2018

Should We Stay or Should We Go? Investigating the Impacts of Intervention on Post-War Development

Benjamin Rudman
Skidmore College, brudman@skidmore.edu

Should We Stay or Should We Go?
Investigating the Impacts of Intervention on Post-War Development

By

Benjamin Rudman

A Thesis Submitted to

Department of Economics

Skidmore College

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the B.A Degree

Thesis Advisor: Qi Ge

May 1, 2018

Abstract

This study investigates the effects of military intervention in civil wars on post-war development. It was theorized that the characteristics of the intervention would influence the effects on development in different ways, and looks into its effects on three types of development: economic, social, and political. This paper looks at the effects of the regime-type of the intervener, the recipient of the intervention, the number of interveners, and whether the intervening state is neighboring the country in conflict or if it is from the same region. Results support the paper's theory, finding that different characteristics of intervention had different effects on development. The study concluded that it is important to consider intervention characteristics when determining whether a country lending support to a side in a civil war will help or hinder the development of that state.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Jeibei Luo for her support and Qi Ge his guidance as my thesis advisor.

Introduction

"To all of those outside Ghouta, living in peace and comfort … I wish to tell you that children, women, the elderly and infants are all dying today in full view of the world," says a rescue worker, referring to an alleged chemical attack in Syria's eastern Ghouta that killed over 90 people (Shaheen 2018). This region was also home to the chemical attack that occurred in 2013, which killed over 1,500 people by some estimates and nearly caused the United States to intervene in the Syrian civil war (Lander et al. 2013). The Syrian economy has also been affected by the civil war. The World Bank (2017) estimated that between 2011-2016, Syria experienced $226 billion of cumulative losses to its gross domestic product (GDP). This leads an important question for those with humanitarian and economic concerns: should countries intervene?

Intervention that occurs during civil war is defined as an "internationalized internal armed conflict [that] occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides" (Themner 2016). There are three types of intervention: (1) indirect, which is supporting either rebel or government forces through means other than military forces (ex: weapons, money, etc.), (2) direct unilateral, which is support through the sending of military forces by a state, and (3) direct multilateral, which is the same as direct unilateral except the support comes from a coalition of states (Naidu 2002).

Arbour (2008) describes the principle of 'The Responsibility to Protect' (R2P), which endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005, as a "permanent duty to protect individuals against abusive behavior." However, Bellamy (2008) notes the confusion surrounding R2P due to its non-consensual nature, as some see it as a way to make giving humanitarian aid easier while others view it as a way to legitimize unilateral intervention. The

R2P, and the disagreement surrounding its implications, suggest that intervention should be studied further in order understand its impact.

Ahmad (2012) used Somalia's civil war as a case study to investigate the effects of intervention on the target state's economy. During its civil war, Somalia experienced a famine that led to international intervention, causing billions of dollars to be invested in international aid, in addition to peacekeeping forces being sent to the country. The monetary aid led to a vast expansion of the informal economy and created a militarized criminal enterprise. This allowed for warlords to consolidate power over their subjects with less reliance on them, thereby allowing the warlords to act in a more predatory manner towards the population in addition to creating incentive to keep the country in a state of dysfunction and collapse. In contrast, the north of the country, an unrecognized sovereign entity called Somaliland, did not experience such intervention. Instead of the disorder that the rest of the country faces, Somaliland has a peaceful and democratic system. This begs the following question: how much did Somalia benefit from international intervention and aid?

The case of Somalia is not representative of all interventions, nor do all states that experience third-party involvement in civil conflict have the same characteristics of Somalia. In order to understand the impact of intervention, it is important to employ an empirical analysis that accounts for varying characteristics of both the conflict and the state the conflict takes place in. This is what the current study aims to do throughout the remainder of this paper.

This study investigated the following research question: how does military intervention in civil wars impact post-war development in relation to economic, social, and political factors? The paper also posited a theory that suggested that the effects of intervention were mediated by the characteristics of the intervention (regime-type of the intervener, recipient of intervention,

etc.). The outcome variables were measured in the change in value from the initial end of the conflict to the value five, ten, and twenty years after the end of the conflict. Data from the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset, the Polity IV dataset, and the World Bank were used. There were 52 conflicts that experienced intervention, which were compared to 347 conflicts without intervention by using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model. Results found that the effects of intervention varied based on the different characteristics of the intervener.

This study found that intervention decreased growth rate while having no other significant effects on any of the other dependent variables. Interaction terms were also used to investigate the effects of intervention on post-war development. An interaction between length and intervention led to an additional increase in GDP per capita and autocracy levels, while decreasing growth rate. Meanwhile, an interaction between cumulative intensity and intervention increased growth rate, but decreased life expectancy and autocracy levels.

Variables that were meant to capture the characteristics of interventions were also implemented. Interventions by a state with a democratic regime led to an additional increase in growth rate, but decreased gross national income (GNI) per capita and autocracy levels. Autocratic states intervening led to an increase in GNI per capita and life expectancy, but a decrease in growth rate and autocracy levels. It also led to a decrease in democracy levels after five and ten years; however, its effects after twenty years led to an additional increase in democracy levels that amounted to an overall net gain in democracy levels. Intervention in favor of the government and in favor of the rebels both increased GNI per capita; however, the former group also decreased growth rate. The number of intervening states in a conflict increased growth rate, mortality rate, and growth rate, while it decreased GDP per capita and autocracy levels. A state that neighbors the country in conflict intervening increased GDP per capita and

democracy levels, while it decreased life expectancy. Finally, a state that was located within the same region increased GDP per capita, while decreasing GNI per capita and mortality rate.

Overall, this paper concluded that different intervention characteristics can have different effects on different types of development, and can sometimes aid one type of development while ailing the other. The findings in this study provided a number of contributions to the literature. First, it contributed to the idea that democracy levels and autocracy levels are not a part of the same scale, but can in fact coexist within a state. A number of results found that democracy levels and autocracy levels did not act as an inverse of one another, suggesting that they do not always act as an opposite. Another contribution this study makes is that the regime-type of the intervener is examined in the context of social and economic factors, whereas previous literature has focused mostly on democratization. Additionally, this study examined the effects that the number of states that intervene had on post-war development, and found that it was often beneficial. Krain (2005) used the number of interveners to measure the effects on human rights violations; however, it had not previously been used to look at development. Finally, this paper examined the effects of a neighboring state or a state from the same region intervening in a civil conflict. These variables have not been used previously in the context of intervention, and the results suggest that these types of interventions may have important implications in terms of development.

This paper also has important policy implications. This paper's findings indicate that interventions with different types of characteristics have varying effects on development. For example, if the United States, a democratic regime, want to promote democracy, its intervention would not have any effect on the democracy level of the state in conflict. However, if the goal is

to increase economic development, it should intervene since democratic intervention has a positive additional impact on growth rate.

The following sections are organized in the following manner. Section one includes a review of past literature on the topic. Section two describes the methodology of the study, followed by the analysis plan and hypotheses. Section three provides the results. Section four discussed the findings while section five has the conclusion.

Literature Review

Before examining literature on intervention and civil wars, it is important to investigate how economic growth and development functions without such exogenous shocks.

Economic Growth Theory

There have been three waves of theory that attempt to explain economic growth. The first two, the Harrod-Domar model and the neoclassical model, both saw the lack of growth as a product of a lack of capital, which could be fixed through foreign aid or investment to bolster capital and, subsequently, growth (Eggertsson 2005). Economists, and financial institutions, saw the theory from the Harrod-Domar model to suggest that a country's capital-output ratio could be used to determine how much investment was needed in order to spur a certain level of growth (Kenny and Williams 2001). Unfortunately, when this idea was put into practice, little evidence suggested that investment increased growth (Snowdon and Vane 2002). A major issue with this theory was the assumptions made about technology. The neoclassical model put an emphasis on how improved technology should increase growth; however, it made the assumption that all countries have access to modern technology (Eggertsson 2005).

The third wave, endogenous growth theory, provided a more practical model. This model put an emphasis on the private sector of economies, expanding on how a lack of investment in

private sectors, like education, also hinders growth (Eggertsson 2005). Because it focused on the private sector, endogenous growth theory also broke from the two former theories by focusing on markets with monopolistic competition (Romer 1990). This allowed the theory to assume that technology is not free, and producing new technology is costly for firms, requiring firms to have some sort of monopoly power as incentive (Romer 1994). Thus, this theory suggested that poverty is associated with small, isolated economies (Eggertsson 2005).

The three theories all suggested that a major factor of growth is investment; however, the Harrod-Domar model and the neoclassical models were both hindered since they do not address how technology is not free of charge. The endogenous growth theory was therefore the most applicable theory as it included the private sector in its model, which allowed for a more elaborate assessment that suggested that investment should go to private sectors in order to spur economic growth. Regardless of this difference, all three models suggested that growth relies on four 'stylized facts': an increase in per capita income growth, a constant capital-output ratio, a trendless rate of rate of return to capital, and substantially different per capita growth rates across countries (Snowdon and Vane 2002).

This section has laid out the theoretical framework of how economic growth and development function. However, the exogenous shock of a civil war can affect such mechanisms, which will be described later in this literature review. First, it is important to discuss the causes of civil wars.

What Causes Civil Wars?

Collier and Hoeffler (1998) argued that economic factors are most important when it comes to the causes of civil war. They found that population size and amount of natural resources increased the risk of civil war while income per capita decreases the risk of civil war.

Additionally, they found that there is a quadratic relationship between ethno-linguistic fractionalization, where civil wars were most likely to occur when there were two groups of equal sizes and were less likely to occur as fractionalization increases. Fearon and Laitin (2003), like Collier and Hoeffler (1998), found that income per capita decreased the likelihood of civil war; however, oil reserves, population size, mountainous terrain, newly-formed states and political instability led to greater risk of conflict. Masfield and Snyder (2002) investigated the effects of institutional strength on the outbreaks of civil wars. They found that governments that did not fully transition into democracies, but rather only began the transition away from autocracy, or did not have strong central authorities were more prone to civil conflict.

Reynal-Querol (2002) found similar results to Mansfield and Snyder (2002) and further reported a negative relationship between political inclusivity and likelihood of civil war. Fearon and Laitin (2003) also found that ethnic and religious measures were insignificant. Reynal-Querol (2002) found that religious polarization increased the likelihood of ethnic civil wars. However, the author did find that religious fragmentation decreased the probability of ethnic civil conflict. Therefore, it appears that Collier and Hoeffler (1998), and Reynal-Querol (2002) stand in agreement while Fearon and Laitin (2003) contradicts their results. It is important to note that Reynal-Querol (2002) reports results from ethnic civil wars while Fearon and Laitin (2003) includes all types of civil wars. This could be the cause for the lack of consensus between the two authors. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) found a significant quadratic relationship. Fearon and Laitin (2003) did not test for this type of effect, which could be the reason they did not find significant results. In addition to the literature above, Dixon (2009) conducted a meta-analysis of previous studies on the causes of civil wars and finds that there is no strong consensus from the data, either qualitative or quantitative, on what initiates these types of

conflicts. Therefore, while there appears to be uniform agreement among the authors reviewed above that political instability increases the likelihood of civil war, there is no clear relationship between ethnic and religious factors having an effect on the outbreak of civil war.

Now that the determinant of intrastate conflicts has been described, it is important to understand the consequences, or costs, during the conflict.

