and legal framework rather than also looking at the political discourse in a certain country or region in form of party or leadership positions. Moreover, only very few articles (with Holmes and Castaneda’s *Representing the “European Refugee Crisis” in Germany and Beyond* and Heisbourg’s *The Strategic Implications of the Syrian Refugee Crisis* as exceptions) also consider popular opinion and political grassroots movements. Some of the articles do take a country-specific approach or compare different responses. But no clear explanation is given why a country reacted the way it did compared to another country. Combining both gaps it becomes
clear that what is lacking is a deeper analysis of how and why individual countries approach the issue of ‘the refugee’, migration, and integration. The approach, however, should not only take into consideration the country specific policies and legal framework but should also focus on political discourse, civil society organizations, and popular opinion. The research question I thus attempt to answer is: what shapes countries’ responses to refugee crises and why have countries that are similar in many respects shown different responses?

3. Potential Data Sources

Since the European refugee crisis is such a current event that has garnered much international attention, much data for the research project will come from media sources. Among the secondary sources, newspaper and magazine articles as well as TV documentaries or news clips will be used. Other sources will be policies, directives, and legal framework, party platforms, speeches, interviews, as well as mission statements of civil society organizations and platforms of popular movements (PEGIDA, Refugees Welcome movement). Statistics from institutions such as the EU, UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees), as well as other governmental or non-governmental institutions and news stories will ensure taking into account the most recent developments of the situation.

4. Methodology

I. The Syrian Refugee Crisis in a European Context

The Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011, displacing millions both internally and externally. As the map shows, most people fled to the neighboring countries Jordan, Lebanon,
and Turkey where refugee camps were quickly set up and grew as the war continued and the threat of ISIS displaced additional thousands. It was not until late 2013 and 2014, however, that Europe became directly involved. In September 2013, Germany was the first country to pledge to resettle 5000 Syrian refugees, the largest plan until then (syrianrefugees.eu, timeline). In October, 15 other countries joined Germany, although most pledges were between 50 and 500 people (Id.). Starting in 2014, more and more refugees tried to reach Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. Sunken boats on the Mediterranean killing hundreds of migrants made headlines across the world (Ma: 2015). The crisis intensified in 2015; especially the economically weak states Italy and Greece are affected, where most refugees arrive. European leaders met to address the issue and agreed on a budget of 2.4 billion Euros to aid countries dealing with the crisis (Id.).

Over the summer, refugees who have arrived in Greece and Italy started making their way through Europe. Countries such as Macedonia and Hungary were faced with thousands of people entering and passing through their territory (Id.). News stories of traffickers letting refugees suffocate in Austria and the picture of a 3-year-
old refugee on the shore of Turkey made international headlines and put additional pressure on
the international community to act. Since then, individual countries have responded to the crisis
in different ways. It is in this context that both Denmark’s and Germany’s responses will be
analyzed and compared. Before looking at each country’s response, however, it is important to
examine their demographics, relation to multiculturalism, immigration history, as well as legal
asylum framework.

II. Comparison of Demographics in Germany and Denmark

Germany and Denmark are both northern European countries known for their wealth and
welfare benefits. Denmark has been named the happiest country (Huffington Post: 2013) and it is
frequently used as an example of a political ideal (Moody and Rosen: 2016). Germany is known
as a European powerhouse and is seen as a leader not only in the EU but globally. The following
tables give a brief overview of Germany’s and Denmark’s society and economy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People and Society</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>German 91.5%, Turkish 2.4%,</td>
<td>Scandinavian, Inuit, Faroese,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>other 6.1% (Greek, Italian,</td>
<td>German, Turkish, Iranian, Somali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polish, Russian, Serbo-Croatian, Spanish)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>Protestant 34%, Roman Catholic</td>
<td>Evangelical Lutheran (official)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34%, Muslim 3.7%, unaffiliated</td>
<td>80%, Muslim 4%, other 16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or other 28.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>80.8 million</td>
<td>5.58 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Age</td>
<td>46.5 years</td>
<td>41.8 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth rate</td>
<td>-0.17%</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net migration rate</td>
<td>1.24 migrants/1000 population</td>
<td>2.2 migrants/1000 population</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Comparison of Denmark and Germany: People and Society
Source: CIA: 2016
### Comparison of Denmark and Germany: Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (PPP)</td>
<td>$3.8 trillion</td>
<td>$257.1 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP real growth rate</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>$47,000</td>
<td>$45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>4.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Comments</td>
<td>Opted out of adoption of Euro and EU immigration policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2 Comparison of Denmark and Germany: Economy
Source: CIA: 2016*

As can be seen from the tables, Germany and Denmark have much in common. Both are fairly homogenous societies, with Denmark being slightly more homogenous. Both are predominantly Christian with a similar Muslim minority. Germany’s population is slightly older than Denmark’s and, as the population growth rate implies, while Denmark’s population is slightly increasing, Germany’s is decreasing. Denmark has a higher net migration rate (no distinction between economic migrants, refugees, and other types of migrants, no distinction between lawful and undocumented migrants) which can be traced back to its refugee resettlement program and its small size.

Economically, the countries are very similar, disregarding the fact that Germany is the EU’s largest exporter and significantly larger than Denmark. The countries’ growth rates only vary by 0.1% and GDP per capita is only slightly higher in Germany. Similarly, the unemployment rate in both countries is low, at around 4.8%.

### III. Multiculturalism in Germany and Denmark

The concept of multiculturalism has a different connotation and meaning in Germany than it has in the US. While in the US multiculturalism is seen as positive and essential to a diverse society, in Germany it is perceived as “a failure of assimilating immigrants” and the emergence of isolated societies (Noack: 2015). Many Germans expected the guest workers that came to Germany in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s to leave. There was no incentive to integrate
them into German society and no acknowledgement of Germany being a country of immigrants (Phalnikar: 2005). When the migrants did not leave but brought their families, however, xenophobia towards immigrants grew and attacks by right-wing extremists became a common occurrence during the 1990s.

The problem of xenophobia has been generally worse in East Germany which has had a limited exposure to migrants and less experience with democratic governance. The German Democratic Republic did have a guest worker program with fellow socialist “brother countries” (such as Angola, Poland, Mozambique, Algeria, and Cuba), but the government did not allow for the workers to have close contact to German citizens (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, Deutschland: 2015). Most of the workers left after reunification, either because they chose to leave themselves or because their residence permit was not extended (Id.). Xenophobic sentiment after the fall of the Berlin Wall and attacks by right-wing extremists in the early 90s have resulted in foreigners avoiding moving to the former GDR Bundesländer, contributing to the lack of a diverse society (Phalnikar: 2005).

Berlin, on the other hand, has become an increasingly international and cosmopolitan city in recent years, incorporating “specific elements of immigrant cultures” (Lanz in Silj: 2010). However, there is still a clear distinction between cultures that are considered beneficial and good, and cultures that are seen as disturbing (Id.). Following 9/11, skepticism of multiculturalism grew and the question of whether Islam is compatible with European values and culture was common in the political discourse (Id.). In more recent years, German politicians have repeatedly denounced multiculturalism, most notably chancellor Angela Merkel. In 2010, Merkel said that multiculturalism had “failed utterly” (Smee: 2010). However, she also added
that Islam is “a part of Germany” (Id.). Five years later, amidst the refugee crisis, Merkel again announced that multiculturalism was a sham (Noack: 2015).

Similar to Germany, multiculturalism in Denmark has been a controversial topic. Because of Denmark’s homogenous society, the fear of the “Other” and the “foreign” is constantly present. Immigration and integration are highly politicized and “immigration, generally formulated as a challenge to Danish society, is either made an object of culture-oriented critique or treated as an economic problem” (Jensen in Silj: 2010). Jensen defines the Danish model of multiculturalism as being “structured around the notion of ‘sameness’, and thus on the notion of cultural assimilation, which in principle does not leave room for difference” (Id.). Compared to other European citizens, Danes are more attached to the local and regional level than the European or international one and also have more trust in their own institutions rather than European ones (Id.). Unsurprisingly then, Danes are more skeptical towards immigration and foreigners compared to other Europeans (Id.).

The rise of the anti-immigrant Danish People’s Party in the 1990s coupled with an increase of immigration of Muslims brought the debate of multiculturalism to the center of attention. Many Danes questioned the compatibility of Islam with Danish values (Ghasemilee: 2011). The Cartoon Crisis in 2005, where the publishing of caricatures in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten was met with protests, both violent and non-violent, in and outside of Denmark, has exacerbated the issue. Since then, even liberal politicians have denounced multiculturalism and called it a failure (The Economist: 2015).
5. Case Studies

I. Willkommenskultur and Asylmissbrauch - Germany’s Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis

As mentioned above, Germany was the first country to pledge to resettle 5000 Syrian refugees in 2014. In the summer of 2015, however, Germany would become directly involved in the crisis. The summer of 2015 was characterized by Germany’s open-door policy. By allowing refugees to cross borders into Germany from Hungary, Germany (in coordination with Austria) suspended the Dublin agreement which requires refugees to register and apply for asylum in the first EU country they enter. In one weekend, approximately 20 000 refugees arrived at train stations in Germany and later predictions projected that over one million refugees would enter Germany in 2015 alone (The World Post: 2015). In the following months, Merkel kept defending her open-door policy, advocating for a humanitarian Europe, and refugees kept arriving at train stations. German politicians started drafting new asylum policies intended to impose more restrictions to curb the massive influx of refugees.

Asylpaket I, also called Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetz (asylum procedure accelerating law) came into force in October 2015, switching back some of the aspects of a previous reform from 2014. Asylum seekers now have to stay in initial reception centers for up to 6 months. During that time they also have Residenzpflcht (obligation of residency), cannot work, and are given non-cash benefits rather than money (although the states and municipalities can decide on this aspect) (ProAsyl: 2015). Additionally, Albania, Kosovo, and Montenegro were declared “safe states”. Asylum seekers with a high likelihood of being granted asylum (people from Iraq, Eritrea, Syria, and Iran) can now attend integration courses during their
application process (Id.). As the restrictions imply, this law is especially geared at so-called “economic migrants”, people who allegedly come to Germany for economic rather than political reasons and who are not protected under the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention.

In November, Germany reinstated the Dublin regulation, with the exception of refugees coming from Greece (Deutsche Welle: 2015). Additionally, politicians started working on another asylum law, Asylpaket II. This new law came into force on February 26, 2016 and is the most recent asylum legislation. It is specifically directed at rejected asylum applicants and refugees with a low likelihood of being granted asylum. Among the goals of the law are to accelerate the asylum process, restrict family reunification, and fast-track deportations (Schuler: 2016). To meet these goals, “special reception centers” are to be set up where applications of refugees with a low likelihood of being granted asylum can be processed quickly (Id.). This applies to asylum seekers from “safe states”, for example. Refugees also need to have a “refugee ID” to receive full benefits. This ID card serves the purpose of preventing people from traveling through the country unregistered (Id.).

Another important change concerns family reunification. Asylum seekers under subsidiary protection now need to wait two years until their family can join them in Germany (Id.). Family reunification of recognized refugees, on the other hand, cannot be restricted due to EU-regulation. The new law also makes deportation of asylum seekers easier. Finally, the new legislation cuts benefits for refugees by up to 10 Euros as a form of financing language and integration courses (Id.).