Costs of War

Skaperdas (2011) examined previous studies on the costs of war. The author investigated multiple aspects regarding these costs. For example, the increase in military expenditure that occurs during war led to less funding for public goods. This ultimately led to the state being unable to fund social services and health care, which led to indirect effects on public health and wellbeing. Unsurprisingly, war also leads to a decrease in growth during the conflict. Additionally, civil war often causes the destruction of public infrastructure, as well as private capital. The author notes how Mozambique's civil war saw a decrease in 20 percent of its stock of capital between the years 1980 and 1993, 60 percent of primary schools were no longer open, and 40 percent of immobile capital was non-operational. This loss of capital, according the section above on growth theory, has implications in terms of the state's ability to maintain economic growth, which Skeperdas (2011) confirmed by suggesting that war leads to a decrease in the state's growth rate. In terms of the effects on the population, the most obvious cost is the deaths caused by war. However, the impact that landmines have even after the war ends is more unknown. Before 2001, it was estimated that the average number of casualties by landmines was 26,000 per year. Another effect of landmines is that they render otherwise-usable land uninhabited and unfarmed due to suspicion that landmines could be in the area. Furthermore, there was an estimated 32.9 million refugees and internally displaced persons in

2006, an increase of about 8 million from the previous decade. While the list above is certainly not exhaustive, Skaperdas (2011) provides a clear picture that the cost of war is high.

While the states in which the civil war occurs is certainly impacted during the conflict, the question that is more relevant to this paper is the effects of conflict after it is over.

Post-War and Development

Studies observing the effects of conflict on social and economic factors post-war were conflicting. Kang and Meernik (2005) found that the keys to economic recovery revolve around government performance and international aid in order to revitalize the economy through capital investment since the state will have likely used up many of its resources during the conflict. This is consistent with growth theory since these results suggest that investment is needed in order for an economy to recover.

The results from the study by Koubi (2005) suggest that there was a negative correlation between countries that have fought in a war and their growth rates when compared to countries that have not. The author also found that the severity of the war as well as its duration had a positive effect on economic growth. Collier (1999) also found that wars that have a longer duration experience a more rapid economic recovery.

Gates et al. (2012) examined the effects of conflict on economic and social issues. They found that war had negative effects on undernourishment, poverty, life expectancy, and mortality rates. In terms of economic effects, the authors note that countries that took part in war experience a 'catch-up effect', where they show faster growth rates than normal. Though, like Kang and Meernik (2005), they note it was likely due to international aid.

Chen et al. (2008) also looked at the effects of conflict on economic and social factors, as well as political ones. The authors found that after the end of the conflict the economy

recovered swiftly, with output per capita and capital investment increasing while inflation decreased. Per capita growth in GDP was higher in countries that experienced conflict when compared to both their respective pre-war levels and growth rates from comparable countries. Investment rates were also higher in conflict countries, which likely was part of the reason that the growth rates were higher. In terms of social aspects, the authors found that primary-school enrollment had a positive relationship, but the opposite was true for secondary-school enrollment. Politically, democratic rights recover slowly; however, law and order improved rapidly. Overall, Chen et al. (2008) found that economic, social, and political development experienced gradual improvement after the end of the war.

The section above describes the effects of civil war. However, the literature above does not take into account the effects of an intervening party. This leads to the central question of the current paper: what are the effects of intervention in civil wars on development?

Third-Party Intervention in Civil Wars

Economic and Social Impacts

Past literature has also indicated that there are certain developmental consequences of third-party intervention in conflicts; however, there is not a consensus on whether these effects are positive or negative. This study provides a theory for why this was the case, which posits that different aspects of intervention mediates different effects on development. In other words, heterogeneous effects on the characteristics of intervention will influence development differently. The literature below provides support for the study's theory.

Regan (2002) investigated the effects of intervention, both economic and military, on the duration of conflicts. Results indicated that both types of intervention increase the lengths of conflict. Breaking intervention down by who received the aid, pro-government, pro-rebel, or

neutral, did not alter the findings that intervention lengthens conflict. However, an interaction term between intervention in favor of the rebel group and the timing in which the intervention occurred yielded negative effects, which suggests that interventions that occur late in the conflict in support of rebels leads to a quicker resolution of the conflict than if the intervention took place earlier. Regan's analysis would have positive implications in terms of development if one compares the results with the studies by Collier (1999) and Koubi (2005), who found a positive relationship between war duration and economic growth.

Pickering and Kisangani (2006) employed a time series cross sectional design to investigate the effects intervention had on developing states' governing institutions, economic performance, as well as the quality of life of citizens. Their analysis involved dividing observations in multiple ways: by whether or not the state in which the conflict occurred was a democracy and whether the intervention was in support of the government or against the government. They found that when the state was not democratic and the intervention was hostile towards the government there was an increase in democratization of the country. There was also evidence that the intervention increased economic growth in the short run. Conversely, when intervention was in favor of the government that was non-democratic there was a decreased likelihood of democratization and a decrease in economic growth. Interventions that occurred in democratic states led to a decrease in quality of life when results were measured ten years after the end of the conflict; however, no other variables yielded significant results. The authors concluded that while hostile interventions are helpful in terms of development, intervention in democratic states are not really affected by third-parties. However, as the authors note, the study is limited by the fact that there was a small number of observations for when intervention occurred in democratic states, which may have led to a bias in the results.

Kim (2017) used an ordinary least squares (OLS) model to examine how interventions in civil wars affect the quality of life of citizens within the country in conflict after the war ended. The author used a composite measure of life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy rate in order to measure quality of life. Additionally, interventions by the United Nations and those done unilaterally by a country were analyzed separately. Results indicated that when the United Nations intervenes, quality of life increased, while unilateral interventions caused quality of life to decrease. Interaction terms were used to further analyze these relationships. When there was intervention in support of the government and the opposition forces were victorious, the country experienced an increase in quality of life; whereas quality of life decreased when the war ended with a negotiated settlement. When the opposition forces received third-party support and the war ended in either a negotiated settlement or a victory in their favor, there was a decrease in quality of life. Based on these results, one would conclude that intervention is beneficial only when it comes from the United Nations. One downside to the methodology chosen by the author is that the analysis does not fully account for long-term effects from intervention. Instead, it measures the annual percent change of its dependent variables, which may not fully capture the longevity of the impacts. Regardless, these results appear to be consistent with Pickering and Kisangani (2006) since both suggest that intervention in favor of the opposition increases quality of life.

Democratization

Before investigating the impact that intervention has on democratization, it is important to mention the relevance of democracy in relation to growth and development.

Leblang (1997) investigated the relationship between democracy and economic growth using a pooled time series cross sectional dataset. The author found that, contrary to past

research, democracy accelerates economic growth. This was attributed to the fact that the study accounted for variation across country and that the time for the effects to be felt could vary. Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu (2008) used a meta-analysis to measure the impact that democracy has on growth. They found that democracy has positive, indirect effects on growth, with increased human capital and economic freedom while inflation and political instability was decreased. Therefore, these two studies suggest that there is a significant link between democracy and economic growth.

Additionally, promoting democracy has been the motivation for intervention in the past and could be in the future as well (Gleditsch et al. 2007). Therefore, in terms of policy implications, it is important to evaluate the effects on democracy and autocracy levels in order to validate- or dissuade- this mode of increasing democracy through intervention in the future.

Democracy and Intervention

Gleditsch et al. (2007) investigated the relationship between the regime-type, either democratic or autocratic, of the intervener and the democratization of the target country. They found that democratic states as the interveners were significantly more likely to cause democratization immediately after the intervention occurs; however, this relationship was not significant five years later. The authors suggest that selection bias could be affecting the results, as they suggest that democratic interventions occur in countries that already had a high probability to democratize. Two subsequent analyses were done in order to attempt to combat this. First, the relationship between regime-type of intervener and the probability of a change in regime-type of the target state was tested where the three potential outcomes were democratization, autocratization, and no change. Results suggested that democracies lead to democratization and autocracies lead to autocratization. However, democracies did not decrease

the likelihood of autocratization, nor did autocracies decrease the likelihood of democratization. The second test looked at the movement of regime-type of the country in conflict in three categories: autocracy, semi-democracy, and democracy. Change in regime-type was then analyzed by looking at the percent-change of the initial regime and the type of regime in place after the intervention. They found that most countries that began as a semi-democracy stayed in that category while there were more changes into autocracy than there was democracy. Subsequently, the findings from this paper concluded that democratic interventions do not lead to democratization.

De Mesquita and Downs (2006) also investigated the effects of intervention on democracy level, coalition size, and the competitiveness of the party system. Like Gleditsch et al. (2007), they divide their analysis by the type of intervener. However, in addition to having two categories of autocratic and democratic, they also include whether the intervener was the United States or the United Nations. They found that while the United States intervening had a positive effect on democracy, an autocratic regime or the United Nations had a negative effect. A democratic state intervening had no significant effect. These results support the findings of Gleditsch et al. (2007). The United Nations also had a negative relationship with coalition size and competitiveness of participation in the party system, with the same being true for democratic interveners. The United States had positive effects for both while autocratic states had no effect. De Mesquita and Downs (2006) also note that a selection effect exists for when the United States decides to intervene. In order to attempt to counteract this, they examined the percent-change of their dependent variables within a ten-year period, comparing only the cases when the intervener is either the United States or another democracy. They found that there was

no difference between the two types of interveners, leading to the same conclusions as the original analysis that intervention is not an effective means to promote democracy.

While de Mesquita and Downs (2006) and Geditsch et al. (2004) found that intervention was harmful to democratization, Pickering and Kisangani (2006) found that intervention in opposition to the government when the state is not democratic leads to democratization. This contradiction is interesting because while de Mesquita and Downs (2006) and Geditsch et al. (2004) account for regime-type of intervener in their analyses, Pickering and Kisangani (2006) divide their interventions by who is getting the support. Both types of analyses are useful and are what the other respective paper lacks. The question arises of whether the former two authors would have found different results had they accounted for whether the intervention was in favor of the government or opposition party or would the latter have found similar results to the former. Pickering and Kisangani (2006) did not reveal findings that found all intervention improves democracy, but rather only when there is an intervention in a non-democracy that is hostile towards the government; it is still significant since that is likely the type of intervention that would occur if a country, like the United States, attempted to change the regime-types of developing countries through intervention. Therefore, this study will attempt to remedy this contradiction by including both who received intervention and the regime of the intervener.

Duration of Peace

Another important aspect of whether intervention is beneficial revolves around whether peace lasts. Fortna (2004) examined whether the presence of peacekeepers caused peace to last longer. The analysis was divided into multiple sections. First, there were two timeframes in which conflicts were observed. There were conflicts that covered the full post-World War II period and there was also a period of observations that only observed conflicts that occurred

after the end of the Cold War. Additionally, the peacekeeper was split into three categories: all peacekeeping forces, United Nations forces, and non-United Nations forces. Finally, the type of peacekeeping mission was split into four groups: observer, traditional, multidimensional, and enforcement missions. Results found that there was no significant difference in duration of peace when observing at the post-World War II timeframe. In the post-Cold War period, there was a positive relationship between all peacekeeping forces and United Nations peacekeeping forces. However, non-United Nations forces yielded no significant results, meaning that the significant results found when looking at all types of peacekeeping forces was likely due to the United Nations forces. In regard to the type of peacekeeping missions, observer missions were positively related to duration of peace in the post-World War II period, but only jointly significant in the post-Cold War period. Enforcement was only positively jointly significant in the post-Cold War period. Traditional was positively jointly significant and positively significant in the post-World War II and post-Cold War periods, respectively. Multidimensional was positively jointly significant in both periods. While these results appear to indicate that United Nations peacekeeping efforts are useful, the author notes that the small sample size could be cause for concern.

Kenwick (working paper)[1] also investigated the effects of intervention on the durability of peace. The author found that while there was no relationship between intervention and the duration of peace, peace that was accomplished through a negotiated settlement with third parties led to a more unstable peace. The lack of consensus between Fortna (2004) and Kenwick (working paper) is likely due to the fact that the former paper accounted for the

[1] No date was found regarding this source on the paper itself or throughout any databases. A search on the author's website and CV to find a date for the paper were also in vain.

different types of interveners whereas the latter did not. This further shows the importance of interaction terms in finding robust results when it comes to this topic.

Human Rights Violations

While the other papers have mainly focused on the effects of intervention after the end of the conflict, Krain (2005) and Peksen (2012) investigated the relationship between intervention and human rights violations during the conflict. Krain (2005) found that the presence of a third-party had no effect on the severity of genocides or politicides, nor did impartial or balanced interventions. When the author investigated how the number of interveners influenced the severity, it was discovered that while interventions in favor of the perpetrator had no effect, interventions that directly challenged the perpetrator group led to a decrease in severity. Therefore, the findings of the study suggest that the only way to decrease the severity of state-sponsored murder is to directly oppose the government.