The popular response in Germany has been multifaceted, from pro-refugee movements pressuring political leaders and people volunteering to anti-immigrant protests and attacks on refugee shelters. When Germany opened its borders and thousands of refugees arrived at train
stations, hundreds of Germans volunteered and donated clothing and food to an extent that the police in Munich had to ask people to stop bringing items to the train station because of a lack in storage space (Connolly: 2015). On the other hand, anti-immigrant protests and attacks on refugee shelters increased after Germany opened its border and many remain skeptical of Merkel’s position and accuse migrants of committing Asylmissbrauch (asylum abuse). The events in Cologne on New Year’s Eve, where hundreds of women were harassed and physically attacked, have increased xenophobic sentiment and raised more questions about the feasibility and validity of Merkel’s response (The Economist: 2016). Most recently, this has also been expressed by regional elections in multiple Bundesländer where the anti-refugee party Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) was able to gain between 12% (Rhineland-Palatinate) and 24.4% (Saxony-Anhalt) (Oltermann: 2016).¹

Germany’s asylum laws and reactions to the refugee crisis are complex and in constant flux. From 2014 to 2016, three different asylum laws have been passed and implemented. For many, 2015 has become the year of the refugee. Angela Merkel, by embracing her open-door policy, has changed the way people view Germany and she has left a mark as the “Crisis Chancellor”, Germany’s Mother Theresa, and TIME magazine’s Person of the Year 2015. Popular opinion in Germany has been diverse, with pro-refugee initiatives and volunteers on the one hand and anti-immigrant protests and attacks on the other. Despite the anti-immigrant protests and sentiment, the German political leadership has predominantly shown

¹ See Appendix Figure 3
a positive response to the refugee crisis in allowing thousands of refugees to enter Germany. Denmark, however, has not had the same reaction.

II. Ads in foreign Newspapers and Jewelry – Denmark’s Response to the Refugee Crisis

Denmark’s response to the refugee crisis has been different to Germany’s. The Danish Parliament passed new legislation in August 2015, cutting refugee benefits by 50% under the pretext of using the money for integration courses (The Local: 2015). One month later, the Danish government spent 30 000 Euros on an ad campaign in Lebanese newspapers. The ad points out the difficulties of being granted asylum and states the new restrictions the Danish government implemented (Frej: 2015). These include mandatory language courses, a longer waiting time for family reunification, and the 50% benefits cut (Id.).

The restrictions did not stop in 2016, when Denmark tightened its border controls on the German border in early January (Bilefsky: 2016). Later that month, on January 26th, the Danish Parliament passed a new asylum law that put Denmark in international spotlight and has been criticized both nationally and internationally. The new law allows the government to seize valuables from asylum seekers that are worth more than $1,450 (except for items with “sentimental value”, such as wedding rings). The government argues that this helps pay for the asylum seekers’ subsistence in the country (Delman: 2016). Additionally, the law extends the period refugees have to wait for family reunification from one to three years. The law can be seen as a strategic way of trying to deter refugees from coming to Denmark.
The popular response in Denmark has been varied. Some Danes have shown support for their government’s restrictions. According to a recent poll, 37% of voters were against issuing more residence permits to migrants (Delman: 2016). Stories such as a night club only allowing in people who speak Danish, German, or English or people putting up road signs pointing to Syria and Iraq have garnered international attention (Nelson: 2016; Reuters: 2016). Moreover, “70% of voters felt the refugee crisis constituted the most important issue on the political agenda,” which can also be seen as an explanation for the DPP’s success (Delman: 2016). Some Danes welcome the refugees with reservations, arguing that those who are in need (Syrians) should be granted asylum but those who are coming from other countries and for economic reasons should not (Nelson: 2016).

There have also been, however, positive responses. A recent Gallup poll shows that “a majority of Danes want to accept more refugees” (Haugbolle: 2015). Movements to support asylum seekers, provide aid, and collect donations were formed while Danish and European politicians questioned and criticized the government’s actions. Pro-refugee protests quickly mobilized and many people volunteered to provide assistance in form of language support or organizing meals (Haugbolle: 2015). When the Danish government announced that it would place an anti-refugee ad into Lebanese newspapers, a private initiative placed a pro-refugee ad in the British The Guardian (Varagur: 2015).

See Appendix Figure 7
In order to properly understand why the two countries responded the way they did, one must be aware of the countries’ historical experience with migration as well as the development of their asylum laws.

III. Comparison of Germany and Denmark’s Immigration History and Asylum Laws

**Gastarbeiter, Anwerbestopp and Aussiedler - Germany’s Immigration History**

Germany has always been a country of migration. Throughout the 17\(^{th}\), 18\(^{th}\), and 19\(^{th}\) century it was the destination of migrants fleeing from poverty and persecution (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung Deutschland: 2015). However, it was the 20\(^{th}\) century that would become the “century of the refugees” (Id.). Between the First and Second World War, refugees from Eastern Europe and Russia sought shelter from the consequences following the October Revolution in 1917 as well as pogroms against Jews (Id.). During the Second World War and under the Nazi regime, Germany would become a country of emigration. Up to half a million people fled from the Nazi’s racist ideology and persecution (Id.). The Second World War severely compromised Germany’s working population, leading to a major labor deficit in the 1950s when Germany experienced an economic boom.

Germany negotiated its first labor recruitment agreement with Italy in 1955; between 1960 and 1973, 7 more agreements would follow and about 14 million so-called “guest workers” entered the country (Id.). Only about 3 million stay in Germany but many who did stay chose to bring their family to Germany as well (Kaiser: 2015). The global Oil Crisis in 1973 resulted in the *Anwerbestopp* which put an end to the recruitment of foreign workers and completely curtailed the addition of guest workers from non-EEC (European Economic Community) countries (DOMID).
Germany experienced the next wave of immigration in the 1990s when, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the lifting of the Iron Curtain, hundreds of thousands sought refuge (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung Deutschland: 2015). Additionally, a huge amount of people who had left Germany during the Second World War, so-called Aussiedler, now returned to Germany. While most (3 million) arrived after 1987, between 1950 and 2013, about 4.5 million Aussiedler returned to Germany (Id.).

Migration has shaped and influenced Germany’s economy, society, and politics throughout centuries. The 20th century was most notably shaped by Germany’s recruitment agreements and guest workers. Refugees and asylum seekers did not play a major role in politics until the late 20th century.3

II. Guest Workers and Right Wing Populism – Denmark’s Immigration History

Similar to Germany, Denmark has been exposed to immigration throughout its history. Low skilled workers arrived from Poland, Germany, and Sweden from the second half of the 19th century until World War I and especially German immigrants have shaped Denmark’s development culturally and economically (Hedetoft: 2006). The different groups largely assimilated into Danish society (Id.). Denmark also experienced multiple waves of migration in the 20th century, although the numbers of immigrants were much smaller than those compared to Germany. Politically and religiously persecuted people sought refuge in Denmark during both World Wars and even after that, in the 1970s, refugees from Chile and Vietnam came to Denmark (Id.).

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3 See Appendix Figure 9
After the Second World War there was a high demand for unskilled workers, leading to guest worker programs that attracted people from especially Turkey, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, and Morocco (Id.). When Germany implemented its *Anwerbestopp* in 1973, so did Denmark. But with its accession to the European Community (now EU) in the same year, people from other EC countries were now able to move to Denmark. A significant amount of migration today consists of people moving to Denmark from other EU countries (especially ones that have recently joined) (Id.).

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Denmark experienced a wave of immigration from former Soviet countries. Temporary residence was granted to refugees from former Yugoslavian countries, Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan (Id.). However, as will be explained in the next section, the founding of the Danish People’s Party in 1995 strongly influenced immigration patterns and led to stricter asylum laws.

This section has shown that, similar to Germany, Denmark has experienced immigration in various forms (refugees, guest workers, migrants from other EU countries). Multiple waves of immigration shaped Denmark in the 20th century. The following part will discuss Denmark’s asylum and immigration laws.\(^4\)

**III. Asylkompromiss and Zuwanderungsgesetz - The Development of Germany’s Asylum Laws**

During the Second War and under the Nazi Regime, refugees were often not protected in foreign countries. For the politicians and constitutionalists of the new Federal Republic of Germany, the right to asylum was thus of high importance. This resulted in the adoption of an

\(^4\) See Appendix Figure 10
article in the constitution granting a right to asylum (UNHCR Last Exit Flucht). Article 16, Paragraph 2 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (from 1949) reads “Persons persecuted on political grounds shall have the right of asylum” (Id.). This is the only right in the constitution that applies to non-citizens and Germany is the only country where the right to asylum is embedded in the constitution (Castaneda in Genova and Peutz: 2010, 248)

Similarly, the constitution of the German Democratic Republic included an article on asylum protection, although it was not a basic right. Political committees decided on which refugee groups to accept (Id.). Over the years, foreigners from countries such as Greece, Spain, and Chile received asylum in the GDR (Id.).

In the reunified Germany of the 1990s, with the next wave of immigration from countries from the former Soviet Union, more and more people became critical of Germany’s asylum policy. This debate was accompanied with increasingly racist violence and radical right-wing rhetoric (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung Germany: 2015; UNHCR Last Exit Flucht). As Heide Castaneda points out, “by the early 1990s, a concern with Überfremdung (overforeignization) became a dominant discourse in public debates, and a wave of xenophobic violence gripped the nation” (Castaneda in Genova and Peutz: 2010, 248). Following the peak of asylum applications in 1992 (439,000 applications), the German government agreed on the so-called “Asylum-Compromise” in 1993 (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung Germany: 2015)

The 1993 reform of the asylum laws changed Article 16 of the constitution and implemented restrictions on the right to asylum. Asylum applicants who entered Germany via another EU country or a third country that recognized the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees now could not apply for asylum in Germany but had to apply in the state they first entered (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung Germany: 2015; UNHCR Last Exit Flucht). The EU
adopted this regulation that has now become known as Dublin-II in 2003 (UNHCR Last Exit Flucht). Additionally, the concept of “secure third states” was introduced. Refugees from countries considered “safe countries of origin” where there is (allegedly) no political persecution do not have a right to asylum (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung Germany: 2015). Initially, EU member states, as well as Ghana and Senegal were considered “safe states” (Id.). The new asylum reform resulted in a rapid decrease of asylum applications.

The next reform, the **Zuwanderungsgesetz** (Migration Act), came into force in 2005 under acknowledgment of the necessity of immigration for economic reasons (KNOW RESET Country Profile: Germany: 2013). The law recognized refugees persecuted by non-states under the Geneva Convention and introduced the concept of “subsidiary protection” (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung Germany: 2015). People under “subsidiary protection” do not have a formal right to asylum or refugee status but are allowed to stay in Germany temporarily if they are threatened by an existential danger of body, life, or freedom in their home country (Id.). The law also specified that asylum seekers that are granted refugee status receive a three year residence permit that also allows them to work (Id.). People under “subsidiary protection” are granted a one-year residence permit.

The asylum law was reformed in 2014, adding more “safe states” but also loosening some of the restrictions of the 2005 law. In addition to Ghana and Senegal, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Macedonia were declared “safe states” (Thurm: 2014). Asylum seekers had a residential obligation and were not allowed to leave the Bundesland (state). Under the new law, asylum seekers could freely move within Germany after 4 months of their entry (Id.). Asylum applicants could also work earlier than they used to: the waiting time to start working shortened
from nine months to three (Id.). Finally, asylum seekers were given money rather than non-cash benefits (Id.).