Peksen (2012) looked at the effects of intervention on extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, and political imprisonment, while also looking at the different types of intervention (supportive towards the government, hostile towards the government, and neutral). Results indicated that supportive interventions led to an increased likelihood of extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, and political imprisonment. Hostile intervention led to an increased probability of political imprisonment, and neutral intervention caused a higher likelihood of killings, disappearances, and torture. The author also measured the effects seven years after the conflict and found that the results were lasting for extrajudicial killings and torture when there was supportive intervention, political imprisonment when there was hostile intervention, and all relationships for neutral interventions were lasting. These findings suggest that intervention has negative effects on human rights, regardless of what side receives support.

This stands in slight contradiction to Krain (2005), as that study found that hostile interventions had a negative effect on severity. However, that result was only found when the number of interveners was evaluated. Instead of this being a conflicting outcome it is more likely that it is due to the use of interaction terms in order to find a fuller picture.

The literature above describes the effects of intervention on the target country. However, there is another question that must be asked: do all civil wars have the same likelihood of having intervention occur?

Selection Effect and When Interventions Occur

Literature has noted that there is an inherent endogeneity concern regarding studying the effects of interventions in conflict. For example, De Mesquita and Downs (2006) and Gleditsch et al. (2007) both noted that a selection bias, or selection effect, was likely present in their papers. Fortna (2004) examined the question of when peacekeepers intervene, either by United Nations forces or unilateral forces. The author found that interventions by the United Nations were less likely when there was a clear victor. Consent-based intervention by either type of group was more likely when the conflict ended in a stalemate. There was no significant effect on likelihood of intervention when the conflict was an identity-conflict. Additionally, deaths from the war only had a significant effect on the probability of an intervention occurring when the missions were an enforcement-missions. However, countries with large armies did experience a smaller probability of intervention. Ultimately, the author concluded that while the question of where peacekeepers are sent is complicated, peacekeepers tend to go where they are most needed and not where peace is most likely.

Gilligan and Stedman (2003) conducted a study to examine when peacekeeping missions occurred. The authors found that the largest predictor of intervention was deaths related to the

conflict, while power dynamics of a government in relation to other powers were also held in consideration. Regional considerations also had an effect on the decision to intervene. Ultimately, the results of this paper indicate that, when it comes to the United Nations, certain characteristics led to a higher chance of intervention. Koga (2011), when looking at the differences in intervention preferences between democracies and autocracies, found that democracies were more likely to intervene in favor of a rebel group when they share an ethnic tie while autocracies were more likely to intervene when a lootable resource was present.

The articles mentioned above support the notion that a selection effect exists, meaning that not all conflicts are equally likely to receive intervention. This has important implications in terms of the limitations of studies that aim to capture the effects of interventions, as endogeneity issues are inherent. There are certain econometric strategies that can be taken in order to attempt to counteract this concern. The implementation of fixed effects for region and years can be used for this purpose. An alternative to this method is to use an instrumental variable. Instrumental variables are variables that are correlated with outcome terms only through their relationship with other variables (Angrist et al. 1996). However, this method was not used since an adequate instrument could not be determined. The issues that arise due to the selection effect will likely be present, regardless of the implementation of methods like the ones stated above; however, the limitations that it brings can at least be minimized.

The literature above was conflicting in its results at time, partly due to the different heterogeneous terms that were used by different researchers. For example, de Mesquita and Downs (2006) and Geditsch et al. (2004) looked at the effects of the regime-type of the intervener and found the effects to have a negative impact on democratization. Meanwhile, Pickering and Kisangani (2006) investigated which side received the intervention and found that

support for the rebel side in a non-democratic state increased democratization. Therefore, while both look at the effects of intervention on democratization, the differing heterogeneous effects that were implemented led to differing results. This supports the theory that the effects of intervention will vary based on the characteristics of the intervention that are being taken into account.

Hypotheses

A number of hypotheses were made regarding the results of the different dependent and intervention variables. Due to a lack of clear consensus in the literature, conflicting theories, and the small number of previous papers on the topic, it was not possible to justify a one-tailed test for any of the predictions. Subsequently, all predictions were tested using a two-tailed estimate; however, the hypotheses below reflect the expected sign of some of the variables that appeared to have a consensus among the literature.

Intervention

Past literature was conflicting when it came to the effects of intervention in general, which made it inappropriate to estimate the direction of the relationships. Therefore, it was hypothesized that intervention would have an effect on economic, social, and political factors.

Regime-Type of Intervener

There were two types of regimes of the intervener that were examined: autocracies and democracies. Literature found that while autocracies intervening has previously led to a decrease in democracy levels, democracies have had no effect (Gleditsch et al. 2007). Additionally, there were no past studies that have looked at the effect of regime-type of intervener on economic or social development. This study hypothesized that autocracies intervening would have a negative impact on democracy levels and democratic intervention would have an effect on democracy

levels. Both autocracies and democracies providing third-party support were expected to have a significant impact on social and economic development.

Recipient of Third-Party Support

Past studies have found a positive relationship between intervention in support of rebel forces and development and a negative relationship when support was given to the government (Pickering and Kisangani 2006). These same relationships were expected in this study: support for rebels would have a positive effect on economic, social, and political factors, and support for the government would have a negative effect on these three categories.

Number of Interveners

Krain (2005) found that the number of interveners had a negative relationship with severity of human rights violations. However, this article did not look at post-war effects, making this article ineffective at basing the direction of the effect on. Subsequently, it was hypothesized that the number of interveners would have an effect on post-war development.

Interaction Terms

The two interaction terms, duration and intensity, were both previously found to have a positive effect on development while not taking intervention into account (Koubi 2005). Therefore, it was expected that there would be the same positive relationship between development and an interaction between (a) duration and (b) cumulative intensity.

Overall Hypothesis

While some of the hypotheses above provided hopeful expectations for the outcome of intervention on development, the literature that was discussed previously in the paper provided a cynical outlook on the effects of third-party intervention in civil conflicts. Consequently, it was expected that, even though some effects might suggest that intervention was beneficial, third-

party involvement in civil wars would have a negative impact on economic, social, and political factors after the conflict ended.

Methodology

The Data

Observations of intrastate conflicts between the years 1960 and 2016 were provided by version 17.1 of Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace Research Institute Oslo (UDCP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002), which has been used in a number of previous studies (Gates et al. 2012)[2]. This dataset also had conflicts that were not intrastate; however, all of them were dropped for the current analysis. All variables, unless specified otherwise, came from this dataset.

Outcome Variables

This study will look at multiple types of dependent variables in order to analyze the effects of intervention on development. All variables were measured in multiple years: the year the conflict ended, five years, ten years and twenty years after the end of the conflict in order to test the longevity of effects. For the analysis, the change between the initial year observation and the value five, ten, and twenty years after the end of the conflict were examined since this would help scale the variables that would otherwise naturally vary by state.

The following economic variables were used as outcome variables: growth rate, gross national income (GNI) per capita, and real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The log of GDP and GNI was taken in order to measure these variables in percentages. Growth rate was also measured in percent. Additionally, life expectancy and mortality rate were used to capture the effects on social factors. Life expectancy was measured in years while mortality rate was

[2] https://www.prio.org/Data/ provides a list of published studies that used data by UCDP/PRIO.

measured in number of deaths per 1000 members of the population. All variables above were taken from the World Bank database. Finally, democracy level and autocracy level were used to capture the implications of intervention on political institutions. The democracy and autocracy variables from the Polity IV dataset were used to measure the political effects of intervention (Marshall 2016). Both democracy and autocracy are measured since the Polity IV codebook infers its support of Eckstein and Gurr's (1975) theory that democratic and autocratic regimes are distinct patterns of authority that can both be present within the same state.

Independent Variables

The main independent variable was whether intervention occurred, which was equal to one if there was intervention and equal to zero otherwise. There were multiple other measures that related to intervention that were meant to provide a more robust understanding of the intervention's effects on development. Inspired by Gleditsch et al. (2007) and De Mesquita and Downs (2006), the regime-type of the intervener was evaluated using the democracy and autocracy measures from the Polity IV dataset. Both democracy and autocracy were on scales of zero to ten, with ten being the highest level of democracy and autocracy, respectively. If the democracy level was greater than five, then the intervener was considered democratic. An autocracy score that was greater than five led to the intervention considered an autocratic intervention. When there were multiple interveners, the average democracy and autocracy levels were used. If the number of interveners was 19 or more, the democracy level was coded to equal 10 and autocracy levels were coded to equal 0 since the intervention was likely organized by an international body. While it is possible that this assumption is inaccurate, there were only two instances where there were at least 19 interveners, making the risk of biasing the results low. Additionally, previous literature suggested that the side that receives intervention has a

significant impact on the outcome (Kim 2017; Peksen 2012; Pickering and Kisangani 2006; Regan 2002). Two dummy variables were generated to evaluate this effect: whether the government (side A) received third-party support and whether the opposition (side B) received aid. Krain (2005) suggest that the number of interveners is an important factor. Therefore, a variable was generated to account for the number of interveners for each side of the conflict.

Control Variables

The following variables were used as controls: region, length, whether the conflict occurred during the Cold War, the intensity of the conflict, the cumulative intensity of the history of conflict, whether the country was a democracy at the initial end of the conflict, incompatibility of the conflict, and if a subsequent civil conflict occurred within five years after the end of the current conflict. Region was broken into the following five dummy variables, which equaled one if the conflict occurred in the region and zero otherwise: Europe, Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Americas. The length of conflict was measured in days between the start and end dates of the conflict provided by the UCDP/PRIO data. A Cold War variable was generated to equal one if the conflict occurred during the years in which the Cold War took place (1947-1991) and zero otherwise. This variable was used because the competition for influence and control by the United States and the Soviet Union could have caused outcomes to vary from what they normally would have been. The intensity of the conflict was equal to zero if the war was considered to be minor (between 25 and 999 battle related deaths in a given year) and one if it was considered a war (greater than 1000 battle-deaths in a given year). The cumulative intensity, which measured the intensity of the history of the conflict, was coded as one if the number of battle-deaths since the onset of the initial conflict was greater than 1000 and was coded as zero otherwise. The democracy variable from the Polity IV dataset was used to measure if the country

was a democracy at the end of the conflict, which equaled one if the country was considered a democracy, and zero otherwise (Marshall 2016). A country was considered democratic if their democracy level was greater than five at the end of the conflict. Incompatibility was defined as "a general coding of the conflict issue." (Themner 2016). There were three possible values: one if the conflict was fought over territory, two if it was because of government, and three if it was because of both. Since only one observation occurred that was because of both, this was turned into a dummy variable that equaled zero if it was fought over territory and one if it was fought over government (the one fought over both was observed in both instances). Finally, a dummy variable was generated to capture whether a conflict reoccurred within five years since the subsequent conflict would hinder the state's ability to recover from the current conflict.

Interaction Terms

A number of variables were generated in order to capture heterogeneous effects. Regan (2002), paired with findings by Collier (1999) and Koubi (2005), suggest that the intervention lengthens the conflict, which leads to a more rapid economic recovery. Therefore, an interaction term was created between length of the conflict and intervention in order to capture this effect. Additionally, Koubi (2005) found that the severity of a conflict increases post-war development. While the author's findings did not assess the effects of intervention, an interaction term between intensity of the conflict and intervention was generated to analyze whether this relationship holds true when third-parties are involved.