IV. Right-Wing Populism and Refugee Resettlement – Denmark’s Immigration Laws

After cutting its guest worker program in 1973, Denmark founded the Foreign Committee that drafted a new immigration law in 1983 called the Aliens Act. It was considered one of the most liberal asylum laws in Europe: §7 of the Aliens Act gives so-called “de facto” refugees who are not covered by the 1951 Geneva Convention the right to asylum and §9 makes family reunification a legal requirement for those who were granted asylum (Hansen: 2016). Additionally, rejected asylum applicants could appeal to a newly founded Refugee Board and the possibility of “spontaneous” entry did not require asylum applicants to have a passport or a visa (Id.). This liberal and humanitarian approach to refugees was widely recognized internationally and led to a sharp increase in asylum applications (Jaffe-Walter: 2016). While the number of asylum applications was just 332 in 1983, it increased to 8,698 in 1985 (Hansen: 2016).

With a significant increase in immigration in the 1980s and 1990s due to the Aliens Act and international conflicts in the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Israel), Somalia, and Yugoslavia, the Aliens Act was frequently amended. The “spontaneous” entry rule was abolished, asylum seekers were given less benefits, and the opportunity for family reunification was restricted (Id.). The issue of increased immigration and integration and acculturation was a wide topic of debate in the political sphere and during elections in the late 1990s and 2000s.

In 1999, Denmark passed the Integration Act which was the first of its kind in a Western country (Hedetoft: 2006). It gave responsibility of integration to municipalities and extended the integration period from 18 months to 3 years. In this time, refugees and immigration must learn
Danish, “familiarize themselves with Danish history, culture and society; acquire skills and competences needed to find jobs; and generally participate in everyday life” (Id.). One of the most controversial aspects of the Act was the monthly integration allowance which was “lower than corresponding welfare benefits Danes receive in comparable social situations” (Id.). The Danish People’s Party, an important force in driving more restrictive past and current legislation, justified the law and argued that one of the objectives of the law was also to discourage potential asylum seekers from coming to Denmark (Id.). The rise and nature of the Danish People’s Party deserves a closer analysis at this point.

The Danish People’s Party (DPP) was founded in 1995 and served to be a new right-wing force that further contributed to toughening the asylum laws in the late 1990s and 2000s and politicizing the issue of immigration. The Conservatives, supported by the DPP, took over the government from the Social Democrats in 2001 and ruled until 2011. In that time, it implemented a variety of laws further restricting immigration. Law no. 365 was passed in June 2002 and severely restricted immigration and rights of refugees. The “de facto” clause from the initial 1983 Act was abolished. Only refugees who would be subject to the death penalty, torture, or other inhumane or degrading treatment in their home country were protected (Hansen: 2016). While permanent residency was granted after 3 years according to the 1983 Act, the new law extended this period to 7 years. Requirements for family reunification were strengthened as well. The law also included a “24-year-rule” which mandates that Danes can only marry a non-EU or Nordic foreigner and settle in Denmark if both parties are 24 or older (Hedetoft: 2006). These restrictions have been widely criticized by international organizations such as the UN and the EU.
Throughout the 2000s, asylum and immigration laws were tightened. Apart from the governmental setup, this can also be contributed to reactions to 9/11 as well as the Danish cartoon crisis of 2005 which boosted support for the DPP (Bowlby: 2011). For example, in 2008, a new rule prohibited “state-funded hostels for the homeless from accepting foreigners who do not have permanent residency status” (Id.). In 2011, a new point-system was introduced further restricting family reunification. A change in government in 2011, however, with the Social Democrats taking over, led to an easing of immigration laws. In 2012, the immigration law was reformed, eliminating “a fee to apply for family reunification and … replac[ing] … an immigration test with a Danish language exam” (Freedomhouse: 2013). The election in 2015 changed the political setup of Denmark once again, with the Conservative bloc forming a governing coalition. Although the Social Democratic Party under the leadership of Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt won the largest share of votes (26.3%), it was not able to form a coalition big enough to reach the 90 seat threshold of the 179-seat parliament (BBC: 2015). The DPP won 21.1% of the vote and formed a coalition with center-right parties including the Liberal Party or Venstre (19.5%) whose leader Lars Lokke Rasmussen became Prime Minister (Id.).

While Denmark does have strict asylum and immigration laws, it has found itself a niche of political influence in refugee resettlement. Since 1979, Denmark has had a fixed quota for asylum seekers. Especially in the early stages, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), played an important role in the resettlement process (Know-Reset Denmark: 2013). Until 2005, Denmark had a set quota system that allocated 500 resettlement places for refugees (Id.). In 2005 the laws changed and the committee was abolished, giving the responsibility of the allocation to the
Minister of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs (Id.). The Danish refugee resettlement has been considered a success and many people view it as a European model (Id.).

This section outlined both Germany’s and Denmark’s immigration history and development of asylum laws. As has been shown, both countries experienced immigration in the 20th century and both countries have changed their asylum laws over the years. These developments are important for understanding how the countries reacted to the current refugee crisis and what drove those responses. The historical and legal context provides the basis of the forces that have shaped the current refugee crisis.

6. Findings and Analysis

Germany and Denmark have reacted differently to the Syrian refugee crisis. Germany, appalled by Hungary’s reaction and headlines of refugee tragedies, opened its borders. Denmark, on the other hand, took preemptive measures to discourage refugees from even coming. The popular response has been similar in both countries, with pro-refugee protests and people volunteering on one side, and anti-immigrant and xenophobic sentiment on the other. Both countries also introduced new legislation. Germany’s new laws were passed to limit the influx of especially “economic migrants,” declaring more states “safe”, making the deportation of rejected asylum applicants easier, and generally accelerating the process. Denmark’s reaction and new law have been criticized for being in violation of human rights and excessively restrictive, being able to take valuables worth more than $1450 from refugees and lengthening the wait for family reunification. This section will examine the reasons for the countries’ different reactions.

The first factors that have to be taken into consideration are historical developments and significant events. As has been shown above, both countries were exposed to immigration in the
20th century, although Germany received a higher number of migrants. What is unique to Germany is its dark history of National Socialism and its aftermath. This history has without doubt shaped German society, leaders, and laws. Germany, unlike Denmark, specifically included an article on the right to asylum in its basic law. In addition, the concept of building a wall around a country’s borders as politicians such as Donald Trump or Victor Orban have suggested is simply inconceivable for a country like Germany and its leaders.

Denmark, however, also has a unique historical and demographic aspect to it that explains the rise of anti-immigrant sentiment and has shaped its response to the refugee crisis. Denmark is and has been an extremely homogenous society, both religiously and ethnically, and its civil culture can be understood as a notion of “imagined sameness” (Jensen, in Silj: 2010). 80% of its population adheres to the state religion (Protestantism) and over 90% of the population are of Scandinavian origin. The Danish welfare state was founded on those values and also relies on this homogeneity. A society that is ethnically, linguistically, and religiously similar is simply more willing to redistribute wealth, based on a sense of solidarity and egalitarianism. It is therefore not surprising that Denmark has restricted its immigration laws as Danish society became more multiethnic and multi-religious (Kaergard: 2006). For example, before Denmark experienced its increase in immigration in the mid-1970s, welfare benefits rose steadily (Id.). Ever since the mid-1970s, however, when Denmark experienced a higher degree of immigration, welfare benefits decreased (Id.). This demonstrates that homogeneity has played a role throughout Denmark’s history and, as a result, has influenced Denmark’s societal, economic, and political setup.

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5 See Appendix Figure 11 and Figure 12
The homogeneity of Danish society and its necessity for a functioning welfare state has also impacted Denmark’s response to the refugee crisis. Denmark’s homogenous nature stresses the role of identity in everyday life. Identity politics have become more important in Danish elections and have led to an increase of support for the DPP (Jensen: 2015). As a result, anti-immigrant sentiment increased and with it the debate about migrants from eastern European countries as well as the Middle East (Jensen: 2015). Additionally, Denmark’s homogenous nature and values of egalitarianism and equality have “come to be seen as obstacles to integration” (Hedetoft: 2006). Political leaders as well as the general public have raised concerns about the financial burden immigrants impose on the welfare system (Hedetoft: 2006). All of these aspects serve as justifications of toughening asylum laws and can be seen to have influenced Denmark’s response to the current crisis.

Xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment is not foreign to Germany, as the 1990s demonstrated. However, while political leaders did restrict its laws and amended Article 16 of the constitution, xenophobic forces or movements did not enter the political sphere as political parties, which was the case in Denmark. The DPP was founded on an anti-immigrant platform and was able to steadily increase its support. Starting off on the periphery of the political spectrum, the DPP has made it into the center of politics following the 2015 election.

Support for the DPP also sharply increased after the 2005 Cartoon Crisis which can be seen as an internal event that has contributed to shaping Denmark’s response. After the Cartoon Crisis and in light of Denmark’s debate on immigration and multiculturalism, even the center-left Danish Social Democrats drifted to the right (Haugbolle: 2015). Germany did not experience

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6 The recent rise of the Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AFD), however, shows that parties with an anti-immigrant platform are now shaking up German politics.
such an event, although multiculturalism has been a controversial topic. Refugee discourse in Germany and debates between the ruling and the opposition parties are more focused on the role of “economic migrants” and whether or not to declare more countries “safe”, rather than toughening restrictions for all refugees or creating measures to deter people from coming as is the case in Denmark.

Another factor that has shaped both countries’ responses is political leadership. In Germany’s case, Angela Merkel has played an integral part in Germany’s reaction. She not only initially stated that Germany would welcome Syrian refugees as well as other people fleeing war and political persecution, but also defended her position throughout the following months and even after the Paris terror attacks (Abé: 2015, Wagstyl: 2015). By adopting this position, she made herself unpopular among politicians in her own ranks such as Horst Seehofer, the leader of Merkel’s sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU).

Merkel usually acts in a calculated and tactical way and has masterfully handled previous crises in Europe, earning her the name of “Crisis Chancellor”. In this case, however, she acted spontaneously and hastily. The reasons for why Merkel has adopted and also stuck to her position go back to her upbringing in East Germany. Her experiences in the GDR and her deep Christian belief based on the principles of altruism and helping the poor, weak, and disadvantaged (her father was a protestant priest) have instilled in her a sense of morality and compassion (Nelles: 2015; Feldenkirchen and Pfister: 2016). German talk show host Anne Will noted Merkel’s passion talking about the refugee crisis and her ability to talk freely about the issue, at one with herself (Feldenkirchen and Pfister: 2016). Merkel has made the refugee crisis her project and she has proven that her reaction to the crisis is something she stands for and truly believes in as a leader, as a German, and as a Christian.
In Denmark, it is less individuals and more the general political climate that has influenced its response. From 2011 to 2015, Denmark was ruled by the Social Democratic party which eased some of the restrictive asylum laws. The election in the summer of 2015, however, led to a change in government. As mentioned above, the conservative party with Lars Lokke-Rasmussen as Prime Minister and the DPP as a supporting party is now Denmark’s governing body. The DPP’s leader, Kristian Thulesen-Dahl, specifically rejected the position of Prime Minister, explaining that he preferred “the little free bird role, which can make the Danish People’s Party come closer to getting our policy through in the real world than you think” (Id.). Thulesen-Dahl was right, the DPP’s objective of further restricting Denmark’s asylum laws was realized with the implementation of the new asylum law.