Analysis Plan

Determinants of Intervention

Inspired by Fortna (2004), the first step this paper took in its analysis was to evaluate the selection effect that was likely present within the dataset. This was done with regressions using

intervention as the dependent variable in order to measure whether differences were significant. To further measure the effects of the intervener's regime-type, the same was done using intervention when the third-party was a democracy and when it was an autocracy. This was done using the democratic and autocratic intervener variables. All relevant control variables were included in order to capture the differences in when intervention occurred. Robust standard errors were used throughout this analysis to control for heteroskedasticity. The equation for this analysis was the following:

1. $W_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_2 region_i + \alpha_3 pol_i + \alpha_4 conflictchar_i + \alpha_5 hist_i + T_t + \varepsilon_i$

Where W_i refers to intervention, *region*$_i$ refers to the region variables (Middle East, Africa, Asia, Americas, and Europe), *pol*$_i$ refers to the political factors of the conflict (whether the country was a democracy at the end of the conflict and whether it began during the Cold War), *conflictchar*$_i$ refers to the characteristics of the conflict (the intensity and reason for the conflict), and *hist*$_i$ refers to the variables that describe the past and future history of the conflict (whether a conflict occurred within five years of the current conflict and cumulative intensity). T_t refers to the time fixed effects.

The Impact of Intervention

Multiple equations were used in the analysis of the effects of intervention. All used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Additionally, all equations were run using robust standard errors in order to combat heteroskedasticity.

Equation 2 used intervention as the independent variable, the economic, political, and social factors as the dependent variables, and a number of control variables. The equation was the following:

2. $Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Int_1 + \beta_2 region_i + \beta_3 pol_i + \beta_4 conflictchar_i + \beta_5 hist_i + T_t + \varepsilon_i$

Where Y_i refers to the dependent variable, *int* refers to the intervention term, $region_i$ refers to the region variables (Middle East, Africa, Asia, Americas, and Europe), pol_i refers to the political factors of the conflict (whether the country was a democracy at the end of the conflict and whether it began during the Cold War), $conflictchar_i$ refers to the characteristics of the conflict (intensity, incompatibility, and length), and $hist_i$ refers to the variables that describe the past and future history of the conflict (whether a conflict occurred within five years of the current conflict and cumulative intensity). T_t is the time fixed effects.

The third equation included interaction terms for length X intervention and cumulative intensity X intervention:

3. $$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Int_i + \beta_2 Length_i + \beta_3 cumintens_i + \beta_4 Int_i Length_i + \beta_5 Int_i cumintens_i + \beta_6 region_i + \beta_7 pol_i + \beta_8 conflictchar_i + \beta_9 hist_i + T_t + \varepsilon_i$$

Where Y_i refers to the dependent variable, int_i refers to the intervention term, length refers to the length of the conflict in days, $cumintens_i$ refers to the cumulative intensity of the conflict, $int_i length_i$ refers to the interaction between length and intervention, $int_i cumintens_i$ refers to the interaction between cumulative intensity and intervention. The remaining terms are the same as from the second equation.[3]

The Types of Intervention and Interveners

An analysis into the types of intervention was conducted. OLS regressions with robust standard errors were conducted on the dependent variables using three different types of interaction terms with intervention variables: regime-type of the intervener, the type of intervention, and the number of interveners. Two separate regressions per dependent variable were used to analyze the regime-type of the intervener, using the democratic intervener and

[3] Length and cumulative intensity were removed from their categorizations from Equation 2 in order to illustrate the interaction terms in the equation.

autocratic intervener variables. Two more regressions per outcome variable were run using the three types of intervention: intervention in favor of the government (side A) and intervention in favor the opposition (side B). An additional regression was run per dependent variable incorporating the number of intervener term. Finally, the effects of intervention on the dependent variables were measured when the intervention came from either a neighboring state or a state from the same region as the country in conflict. The equation for the regressions above are as follows:

4. $Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 int_i + \beta_2 intchar1_i + \beta_3 intchar2_i + \beta_4 int_i intchar1_i + \beta_5 int_i intchar2_i + \beta_6 region_i + \beta_7 dem_i + \beta_8 clonflictchar_i + \beta_9 hist_i + T_t + \varepsilon_i$

Where Y_i refers to the dependent variable, int_i refers to the intervention term, $intchar1_i$ refers to the first intervention-characterization variable (regime-type, type of intervention, number of interveners, or location of interveners) while $intchar2_i$ refers to the second intervention-characterization term, and $int_i intchar1_i$ and $int_i intchar2_i$ refers to the interaction between the intervention term and the intervention-characterization term. The remaining variables were the same as from Equation 2.

Results

Descriptive Results

Tables 1-4 provide the following results. Tables 4-6 show basic summary statistics of the outcome variables. There were 399 cases of civil conflicts observed, with 52 conflicts (approximately 13%) experiencing intervention and 347 conflicts (approximately 87%) not experiencing intervention. The average length of conflict in days was 6243.6 days, while the average length of conflicts that experienced intervention was 5451.6 days and those that did not experience intervention was 6361.6 days. Conflicts whose intensity variable indicated that they

were considered wars accounted for 12.5% of observations. Approximately 26.9% of interventions took place in wars while 10.4% of conflicts that did not experience intervention were wars.

States that were democracies at the end of the conflict accounted for 45.9% of the observations. Democratic states that housed conflicts experienced intervention 46.2% of the time while there was not intervention 45.8% of the time. The cumulative intensity was greater than 1,000 battle-deaths 50.9% of the time, with intervention occurring 69.2% of the time that this was true while no intervention occurred 48.2% of the time. Approximately 47.6% of conflicts were fought over government, with this being true 59.6% of the instances intervention occurred while 45.8% of the conflicts without intervention were fought over government. Of the 401 conflicts observed, 52.6% had a conflict occur within five years. Approximately 32.7% of conflicts that experienced intervention had another conflict occur within five years while 55.6% of conflicts without intervention experienced a reoccurrence of conflict within five years. The Cold War had 70.3% of conflicts occur during its time period, with 53.8% of them experiencing intervention and 72.8% without.

Europe had 10.5% of conflicts occur within its region, with 21.2% of conflicts with intervention being in Europe and 8.9% without intervention. The Middle East housed 13.5% of conflicts, with the frequency of conflicts with intervention and without intervention in the region both also being 13.5%. Thirty-one percent of conflicts occurred in Asia, with conflicts with intervention being in the region 17.3% while conflicts without intervention occurred in Asia 33.2% of the time. Africa housed the most conflicts with 36.9%. Forty-four percent of conflicts that experienced intervention occurred in Africa while the same was true for 35.8% of conflicts

without intervention. The Americas experienced 7.5% of the conflicts in the dataset, and 3.8% and 8% of conflicts with and without intervention, respectively.

Figure 1[4]: Map of Where Conflicts Occur



The apparent difference between conflicts that experienced intervention and those that did not was further tested to see if such differences were significant. T-tests were run in order to test this. The results can be seen in tables 1-3. There was a significant difference between the intensity of the conflict when intervention occurred, with a conflict being classified as a war

Figure 2[5]: Map of Where Interventions Occur

[4] Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of civil conflicts within the study's time period. Lighter shaded countries, like the United States, have experienced fewer conflicts than the darker shaded countries, like India.
[5] Figure 2 shows the distribution of states that underwent conflict (red) compared to those who also experienced intervention (green).



0.1655 points (p = 0.0125) less when intervention occurred. There was a significant difference in conflicts fought over government of -.1379 points (p = 0.0657) between instances that experienced intervention and those that did not. The differences between conflicts experiencing intervention in conflicts in Asia compared to conflicts without intervention was 0.1593 points (p = 0.0082), while the difference in conflicts in Europe was -0.1227 points (p = 0.0426). The difference between conflicts in the Cold War that experienced intervention and those that did not was 0.1893 (p = 0.0126). The difference in wars that experienced intervention compared to those that did not was 0.2110 (p = 0.0657). Finally, wars that experienced intervention also experienced another war within five years of the end of the current conflict 0.2293 points more than conflicts that did not experience intervention. The outcomes from the t-tests of the remaining variables did not yield significant results.

These results indicate that there is a statistical difference between the variables above when the conflict experiences intervention and when the conflict does not. Further analysis was done to explore this finding, which is can be found in the following section.

Table 1: Summary Statistics- Conflict Characteristics

Intervention	Length (Days)	Intensity	Incompatibility
No	6361.63	10.4%	45.8%
Yes	5451.60	26.9%	59.6%
Total	6243.03	12.5%	47.6%
Difference	910.03 (886.89)	-0.1655** (0.0642)	-0.1379* (0.0737)

Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1

Table 2: Summary Statistics- Region Terms

Intervention	Middle East	Asia	Africa	Europe	Americas
No	13.5%	33.2%	35.8%	8.9%	8.02%
Yes	13.5%	17.3%	44.2%	21.2%	3.8%
Total	13.5%	31.2%	36.9%	10.5%	7.5%
Difference	-0.0001 (0.0005)	0.1593*** (0.0587)	-0.08 (0.0741)	-0.01227** (0.0592)	0.0417 (0.306)

Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1

Table 3: Summary Statistics- Political Factors of Conflict and Conflict History

Intervention	Cold War	Democracy	Cumulative Intensity	War Occurring Within Five Years
No	72.8%	45.8%	48.2%	55.6%
Yes	53.8%	46.2%	69.2%	32.7%
Total	70.3%	45.9%	50.9%	52.6%
Difference	0.1893** (0.738)	0.31 (0.747)	-0.2110*** (0.70)	0.2293*** (0.710)

Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1

Table 4: Summary Statistics- Economic Outcome Variables

	Logged GNI per Capita (Change in Percentage Points)			Logged GDP per Capita (Change in Percentage Points)			Growth Rate (Change in Percentage Points)		
Intervention	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
No	5.35	6.12	6.90	0.25	0.55	1.0	2.05	2.73	3.27
Yes	5.56	6.65	6.83	0.45	0.88	1.18	0.26	2.74	-0.61

Total	5.38	6.17	6.90	0.26	0.58	1.0	1.91	2.73	3.10

Table 5: Summary Statistics- Social Outcome Variables

	Mortality Rate (Deaths per 1000 members of Population)			Life Expectancy (Years)		
Intervention	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
No	-15.44	-30.87	-56.99	2.01	3.84	2.22
Yes	-23.92	-46.87	-87.81	2.11	4.78	8.65
Total	-16.18	-32.26	-58.95	2.02	3.92	2.69

Table 6: Summary Statistics- Political Outcome Variables

	Democracy Level			Autocracy Level		
Intervention	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
No	0.34	0.67	1.59	-0.16	-0.6	-1.56
Yes	0.04	0.63	-0.18	-0.26	-0.37	-1.36
Total	0.31	0.66	1.48	-0.17	-0.58	-1.55

When Does Intervention Occur?

The results from the following regressions can be found in table 7. The conflict occurring during the Cold War decreased the likelihood of intervention by 12.6 percentage points ($p = 0.028$). The cumulative number of battle deaths being at least 1000 increased the likelihood of intervention by 11.2 percentage points ($p = 0.008$). The conflict occurring in the Americas significantly decreased the likelihood of intervention by 13.7 percentage points ($p = 0.086$) while conflicts occurring in Asia and the Middle East decreased the likelihood by 17.3 percentage points ($p = 0.011$) and 16.1 percentage points ($p = 0.038$), respectively. The other variables did not have a significant relationship with the likelihood of intervention.

Next, it was examined when democratic states intervene. None of the variables were significant predictors of democratic intervention; although, intensity, democracy, and incompatibility approached significance. Intensity measuring the conflict as a war increased the likelihood of democratic intervention by 9.1 percentage points ($p = 0.126$), the state being a

democracy at the end of the conflict increased the likelihood by 3.9 percentage points (p = 0.159), and the conflict being fought over the government increased the likelihood of democratic intervention by 4.4 percentage points (p = 0.156).

Finally, autocratic state's interventions were examined. The Cold War significantly decreased the likelihood of an autocratic intervener by 11.8 percentage points (p = 0.035). The cumulative intensity being equal to one increased the likelihood of autocratic intervention by 9.4 percentage points (p = 0.015). The conflict occurring in the Middle East decreased the likelihood of intervention by an autocratic state by 19.4 percentage points (p = 0.006) and if it occurred in Asia the likelihood of autocratic intervention decreased by 16.3 percentage points (p = 0.013). The rest of the variables were not statistically significant.

Table 7: Likelihood of Intervention Post-1960

VARIABLES	(1) Intervention	(2) Democratic Intervener	(3) Autocratic Intervener
Cold War	-0.126**	-0.0521	-0.118**
	(0.0570)	(0.0484)	(0.0557)
Middle East	-0.161**	0.0510	-0.194***
	(0.0771)	(0.0550)	(0.0695)
Asia	-0.173**	-0.00117	-0.163**
	(0.0675)	(0.0398)	(0.0650)
Americas	-0.137*	-0.00431	-0.113
	(0.0797)	(0.0633)	(0.0792)
Africa	-0.101	0.0456	-0.0982
	(0.0673)	(0.0438)	(0.0641)
Intensity	0.0942	0.0910	0.0580
	(0.0672)	(0.0592)	(0.0599)
Cumulative Intensity	0.112***	0.0414	0.0942**
	(0.0422)	(0.0344)	(0.0385)
Democracy	0.0104	0.0392	0.00381
	(0.0363)	(0.0278)	(0.0337)
Incompatibility	0.0558	0.0438	0.0442
	(0.0380)	(0.0308)	(0.0339)
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.702*	-0.0335	0.702*

	(0.419)	(0.0568)	(0.418)
Observations	399	399	399
R-squared	0.283	0.216	0.284

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1

The significance of the Cold War as a predictor of intervention warrants further investigation because the motivation for states involved in the Cold War, like the United States and Russia, may have changed since the end of the Cold War.

Post-Cold War

Following Fortna (2004), the same analysis that was done above was done using only observations after the end of the Cold War, which has 35 cases of intervention and 215 without intervention (total of 250). Table 8 shows the results. The conflict occurring in the Middle East decreased the likelihood of intervention by 31.2 percentage points ($p = 0.001$) and if the conflict occurred in Asia the likelihood of intervention decreased by 30.2 percentage points ($p = 0.000$). Africa decreased the likelihood of intervention by 18.4 percentage points ($p = 0.027$) and the Americas decreased the likelihood of intervention by 21.9 percentage points ($p = 0.087$). Additionally, intensity indicating that a conflict was a war increased the likelihood of intervention by 22.7 percentage points ($p = 0.022$). The remaining variables were not statistically significant.

Next, democratic states intervening was analyzed. The only significant predictor of democratic intervention was intensity, which found that a conflict being a war increased the likelihood of intervention by 15.6 percentage points ($p = 0.060$). Autocratic interveners were then observed. The conflict occurring in the Middle East decreased the likelihood of an autocratic state intervening by 31.4 percentage points ($p = 0.000$), the conflict occurring in Asia decreased the likelihood of intervention by 28.4 percentage points ($p = 0.000$), and the conflict

occurring in Africa decreased the likelihood of autocratic intervention by 16.2 percentage points ($p = 0.048$). Meanwhile, a conflict being a war increased the likelihood of autocratic intervention by 19.2 percentage points ($p = 0.048$). The other terms were not statistically significant.

Table 8: Likelihood of Intervention Post-Cold War

VARIABLES	(1) Intervention	(2) Democratic Intervener	(3) Autocratic Intervener
Middle East	-0.312***	-0.00103	-0.314***
	(0.0891)	(0.0550)	(0.0855)
Asia	-0.302***	-0.0263	-0.284***
	(0.0791)	(0.0356)	(0.0767)
Americas	-0.219*	0.0357	-0.199
	(0.128)	(0.118)	(0.127)
Africa	-0.184**	0.0211	-0.162**
	(0.0824)	(0.0444)	(0.0800)
Intensity	0.227**	0.156*	0.192**
	(0.0984)	(0.0826)	(0.0969)
Cumulative Intensity	0.0296	0.000704	0.0401
	(0.0416)	(0.0282)	(0.0409)
Democracy	-0.0457	0.00933	-0.0481
	(0.0434)	(0.0303)	(0.0424)
Incompatibility	0.0537	0.0362	0.0474
	(0.0453)	(0.0358)	(0.0444)
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.180**	-0.0277	0.167**
	(0.0834)	(0.0477)	(0.0788)
Observations	248	248	248
R-squared	0.282	0.168	0.276

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Drawing back from the literature review of this paper, the findings by Gilligan and Stedman (2003) suggest that the cumulative intensity should have a positive impact on the likelihood of peacekeeping missions while Fortna (2004) asserts that peacekeepers go where they are most needed. The results from the current analysis support these previous findings. Since 1960, conflicts that were wars increased the likelihood of intervention and democratic

intervention at levels that fell just short of statistical significance, while cumulative intensity had a positive effect on the likelihood of intervention and autocratic intervention. In the post-Cold War period, the intensity of the conflict became positive and significant for intervention, democratic intervention, and autocratic intervention. However, cumulative intensity lost its significant relationship with intervention and autocratic intervention. Overall, these results support the findings of past literature. It should also be noted that while the two studies mentioned above only focused on peacekeeping missions organized by the United Nations, this paper included unilateral interventions. Therefore, this study expands the scope of the literature to cover interventions as a whole, as opposed to just missions from the United Nations.

The Effects of Intervention

Economic Factors

Table A in the appendix provides the full results. The difference between the GNI per capita of the country at the initial end of the conflict and five, ten, and twenty years later experienced decreases of 13.5 percentage points ($p = 0.699$), 0.6 percentage points ($p = 0.984$), 24.3 percentage points ($p = 0.536$), respectively; though, the relationships were not significant. Intervention increased GDP per capita by 0.06 points ($p = 0.568$) after five years, 0.04 points ($p = 0.773$) after ten years, and 0.30 points ($p = 0.219$) after twenty years. None of these relationships were statistically significant. Intervention decreased the growth rate by 4.24 percentage points ($p = 0.089$) after five years, 2.09 percentage points ($p = 0.477$) after ten years, and 6.93 percentage points ($p = 0.154$) after twenty years. The coefficient was only statistically significant after five years. Subsequently, intervention appears to have a slight negative impact on economic factors.

Social Factors

See table 9 for full results. Intervention decreased mortality rate by 4.33 deaths per 1000 members of the population (p = 0.240) after five years, 9.54 deaths per 1000 (p = 0.169) after ten years, and 27.75 deaths per 1000 (p = 0.074) after twenty years; though, only the latter-most relationship was significant. Intervention decreased life expectancy by 0.08 years (p = 0.845) after five years, increased life expectancy by 0.46 years (p = 0.432) after ten years, and increased life expectancy by 1.57 years (p = 0.176) after twenty years. None of the relationships were significant. While only one relationship among the social factors was significant, a number of others were lingering near significance. Therefore, intervention seems to have a significant effect on social factors.

Table 9: The Effects of Intervention- Social Factors

	Mortality Rate			Life Expectancy		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	-4.331	-9.540	-27.75*	-0.0753	0.462	1.571
	(3.680)	(6.918)	(15.45)	(0.384)	(0.587)	(1.157)
Middle East	-10.00***	-20.33***	-49.83***	1.993***	3.776***	5.698***
	(3.422)	(6.258)	(11.81)	(0.524)	(0.855)	(1.720)
Africa	-15.30***	-32.21***	-73.46***	1.328***	2.582***	5.000***
	(3.057)	(5.702)	(11.31)	(0.470)	(0.670)	(1.318)
Asia	-10.52***	-21.48***	-49.20***	1.074**	2.120***	4.191***
	(2.618)	(4.905)	(9.892)	(0.447)	(0.634)	(1.242)
Americas	-11.07***	-22.26***	-39.80***	1.133**	2.422***	3.962**
	(3.262)	(6.577)	(11.81)	(0.470)	(0.732)	(1.604)
Length	0.000369	0.00108***	0.00169**	-2.20e-05	-7.36e-05	-0.000200
	(0.000225)	(0.000410)	(0.000719)	(3.75e-05)	(5.55e-05)	(0.000122)
Cold War	0.448	-1.553	-1.710	-0.198	-0.360	1.667
	(3.642)	(6.762)	(14.70)	(0.639)	(0.979)	(2.186)
Intensity	-3.384	-4.250	-6.518	0.0630	-0.0914	-0.411
	(3.361)	(6.324)	(10.42)	(0.589)	(0.941)	(1.649)
Cumulative Intensity	-3.811**	-6.834*	-2.002	0.560**	0.977**	1.054
	(1.867)	(3.646)	(6.834)	(0.230)	(0.397)	(1.053)
War in Five	-3.223*	-7.793**	-11.06*	0.184	0.447	-0.344
	(1.895)	(3.698)	(6.670)	(0.271)	(0.473)	(0.855)
Incompatibility	-1.224	-1.281	1.111	0.188	-0.0326	-0.687
	(1.932)	(3.837)	(7.430)	(0.243)	(0.432)	(0.953)

Democracy	1.784	1.779	-1.845	-0.165	-0.0761	-0.0151
	(1.962)	(3.721)	(6.368)	(0.288)	(0.448)	(0.966)
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-12.70**	-8.237	15.50	1.629**	2.418**	0.872
	(6.146)	(11.19)	(20.72)	(0.789)	(1.183)	(2.522)
Observations	308	275	204	307	280	216
R-squared	0.409	0.406	0.450	0.268	0.298	0.934

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Political Factors

See table B in the appendix for full results. Intervention decreased democracy levels by 0.57 points (p = 0.212) after five years, increased democracy levels by 0.045 points (p = 0.954) after ten years, and led to a 1.17-point (p = 0.320) decrease after twenty years. There was never a significant effect. Intervention impacted autocracy levels by -0.15 points (p = 0.696) after five years, -0.07 points (p = 0.895) after ten years, and -0.46 points (p = 0.656) after twenty years. The results were never significant. Therefore, there is no apparent relationship between intervention and political factors.

Overall, intervention had significant impacts on economic and social factors, while not having any effect on political factors. While three was a decrease in growth rate after five years, results did not suggest a strong residual effect. Additionally, there was a decrease in mortality rate that was significant twenty years after the end of the conflict.

Additional Relationships[6]

Length

Length increased GNI per capita by 0.005 percentage points (p = 0.098) per day after five years, but was not significant during any other time period. For every day the conflict occurred,

[6] Only significant relationships within this section were reported. See tables 9, and A and B in the appendix, for the full results.

the mortality rate increased by an insignificant amount after five years, 0.0012 deaths per 1000 ($p = 0.009$) after ten years, and 0.0017 deaths per 1000 ($p = 0.020$) after twenty years. Meanwhile, length decreased democracy levels; although this relationship was only significant after twenty years, when length decreased democracy levels by 0.00018 points ($p = 0.019$) per day the conflict occurred.

Cumulative Intensity

Cumulative intensity increased GDP per capita after five years at insignificant levels, but significantly increased by 20 percentage points ($p = 0.088$) after ten years and 29.4 percentage points ($p = 0.097$) after twenty years. Additionally, life expectancy increased by 0.56 years ($p = 0.015$) after five years, 0.98 years ($p = 0.015$) after ten years, but was not significant after twenty years. Additionally, democracy level significantly increased by 0.55 points ($p = 0.076$). On the other hand, if the cumulative intensity was equal to one, the mortality rate decreased by 3.81 deaths per 1000 ($p = 0.042$) after five years, 6.83 deaths per 1000 ($p = 0.062$) after ten years, but was not significant after twenty years.

Incompatibility

If the conflict was fought over the government, growth rate increased by 3.98 percentage points ($p = 0.011$) after five years, 6.23 points ($p = 0.002$) after ten years, and 4.79 points ($p = 0.026$) after twenty years. GNI per capita experienced a decrease when conflicts were fought over government, with it decreasing by 54.5 percentage points ($p = 0.038$), but was not significant after ten or twenty years. Democracy level also had a negative relationship between conflicts that were fought over the government, but the effects were not significant after five and twenty years. However, democracy level did significantly decrease by 0.90 points ($p = 0.057$) after ten years.