Social movements, both pro-refugee and anti-immigrant, have also played a role in shaping leaders’ responses, especially in Germany. Protests by refugees and pro-refugee initiatives in Berlin had already led to loosening restrictions of the Residenzpflicht in 2014 (Thurm: 2014). Though less successful in eliciting a legislative response, protests by the anti-immigrant movement PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West) were frequent in 2015 and were attended by thousands of people. Attacks on refugee homes increased five-fold in 2015 compared to 2014 and a high majority of those attacks were driven by far-right ideology (Schumacher: 2016). In August, Angela Merkel visited the city of Heidenau, Saxony, where a former hardware store was transformed into a refugee shelter. Right-wing extremists were protesting in front of the store, honking and whistling at Merkel, and calling her a traitor to the country (Tagesschau: 2015).

7 See Appendix Figure 13
On the other side, pro-refugee groups such as the “Refugees Welcome” movement or the activists of the *Zentrum für Politische Schönheit* (Center for Political Beauty) have criticized Merkel for not speaking out against right-wing extremism and attacks against refugees earlier. For example, the *Zentrum für Politische Schönheit* organized an events in Berlin in July where activists dug graves for refugees who died on the Mediterranean to raise awareness to the issue and criticize the German government’s and the European Union’s reaction (or lack thereof) to the refugee crisis (*Zentrum für Politische Schönheit*: 2016). Merkel’s experience in Heidenau as well as the demands from pro-refugee activists can be seen as putting pressure on the chancellor to not only firmly speak out against right-wing extremism but also contribute to solving the crisis.

Finally, external events have played a role in Germany’s response to the refugee crisis but can be understood in the context of further pressuring political leaders to act. In the days leading up to Germany opening its borders, international headlines were filled with pictures of a 3-year old refugee boy who drowned on the Turkish shore. A few days earlier, 71 refugees suffocated in a truck in Austria. These tragedies definitely leave a mark on a political leader like Angela Merkel who, as mentioned above, is strongly influenced by Christian values and morality.

7. Conclusion

I. Summary

This paper has demonstrated that responses to refugee crises cannot be viewed through one lens only. Governments and political leaders initially either responded in a positive way, by welcoming refugees and granting them asylum, or in a negative way, by taking measures to deter
more people from coming. These responses, however, are not absolute but in constant flux. As the example of Germany shows, despite Merkel’s initial full embrace of the open-door policy, multiple laws intending to restrict the influx have been passed.

One could question Germany’s positive response given that it did restrict its laws in the months following the initial massive influx. However, it must be acknowledged that there is a difference between laws and measures intended to deter all refugees from coming (jewelry law, newspaper ad) and laws intended to restrict the influx of migrants that already have a very slim chance of being granted asylum (Asylpaket I and II). The debate around the legitimacy of “economic migrants’” refugee status is very controversial in Germany and was not extensively discussed in this paper for the purpose of space. It should be noted, however, that there are parties (Die Linke, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) that view Germany’s current legislation as too restrictive and as acting as a deterrence.

Popular responses in Germany and Denmark have been similar, with pro-refugee protests and initiatives on the one hand, and anti-immigrant sentiment and attacks on the other side. The negative popular response in Denmark seems less structured and streamlined than the negative response in Germany, which is to a large extent organized by and connected to the social movement PEGIDA. This might be related to the fact that the Danish government’s response is already very restrictive. General skepticism towards foreigners and xenophobia in Denmark can be seen as resulting from the homogenous character of Danish Welfare State. The positive popular response, on the other hand, is similar in both countries, with pro-refugee initiatives and volunteers pressuring leaders to adopt less restrictive policies.

Both cases have shown that one cannot understand countries’ responses without taking a holistic approach. The countries’ responses must be seen in a historical context, looking at
exposure to immigration and the development of legal framework. Denmark is interesting as it initially implemented very liberal asylum policies that were only over time restricted but now have evolved into some of the most restrictive in the EU. Here the relationship between Danish homogeneity, the Welfare State, and an increase in immigration played a role. Germany has experienced steady waves of immigration and has restricted and liberalized its laws throughout time.

Political leaders and the general political climate have similarly played an important role in the countries’ responses. Since the founding of the DPP in 1995, Denmark’s political spectrum seems to have steadily shifted to the right, with skepticism towards foreigners at best, and anti-immigrant sentiment at worst becoming the new normal. It is questionable whether the German leadership would have reacted the same way without Angela Merkel. Influenced by her upbringing, faith, and morality, she views her response to the crisis as a rational one, the right thing to do, and the only option in light of external events and tragedies. The influence of social movements in pressuring political leaders, however, should also be noted.

II. Limitations

One argument that was has not been addressed in my paper is related to Germany’s declining population. Some could argue that Germany’s or Angela Merkel’s response is driven by the country’s shrinking population and need for especially low-skilled workers to fill the gaps in the labor market. There is merit to this argument and political leaders could use this argument to “sell” a more liberal approach to the refugee crisis to the public. However, having analyzed Merkel’s response and her background, this aspect has not been one of the deciding forces of Germany’s response. It can be viewed as a positive unintended influence but not as a prime factor that shaped Merkel’s or Germany’s response. Legal measures to restrict immigration from
“safe states”, whose citizens could just as well fill the gaps in the labor market, also shows that this cannot be seen as a major influence.

III. Future Research

It would be incorrect to say that refugee crises are understudied. As the literature review has shown, there is a vast amount of literature on refugee crises and related topics. However, there are also still gaps in the literature. This paper has attempted to fill one of them by examining the forces behind responses to refugee crises. Further research could look at the implications of these responses for European society and demographic structure. Similarly, it would be interesting to combine some of the research done on related topics with the current refugee crisis. Anti-immigrant right-wing parties have steadily increased their support in different European countries such as France, Denmark, and the UK. How does this rise relate to refugee crises and countries’ responses to them? And what are the implications of the rise of these right-wing parties? With Germany’s AFD having gained more support in recent elections, will it be the next country with an anti-immigrant party in a governing coalition in the future?