Intensity

If the conflict was considered a war, growth increased by 6.45 percentage points ($p = 0.063$) after five years, 7.44 percentage points ($p = 0.045$) after ten years, but was not significant after twenty years. Meanwhile wars decreased GNI per capita by 68.5 percentage points ($p = 0.059$) after twenty years, but there was no significant relationship after five or ten years.

Cold War

Conflicts that occurred during the Cold War had positive impact on democracy levels after five years, leading to a 1.39-point ($p = 0.010$) increase. Meanwhile, the Cold War decreased GDP per capita by 25 percentage points ($p = 0.052$) after ten years, but was not significant after five or twenty years. Additionally, autocracy levels decreased by 1.29 points ($p = 0.007$) after five years if the conflict occurred during the Cold War and by 1.06 points ($p = 0.067$) after ten years, but was not significant after twenty years.

Interaction Terms

Tables 10 and C and D in the appendix provide full results for this section.

Length X Intervention

The interaction between length and intervention increased GDP per capita by an additional 0.005 percentage points ($p = 0.088$) per day after five years, 0.006 percentage points ($p = 0.202$) per day after ten years, and increased GDP per capita by an additional 0.011 percentage points ($p = 0.012$) per day after twenty years. However, the relationship after ten years was not significant, and the remaining terms had small magnitudes. The interaction term increased autocracy levels by an additional 0.0003 points ($p = 0.011$) per day after five years, 0.004 points ($p = 0.089$) per day after ten years, and 0.0003 points ($p = 0.358$) per day after twenty years. The relationships after five and ten years were significant. The interaction term

decreased growth rate by an additional 0.003 points (p = 0.023) after twenty years. The relationships after five and ten years were not significant. The remaining dependent variables were not significant.

Table 10: Interaction Terms- Economic Factors

	GNI per capita			GDP per capita			Growth Rate		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	0.389	-0.103	-0.159	-0.158	-0.107	-0.0622	-3.959	0.0780	-4.418
	(0.451)	(0.502)	(0.574)	(0.145)	(0.200)	(0.250)	(2.626)	(2.359)	(4.320)
Middle East	0.346	0.526	-0.852*	-0.186	-0.197	-0.603**	-8.023**	-8.737*	-9.261*
	(0.520)	(0.484)	(0.454)	(0.128)	(0.184)	(0.236)	(3.726)	(4.738)	(5.006)
Africa	-1.707***	-1.929***	-2.885***	-0.235**	-0.420***	-0.827***	-5.620	-6.297	-5.315
	(0.369)	(0.397)	(0.400)	(0.0980)	(0.145)	(0.193)	(3.451)	(4.021)	(4.239)
Asia	-1.848***	-1.527***	-2.263***	-0.0725	-0.128	-0.408**	-5.168	-5.756	-7.405*
	(0.391)	(0.398)	(0.389)	(0.106)	(0.160)	(0.203)	(3.363)	(3.727)	(4.135)
Americas	-0.416	0.0801	-0.524	-0.0840	-0.120	-0.556**	-4.409	-7.688*	-7.233
	(0.539)	(0.505)	(0.454)	(0.152)	(0.190)	(0.219)	(3.992)	(4.641)	(4.855)
Length	5.68e-05*	-1.01e-05	8.05e-06	1.44e-06	-1.16e-06	-1.73e-05	-7.96e-05	-5.32e-05	-0.000165
	(3.04e-05)	(2.43e-05)	(3.35e-05)	(8.55e-06)	(1.12e-05)	(1.51e-05)	(0.000185)	(0.000228)	(0.000266)
Cold War	-0.0940	-0.324	0.166	-0.0803	-0.270**	0.0162	1.050	1.837	-1.529
	(0.428)	(0.371)	(0.524)	(0.0852)	(0.129)	(0.236)	(2.788)	(3.023)	(4.303)
Intensity	-0.190	-0.297	-0.677*	-0.0622	-0.203	-0.341*	6.529*	7.558**	1.089
	(0.350)	(0.372)	(0.367)	(0.0955)	(0.125)	(0.201)	(3.466)	(3.703)	(4.806)
Cumint	-0.152	0.330	0.140	0.115	0.212*	0.310*	-0.904	-1.528	1.468
	(0.262)	(0.231)	(0.329)	(0.0882)	(0.120)	(0.180)	(1.620)	(2.176)	(2.577)
War in Five	-0.237	-0.0612	-0.398	-0.0334	-0.0159	-0.177	2.425	3.837*	3.200
	(0.268)	(0.216)	(0.255)	(0.0566)	(0.0840)	(0.138)	(1.572)	(2.172)	(2.538)
Incompatibility	-0.518**	-0.273	-0.290	-0.0437	-0.0775	-0.0138	4.023***	6.342***	4.724**
	(0.255)	(0.225)	(0.254)	(0.0567)	(0.0856)	(0.130)	(1.543)	(1.981)	(2.174)
Democracy	0.121	0.343*	0.446*	-0.0247	0.00501	0.152	2.150	2.787	2.273
	(0.230)	(0.197)	(0.237)	(0.0566)	(0.0818)	(0.115)	(1.465)	(1.972)	(1.942)
Length X intervention	-0.000126	3.57e-05	-8.77e-05	4.65e-05*	6.46e-05	0.000109**	-0.000368	-0.000948	-0.00308**
	(0.000103)	(9.21e-05)	(0.000133)	(2.71e-05)	(5.05e-05)	(4.26e-05)	(0.000665)	(0.00118)	(0.00134)
Cumulative Intensity X Intervention	0.250	-0.0598	1.373	-0.0409	-0.223	-0.310	2.637	3.401	20.75*
	(0.615)	(0.704)	(1.321)	(0.190)	(0.329)	(0.478)	(4.672)	(5.413)	(11.76)
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	6.346***	6.705***	9.479***	0.612***	0.938***	2.251***	-3.703	-2.550	9.322
	(0.735)	(0.700)	(0.766)	(0.210)	(0.302)	(0.420)	(6.420)	(6.479)	(8.415)
Observations	198	184	140	267	233	167	291	257	198
R-squared	0.618	0.680	0.758	0.507	0.633	0.665	0.299	0.276	0.290

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Cumulative Intensity X Intervention

The interaction between cumulative intensity and intervention increased growth rate by 2.64 percentage points (p = 0.573) after five years, 3.40 percentage points (p = 0.530) after ten years, and 20.75 percentage points (p = 0.080) after twenty years. Only the relationship after twenty years was significant. The interaction term also increased life expectancy by an additional 0.09 years (p = 0.914) after five years and 0.38 years (p = 0.798) after ten years while causing it

to decrease by an additional 4.91 years (p = 0.071) after twenty years. However, only the relationship after twenty years was significant and relatively large standard errors could be attributed for the sign-change. Additionally, the interaction between cumulative intensity and intervention led to a decrease in autocracy levels by an additional 2.02 points (p = 0.048) after five years, 1.77 points (p = 0.129) after ten years, and 4.15 points (p = 0.015) after twenty years. The relationships after five and twenty years were significant. The remaining effects of the interaction and dependent variables were not significant.

Figure One[7]: Additional Impact on Interaction Terms on Autocracy Level



The interaction between length and intervention had mixed effects on economic variables, with a negative impact on growth rate and positive one GDP per capita. However, the coefficients for both of these additional effects were relatively small, equaling zero to the third decimal. It had no impact on social terms and there was a marginal impact on political factors. In terms of cumulative intensity and intervention, growth rate increased while life expectancy

[7] Figure One shows the effects of the two interaction terms over time. Length X Intervention stays virtually at zero, showing that even though the results were statistically significant, the magnitude of the effects were weak. Significant additional effects were shown with the following symbol: ◊ (a hollowed diamond). Insignificant effects were shown with the symbol being filled.

decreased. This suggests that while certain factors may benefit from different interactions, others may experience the opposite effect.

The Types of Intervention and Interveners

There were 27 instances where the intervener was considered democratic and 42 autocratic interventions. Intervention in favor of the government occurred 39 times while rebels received support on 22 occasions. Finally, the average number of interveners was when intervention occurred was 3.23 interveners.

Regime-Type of the Intervener

Full results can be found in tables 11, E and F (appendix).

Democratic Intervention

The interaction between democratic intervention and intervention increased growth rate by an additional 7.81 points (p = 0.066) after five years, 9.96 points (p = 0.061) after ten years**,** and 8.84 points (p = 0.300) after twenty years. These relationships were significant except for after twenty years.

Additionally, democratic intervention decreased GNI per capita by an additional 20.7 percentage points (p = 0.098) after five years, 67.5 percentage points (p = 0.154) after ten years, and 20.7 percentage points (p = 0.708) after twenty years. However, only the relationship after five years was significant. Autocracy levels decreased by an additional 1.21 points (p = 0.181) after five years, 2.79 points (p = 0.011) after ten years, but increased autocracy levels by 0.90 (p = 0.626) after twenty years. However, only the relationship after ten years was significant. The remaining dependent variables had no significant relationship with democratic intervention.

Table 11: The Types of Intervention and Interveners- Economic Factors Regime-Type

	GNI per capita			GDP per capita			Growth Rate		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	0.191	0.934	0.976	0.329	0.413	-0.560	-24.39***	-28.13**	-12.62

	(1.216)	(0.924)	(0.897)	(0.413)	(0.606)	(0.635)	(7.006)	(11.83)	(10.04)
Middle East	0.444	0.415	-0.842*	-0.244*	-0.219	-0.574**	-7.395**	-8.094*	-9.470*
	(0.534)	(0.484)	(0.443)	(0.125)	(0.184)	(0.236)	(3.742)	(4.608)	(5.051)
Africa	-1.576***	-1.956***	-2.873***	-0.269***	-0.425***	-0.834***	-5.756	-6.401	-5.257
	(0.385)	(0.390)	(0.402)	(0.101)	(0.146)	(0.194)	(3.589)	(3.907)	(4.275)
Asia	-1.715***	-1.560***	-2.349***	-0.112	-0.144	-0.394*	-5.172	-5.587	-7.323*
	(0.404)	(0.390)	(0.396)	(0.106)	(0.160)	(0.208)	(3.438)	(3.599)	(4.163)
Americas	-0.310	0.0620	-0.565	-0.114	-0.133	-0.559**	-4.306	-7.467	-7.488
	(0.551)	(0.499)	(0.445)	(0.155)	(0.192)	(0.221)	(4.062)	(4.596)	(4.881)
Length	5.04e-05*	-7.16e-06	1.23e-06	1.79e-06	8.07e-07	-1.28e-05	-8.64e-05	-8.41e-05	-0.000161
	(3.00e-05)	(2.43e-05)	(3.36e-05)	(8.47e-06)	(1.13e-05)	(1.52e-05)	(0.000181)	(0.000222)	(0.000260)
Cold War	-0.0794	-0.258	0.224	-0.0501	-0.237*	-0.0233	0.331	0.914	-1.975
	(0.427)	(0.379)	(0.524)	(0.0827)	(0.129)	(0.239)	(2.825)	(3.018)	(4.330)
Intensity	-0.0392	-0.250	-0.696*	-0.0747	-0.188	-0.339	6.326*	7.134*	0.718
	(0.367)	(0.386)	(0.385)	(0.0970)	(0.130)	(0.205)	(3.640)	(3.952)	(4.985)
Cumulative Intensity	-0.179	0.298	0.182	0.109	0.186	0.308*	-0.466	-0.989	2.038
	(0.255)	(0.236)	(0.334)	(0.0851)	(0.121)	(0.179)	(1.521)	(2.064)	(2.534)
War in Five	-0.291	-0.0807	-0.316	-0.0202	-0.0190	-0.184	2.309	3.840*	2.917
	(0.276)	(0.229)	(0.252)	(0.0548)	(0.0849)	(0.141)	(1.564)	(2.161)	(2.566)
Incompatibility	-0.531**	-0.299	-0.182	-0.0309	-0.0711	-0.0215	3.767**	6.110***	4.525**
	(0.262)	(0.233)	(0.239)	(0.0583)	(0.0873)	(0.131)	(1.585)	(1.987)	(2.202)
Democracy	0.123	0.326*	0.493**	-0.0232	0.0140	0.149	2.042	2.612	1.639
	(0.238)	(0.196)	(0.247)	(0.0571)	(0.0836)	(0.120)	(1.436)	(1.950)	(1.955)
Democratic Intervener X Intervention	-0.982*	-0.675	0.207	0.0347	-0.191	0.472	7.813*	9.964*	8.835
	(0.589)	(0.471)	(0.552)	(0.167)	(0.244)	(0.529)	(4.231)	(5.287)	(8.490)
Autocratic Intervener X Intervention	0.460	-0.0506	1.108*	0.178	0.156	-0.263	4.646	5.674	-22.55**
	(0.843)	(0.645)	(0.574)	(0.169)	(0.209)	(0.465)	(4.169)	(4.969)	(8.732)
Democratic intervener	-0.757	-0.0350	-2.005**	-0.00843	-0.104	0.946*	2.651	6.335	15.37
	(0.854)	(0.640)	(0.791)	(0.171)	(0.291)	(0.506)	(5.641)	(5.293)	(11.86)
Autocratic intervener	0.683	-0.566		-0.407	-0.307		15.77***	18.28**	
	(0.968)	(0.717)		(0.337)	(0.414)		(5.017)	(8.402)	
o.Autocratic intervener						-			-
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	6.594***	6.950***	7.933***	0.536**	0.944***	2.412***	-2.859	-1.623	9.959
	(0.879)	(0.908)	(0.798)	(0.220)	(0.354)	(0.469)	(6.666)	(6.426)	(8.442)
Observations	198	184	140	267	233	167	291	257	198
R-squared	0.621	0.684	0.762	0.510	0.632	0.664	0.315	0.289	0.298

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Autocratic Intervention

Autocratic intervention increased life expectancy by 0.65 years (p = 0.450) after five years, 3.14 years (p = 0.002) after ten years, and 1.33 years (p = 0.575) after twenty years. Only the relationship after ten years was significant. Autocratic intervention impacted GNI per capita by 46 percentage points (p = 0.586) after five years, -5.1 percentage points (p = 0.938) after ten years, and 110.8 percentage points (p = 0.057) after twenty years. Only the relationship after twenty years was significant.

Figure Two[8]: Effects of Regime-Type on Growth Rate



Autocratic intervention was significantly related to growth rate only after twenty years, where it led to an additional decrease of 22.55 points ($p = 0.011$). Intervention by autocratic regimes decreased democracy levels by an additional 2.48 points ($p = 0.030$) after five years, 3.92 points ($p = 0.002$) after ten years, but increased democracy levels by 10.74 points ($p = 0.000$) after twenty years. Interestingly, all of these relationships were significant and standard errors were not large enough to have had any obvious effect. Autocratic interveners only had a significant relationship with autocracy levels after twenty years, where it led to an additional decrease of 9.07 points ($p = 0.000$). The remaining variables can be found in the appendix (Tables E and F), as they did not yield significant results.

Figure Three[9]: Impact of Regime-Type on Democracy Level

[8] Figure Two shows that democratic intervention's additional effect on growth rate is positive after five and ten years, leading to net gains in growth rate. Autocratic intervention had no effect after five and ten years, but lead to a sharp decrease in growth rate after twenty years.
Significant additional effects were shown with the following symbol: ◊ (a hollowed diamond). Insignificant effects were shown with the symbol being filled.

[9] Figure Three shows the change in direction that democracy level experiences from the additional impact of autocratic intervention. Not only do democracy levels increase after twenty years, but the net additional effect is positive, as well. Meanwhile democratic intervention had no significant additional impact on democracy levels.



Democratic intervention appears to have a positive impact on economic factors. However, its results suggest that the effects from autocratic intervention are negative. This type of intervention can create contradictory effects on economic terms, while also having interesting relationships with political variables. Autocratic intervention increases life expectancy while decreasing growth rate. Its impact on democracy level is negative five and ten years after the end of the conflict, but leads to an increase in democracy level after twenty years.

Recipient of Intervention

Full results can be found in the appendix (Tables G, H, and I).

Support for the Government (Side A)

Interventions that were in favor of the government increased GNI per capita by an additional 32.3 percentage points ($p = 0.724$) after five years, 41.4 percentage points ($p = 0.463$) after ten years, and 244.3 percentage points ($p = 0.000$) after twenty years. Only the relationship after twenty years was significant. Support for the government decreased GDP per capita by an

---

Significant additional effects were shown with the following symbol: ◊ (a hollowed diamond). Insignificant effects were shown with the symbol being filled.

additional 47.3 percentage points (p = 0.036) after five years, but did not have significant impacts on this term after ten or twenty years. The remaining terms were not significant.

Support for Rebels (Side B)

Rebel support increased GNI per capita by an additional 81.3 percentage points (p = 0.281) after five years, 100.8 percentage points (p = 0.063) after ten years, and 46.4 percentage points (p = 0.502) after twenty years. Only the relationship after ten years was significant. Additionally, it increased democracy levels after five years by an additional 0.48 points (p = 0.531), 0.63 points (p = 0.641) after ten years, and but decreased democracy levels by 3.19 points (p = 0.079) after twenty years. Only the relationship after twenty years was significant. The remaining results did not have significant outcomes.

Results found that social and political factors were not strongly related to the recipient of intervention while economic factors seemed to have a more substantial relationship. Support for either side appeared to increase democracy levels while support for the government led to a decrease in GDP per capita. GNI per capita experienced a sizable additional increase after twenty years.

Number of Interveners

Tables J, K, and L (appendix) provide the full results of this section.

The interaction between the number of interveners and intervention increased growth by an additional 0.91 percentage points (p = 0.003) after five years, 0.34 percentage points (p = 0.355) after ten years, and led to a decrease in growth rate by an additional 0.858 percentage points (p = 0.838) after twenty years. However, only the relationship after five years was significant. The number of interveners increased mortality rate by an additional 0.77 deaths per 1000 (p = 0.145) per intervener after five years, 1.30 deaths per 1000 (p = 0.099) per intervener

after ten years, and 3.29 deaths per 1000 ($p = 0.804$) per intervener after twenty years. Only the relationship after ten years was significant, though the effects after five years neared the 10% level of significance. There was also an increase in democracy levels by an additional 0.22 points ($p = 0.000$) per intervener after five years, 0.34 points ($p = 0.000$) per intervener after ten years, and 0.22 points ($p = 0.773$) per intervener after twenty years. These relationships were significant after five and ten years, but was not after twenty years.

The additional impact of the number of interveners decreased GDP per capita by 2.0 percentage points ($p = 0.112$) per intervener after five years, 2.8 percentage points ($p = 0.077$) per intervener after ten years, but increased GDP per capita after twenty years by an additional 11.2 percentage points ($p = 0.661$). However, this latter relationship was never significant. Additionally, the relationship after five years fell just short of significance. The number of interveners had a significant negative effect on autocracy levels of an additional 0.28 points ($p = 0.000$) per intervener after five years, 0.23 points ($p = 0.000$) per intervener after ten years, and increased after twenty years at insignificant levels. The remaining results were not significant.

While the effects of the number of interveners on economic factors are mixed, there appears to be an increase in democracy levels and a decrease in autocracy levels. However, an increase in mortality rate is also present, further adding to the conflicting outcomes between the different factors.

The Location of the Intervening State

The Intervening state neighbored the state in conflict 34 times while the intervener was from the same region a total of 42 times. See tables M-R (appendix) for the full results of the following analyses.

Neighboring Intervention

Intervention coming from a neighboring country increased GDP per capita by an additional 30.7 percentage points (p = 0.042) after five years, 39.8 percentage points (p = 0.115) after ten years, and 90.5 percentage points (p = 0.012) after twenty years. The relationships after five and twenty years were significant. Democracy levels also increased by an additional 45.4 percentage points (p = 0.021) after twenty years, while the relationships after five and ten years were not significant. Meanwhile, life expectancy decreased when a neighboring country intervened by an additional 1.13 years (p = 0.070) after five years, 1.89 years (p = 0.064) after ten years, and 3.96 years (p = 0.073) after twenty years.

Figure Four[10]: Heterogeneous Effects on Life Expectancy



Regional Intervention

When a country that was located within the same region intervened, GDP per capita increased by an additional 33.7 percentage points (p = 0.017) after five years, 68.6 percentage

[10] Figure four shows that neighboring intervention leads to a steady additional decrease in life expectancy over the three time periods. Meanwhile, autocratic intervention increases life expectancy after ten years before it begins to decrease after twenty years at insignificant levels.
Significant additional effects were shown with the following symbol: ◊ (a hollowed diamond). Insignificant effects were shown with the symbol being filled.

points (p = 0.002) after ten years, and 95.8 percentage points (p = 0.007) after twenty years. All relationships were significant. On the other hand, GNI per capita decreased by an additional 141.3 percentage points (p = 0.072) after twenty years. The relationships after five and ten years were not significant. Additionally, intervention by a state within the region decreased mortality rate by an additional 9.91 deaths per 1000 (p = 0.081) after five years, but effects after ten and twenty years were not significant.

Neighboring countries intervening in a civil war appears to increase economic factors while also causing an increase in political factors in the long run. However, there were negative effects on life expectancy that were significant and residual. Intervention by a country within the

Figure Five[11]: Effects of Location of Intervener on GDP per Capita



[11] Figure five shows that both neighboring intervention and regional intervention both increase GDP per capita over the three time periods and the net additional increases are similar. However, regional intervention leads to a steadier increase, while regional intervention experiences most of the additional increase after twenty years.
Significant additional effects were shown with the following symbol: ◊ (a hollowed diamond). Insignificant effects were shown with the symbol being filled.

same region had mixed effects on economic factors, as it increased GDP per capita but decreased GNI per capita. Regional intervention also appeared to have a positive impact on social factors since mortality rate decreased.

Discussion

The effects of intervention on economic, social, and political factors was mixed, with different interaction terms leading to different effects. In terms of economic development, there was a negative relationship with growth in the short term (after five years); however, there was no lasting effects, as the relationships ten and twenty years after the end of the conflict were insignificant. Additionally, the relationship was only significant at the 10% level, making the overall substantive significance of the relationship questionable. Therefore, the hypothesis that intervention would have an effect on economic factors was rejected.

However, intervention's effects change when heterogeneous effects were accounted for. The additional effects of length on economic factors significantly increased GDP per capita and decreased the growth rate in the long-term outlook (twenty years after the end of the conflict). The finding regarding growth rate contradicts those of Koubi (2005) and Collier (1999), who investigated the relationship between war and economic growth without taking intervention into account. The difference in direction of this relationship between the current study and the ones from the two authors suggest that intervention can diminish some of the 'good' that comes from conflict. In terms of the difference in GDP per capita's sign compared to growth rate, the variable's small coefficients paired with a small sample of observations that experienced intervention could explain the lack of consensus. In other words, while there may be a statistically significant relationship between the additional impact of length and intervention on GDP per capita, the substantive significance is low. The interaction between cumulative intensity

and intervention had a positive additional impact on growth, which did coincide with the findings by Koubi (2005). Therefore, while the outcome of the interaction between length and intervention on was either too small in magnitude or had a negative relationship, causing the hypothesis that there would be a positive relationship between the interaction involving length on economic factors to be rejected, the interaction between cumulative intensity and intervention was not rejected.

Autocratic intervention led to a decrease in growth rate after twenty years, while democratic intervention increased growth. This suggests that the regime-type does matter when it comes to economic development. Intervention in support for the government decreased growth in the short run, but there were little residual effects. However, GNI per capita experienced a sizable increase after twenty years, by which time the negative impact on growth had already disappeared. On the other hand, support for the rebels had no additional impact on economic factors. Pickering and Kisangani (2006) found similar results in terms of the effects of support for the government on economic growth; though, their analysis was limited to non-democratic states.