Further research could take the approach taken in this paper to another level, by comparing the forces driving responses to refugee crises in countries that have dealt with different types of refugee crises. For example, how does a country respond to a refugee crises that was caused by climate change? Are responses and driving forces different from those of refugee crises caused by political and/or economic factors? Have forces driving countries’ responses changed over time? If so, what accounts for this change? How have refugee crises changed over time and in an increasingly globalized world?
Refugee crises are complex and there will always be more topics to study. As with every topic, the researcher has to cast a wide net and look at all aspects to be able to come to a conclusion. By analyzing the different forces driving responses to refugee crises, this paper has examined the cultural, economic, and political implications of refugee crises in the context of responses of destination countries and has demonstrated that history, leadership, social context, and internal and external events shape countries’ responses.
8. Appendix

Figure 1: Syrian Refugees in Neighboring Countries:

Source: Owen: 2013

Figure 2: The Balkan Route

Source: Arapi: 2015
Figure 3: German Regional Elections 2016

Länder slips
Results at March 14th 2016
Seats won in state parliamentary elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
<td>Green (47)</td>
<td>CDU (42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhineland-Palatinate</td>
<td>SPD (39)</td>
<td>CDU (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony-Anhalt</td>
<td>CDU (30)</td>
<td>AfD (25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
(CDU) Christian Democratic Union
(SPD) Social Democratic Party
(AfD) Alternative for Germany
(FDP) Free Democratic Party
Left Party

Federal states’ ruling parties/coalitions and votes in the Bundesrat

- Baden-Württemberg: Pop. 10.72m
- Bavaria: Pop. 12.69m
- Berlin: Pop. 3.47m
- Brandenburg: Pop. 2.46m
- Bremen: Pop. 0.66m
- Hamburg: Pop. 1.76m
- Hesse: Pop. 6.09m
- Mecklenburg-West Pomerania: Pop. 1.60m
- North Rhine-Westphalia: Pop. 17.64m
- Saxony: Pop. 4.06m
- Saxony-Anhalt: Pop. 2.34m
- Schleswig-Holstein: Pop. 2.83m
- Thuringia: Pop. 2.16m

To be confirmed: 14
TOTAL BUNDESRAT VOTES: 69

Source: The Economist: 3/2015

Economist.com
Figure 4: Mother Angela

Figure 5: 2015 Person of the Year

Figure 6: Danish Ad in Lebanese Newspaper

Figure 7: Iraq Road Sign

Figure 8: Pro-Refugee Ad

Source: Nelles: 2015
Source: Lee: 2015
Source: Frej: 2015
Source: Reuters: 2016
Source: Varagar: 2015
Figure 9: Migration to Germany

The long history of immigration in Germany
Arrivals in Germany since 1950

Source: www.destatis.de

Figure 10: Migration to Denmark

How many refugees have DK received over the years and where did they come from?

Source: Bendixen: 2016
Figure 11: Unemployment Benefit Relative to Average Wage

Source: Kærgård (1991) and ADAM’s data base, Statistics Denmark

Source: Kaergard: 2006
Figure 12: Religious Belief in Denmark

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Number of Inhabitants</th>
<th>Public Lutheran Church</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Roman-Catholics</th>
<th>Others Including other Christian Societies</th>
<th>Of which Muslims (Non-Christian Religious Societies)</th>
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<td>1,784,741</td>
<td>1,769,724</td>
<td>4290</td>
<td>1857</td>
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<td>(117)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>(0.6%)</td>
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<td>1,951,513</td>
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<td>99.1%</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>2,449,540</td>
<td>2,416,511</td>
<td>3476</td>
<td>5373</td>
<td>24,180</td>
<td>(873)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>98.7%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>(0.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>2,757,076</td>
<td>2,715,187</td>
<td>5164</td>
<td>9821</td>
<td>26,904</td>
<td>(892)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>(0.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>3,267,831</td>
<td>3,200,372</td>
<td>5947</td>
<td>22,137</td>
<td>39,375</td>
<td>(3942)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>97.9%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>(0.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>5,036,184</td>
<td>(4,748,000)</td>
<td>(4067)</td>
<td>24,980</td>
<td>259,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>94.3%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>5,112,130</td>
<td>4,884,060</td>
<td>(3663)</td>
<td>27,387</td>
<td>397,020</td>
<td>38,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>91.6%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5,135,409</td>
<td>4,584,000</td>
<td>3486</td>
<td>29,783</td>
<td>518,140</td>
<td>75,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>89.3%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5,330,020</td>
<td>4,536,422</td>
<td>2982</td>
<td>33,177</td>
<td>757,439</td>
<td>168,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>85.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1870-1921: Danish Census supplemented with Falbe-Hansen & Scharling (1885) and Warming (1912)
1974: Calculated from number of Church-tax-payers and the statistics for official religious societies.

Note: The number of Muslims is not reported in the Census 1870-1921 except for 1880 where Falbe-Hansen & Scharling (1885) reported 8 Muslims - but there is a figure for Non-Christian religious societies (separated from non religious affiliation), and it is these figures reported in parents in the table. For Jews in 1974 and 1983 is only reported main persons in the household; the figures are because of this raised with 50%. The figure for members of the Public Church in 1974 is calculated on the basis of number of church-tax-payers which is reported 1976-1985; this series is linear extrapolated to 1974 and the level adjusted on the basis of the years 1983-85, where both Church-tax-payers and the members of the public church is reported. The number of Muslims 1983-2000 is calculated on the basis of the number of immigrants from the 17 in this relation most important Muslim countries and Muslim-rates for these countries reported in Kühle (2006). For an earlier attempt to use that sort of methods see Simonsen (1989). The number of Muslims from other countries, converted Danes and 3rd generation immigrants are assumed to have the same ratio to the number of Muslims from the 17 countries as in Kühle (2006); this means that the figure from the 17 countries are multiplied with 1.087.

Source: Kaergard: 2006
Figure 13: Attacks on Refugee Homes in 2014 and 2015 in Germany

Source: Schumacher: 2016
9. References


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