The interaction between the number of interveners and intervention led to a small decrease in GDP per capita, which was only significant at the 10% level, and an increase in growth. Therefore, it appears that the positive effects of growth outweigh the negative impact on GDP per capita. These results help to expand those of Krain (2005), who used this interaction to find that the number of interveners decreases severity of politicides and genocides, to show that it can be beneficial for economic factors, as well.

Neighboring interveners and regional interveners both increased GDP per capita while regional interveners also led to an additional decrease in GNI per capita. No previous research has been done regarding the effects of this type of intervention; however, it is interesting that it

appears to have economic benefits when a local state gets involved in a civil conflict. Based on the findings discussed above, all hypotheses regarding intervention characteristics, except for those regarding the recipient of intervention, were not rejected.

Intervention also had significant effects on social factors. Mortality rate decreased after twenty years, suggesting that intervention improves this category of variables in the long term, causing a failure to reject the hypothesis that intervention would have an effect on social development. Further analysis was conducted using interaction terms. It was found that while most heterogeneous effects were insignificant, autocratic intervention led to an increase in life expectancy while the number of interveners improved both aspects of social development (decrease in mortality rate and an increase in life expectancy). The significant and beneficial effect of the number of interveners on social factors once again strengthens the findings made by Krain (2005). Additionally, while the literature had previously found a significant positive effect between government support and an increase in quality of life (Pickering and Kisangani 2006), this relationship was not present in the current results.

Intervention by a neighboring state decreased life expectancy while regional intervention decreased mortality rate. This could suggest that regional intervention is more beneficial to the state in conflict than neighboring states. It would be difficult to determine why this could be the case, especially since there is no previous research to guide these findings and also because neighboring interventions are also counted as regional interventions. However, one possibility is that a regional state has less of a possibility to capture and control parts of the state in conflict than a neighboring state would. This would make a regional power more interested in influence, which makes it more interested in the wellbeing of country.

Based on the findings that were mentioned above, the hypotheses that length and cumulative intensity would have a positive effect on social development, that the recipient of the intervention, and democratic intervention would have an effect on social factors were rejected. Meanwhile the hypotheses that there would be a significant effect from the interaction terms regarding autocratic intervention, number of interveners, and the location of the interveners were not rejected.

Results from the initial analysis regarding intervention and political factors found that no significant relationship was present, causing a rejection of the hypothesis stating there would be an effect. However, interaction terms showed the significance of heterogeneous effects on democracy and autocracy levels. The length of the conflict's interaction with intervention showed an increase in autocracy levels; however, the magnitudes of the effects were small. Conversely, cumulative intensity led to an additional decrease in autocracy levels. Therefore, both the hypotheses predicting a positive relationship between these two interactions and the political factors were rejected. The former was not supported because the magnitude was too small, especially when considering the levels of significance, and the latter was rejected since the opposite effect was present. Once again, the number of interveners appeared to benefit the country the conflict took place in, as it increased democracy levels and decreased autocracy levels. Democratic interveners decreased autocracy levels, though they did not improve democracy levels. This lack of effect on democracy levels is consistent with the literature (de Mesquita and Downs 2006). Finally, this study found that while autocratic interveners decrease democracy levels in the short term, it leads to an increase in democracy levels after twenty years. The net effects also appeared to be positive. Additionally, the relationship was significant to at least the 5% level in all three time periods. These results stand in contrast with Gleditsch et al.

(2004) and de Mesquita and Downs (2006), who found negative and insignificant effects, respectively. Because of the results stated above, only the hypothesis regarding the government being the recipient of intervention was rejected, while the results from the study led to the remaining hypotheses not being rejected.

Overall, there were a number of major findings within this paper that contributed to the literature. First, the results furthered the argument made by Eckstein and Gurr (1975) that democracy levels and autocracy levels should not be seen on the same scale. The results found that these two variables did not always respond inversely with each other, suggesting that they do not work is if they were just two ends of a scale. A second important finding is the beneficial effects of the number of interveners on all types of development. One possible explanation is that some of these observations could be reflecting intervention organized by an international body, like the United Nations. However, even if this were the case, results from Kim (2015) found that intervention by United Nations forces were beneficial in terms of quality of life. Therefore, the cost of not accounting for these results potentially being a reflection of United Nations forces is low. Additionally, the location of the intervener in terms of being a neighboring state or a country within the same region, which had not previously been examined, had a significant effect on developmental factors; however, further analysis is needed in order to ensure these findings are robust. Finally, this study investigated the effects of the regime-type of the intervener on post-war development. While past research has mainly focused on its effects on democratization, this study looked at its effects on economic, social, and political factors in order to widen the scope of research on the impact of democratic and autocratic intervention. One of the more notable findings from this section of the analysis, was the relationship between the additional effect of autocratic interveners on democracy levels. Previous literature's assertion that

autocracies intervening leads to autocratization was not only not supported, but the opposite relationship was found when looking at the long term. Democracy levels were negatively impacted after five and ten years, but only after twenty years did the relationship turn positive. It is possible that the past literature only saw a snapshot of the effects because they did not allow for the relationship to develop for a long enough period of time.

Conclusion

The overall hypothesis of this paper was that the impact of intervention, with all effects considered, would have a negative impact on development. However, this study found that the answer to whether intervention does not result in a clear answer. Like the study's theory suggests, there were certain aspects of the characteristics of interventions that helped and others that hindered the economic, social, and political factors that were analyzed in this paper. What is clear, however, is that intervention characteristics matter when it comes to interventions effects on development, with different characteristics impacting the three development factors in different manners. For example, autocratic intervention can increase social and political factors, but at the expense of economic growth. This leads to important policy implications for the study. When a government is deciding whether it should intervene, it is important that it considers what developmental factors are important to them and how their own regime-type will have an impact on the possibility of the target country of benefiting in that developmental area. The United States, for example, should intervene if its post-war goal is to improve economic growth; however, if it wishes to improve social factors or promote democracy, its intervention will have no significant effect. Therefore, the United States would likely be better off not intervening since it would experience the cost of war while not influencing the factors that it desired.

There were a number of limitations within this study. First, the number of observations of conflicts that experienced intervention was low. While there was a total of 52 observations with intervention, this number varied when looking at the different time periods. This could have led to results that were partially biased. Additionally, this paper did not differentiate between unilateral intervention and that done by United Nations forces. However, while this was done by a number of studies in the literature, it is not standard practice to do so. Another limitation to this study was that a selection bias was present for observations that experienced intervention so that not all conflicts had the same chance of experiencing intervention. This selection bias is an inherent issue when examining intervention; however, this study attempted to minimize its impact by using fixed effects for both year and region.

Future studies should further investigate the impact that the regime-type of the intervener has on post-war development. Results from this study are do not fully coincide with past studies, requiring further research to be done in order to allow for a better understanding of these effects. Additionally, the impact of the number of interveners should be analyzed further. Other than Krain (2005), who inspired the inclusion of this term in the current study, there have not been any other studies that have used this interaction. The results suggest that it is an important factor for all aspects of development. Subsequently, more research should be done on it to provide a more robust understanding of its impact.

References

Angrist, J. D., Imbens, G. W., & Rubin, D. B. (1996). Identification of causal effects using instrumental variables. *Journal of the American statistical Association*, *91*(434), 444-455.

Ahmad, A. (2012). Agenda for peace or budget for war? evaluating the economic impact of international intervention in Somalia. *International Journal, 67*(2), 313-331.

Arbour, L. (2008). The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice. *Review of International Studies, 34*(3), 445-458.

Bellamy, A. J. (2008). The responsibility to protect and the problem of military intervention. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 84*(4), 615-639.

Chen, S., Loayza, N. V., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2008). The aftermath of civil war. *The World Bank Economic Review, 22*(1), 63-85.

Collier, P. (1999). On the economic consequences of civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers, 51*(1), 168-183.

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (1998). On economic causes of civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers, 50*(4), 563-573.

De Mesquita, B. B., & Downs, G. W. (2006). Intervention and democracy. *International Organization, 60*(3), 627-649.

Dixon, J. (2009). What causes civil wars? Integrating quantitative research findings. *International Studies Review, 11*(4), 707-735.

Doucouliagos, H., & Ulubaşoğlu, M. A. (2008). Democracy and economic growth: A meta-analysis. *American Journal of Political Science, 52*(1), 61-83.

Eckstein, H., & Gurr, T. R. (1975). *Patterns of authority: A structural basis for political inquiry.* Wiley-Interscience.

Eggertsson, T. (2005). Imperfect institutions and growth theory in modern economics. *Imperfect institutions* (pp. 9-22) University of Michigan Press.

Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American Political Science Review, 97*(1), 75-90.

Fortna, V. P. (2004). Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war. *International Studies Quarterly, 48*(2), 269-292.

Gates, S., Hegre, H., Nygård, H. M., & Strand, H. (2012). Development consequences of armed conflict. *World Development, 40*(9), 1713-1722.

Gilligan, M., & Stedman, S. J. (2003). Where do the peacekeepers go? *International Studies Review, 5*(4), 37-54.

Gleditsch, N. P., Christiansen, L. S., & Hegre, H. (2007). Democratic jihad? Military intervention and democracy.

Gleditsch, N. P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M., & Strand, H. (2002). Armed conflict 1946-2001: A new dataset. *Journal of Peace Research, 39*(5), 615-637.

Kang, S., & Meernik, J. (2005). Civil war destruction and the prospects for economic growth. *Journal of Politics, 67*(1), 88-109.

Kenny, C., & Williams, D. (2001). *What do we know about economic growth? Or, why don't we know very much?*

Kenwick, M. (Working Paper). Military intervention and settlement durability in civil conflicts.

Kim, S. K. (2017). Third-party intervention in civil wars and the prospects for postwar development. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61*(3), 615-642.

Koga, J. (2011). Where do third parties intervene? Third parties' domestic institutions and military interventions in civil conflicts. *International Studies Quarterly, 55*(4), 1143-1166.

Koubi, V. (2005). War and economic performance. *Journal of Peace Research, 42*(1), 67-82.

Krain, M. (2005). International intervention and the severity of genocides and politicides. *International Studies Quarterly, 49*(3), 363-387.

Landler, M., Mazzetti, M., & Rubin, A. J. (2013). Obama Officials Weigh Response to Syria Assault. *The New York Times*.

Leblang, D. A. (1997). Political democracy and economic growth: Pooled cross-sectional and time-series evidence. *British Journal of Political Science, 27*(3), 453-472.

Mansfield, E. D., & Snyder, J. (2002). Democratic transitions, institutional strength, and war. *International Organization, 56*(2), 297-337.

Marshall, M., Gurr, T., & Jaggers, K. (2016). Polity IV project. Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2015. dataset users' manual. center for systemic peace.

Naidu, M. V. (2002). Security, sovereignty, and intervention: Concepts and case studies. *Peace Research, 34*(1), 33-58.

Peksen, D. (2012). Does foreign military intervention help human rights? *Political Research Quarterly, 65*(3), 558-571.

Pickering, J., & Kisangani, E. F. (2006). Political, economic, and social consequences of foreign military intervention. *Political Research Quarterly, 59*(3), 363-376.

Regan, P. M. (2002). Third-party interventions and the duration of intrastate conflicts. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46*(1), 55-73.

Reynal-Querol, M. (2002). Ethnicity, political systems, and civil wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46*(1), 29-54.

Romer, P. M. (1990). Endogenous technological change. *Journal of Political Economy, 98*(5, Part 2), S71-S102.

Romer, P. M. (1994). The origins of endogenous growth. *Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8*(1), 3-22.

Shaheen, K. (2018). Syria Aid Deliveries Halted Amid Reports of Chemical Attacks. *The Guardian.*

Skaperdas, S. (2011). The costs of organized violence: A review of the evidence. *Economics of Governance, 12*(1), 1-23.

Snowdon, B., & Vane, H. R. (2002). *An encyclopedia of macroeconomics.* Edward Elgar Publishing.

The World Bank Group (2017). The Toll of War: The Economic and Social Consequences of the Conflict in Syria.

Themnér, L. (2016). UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook Version 17.1. *Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)*

The World Bank Open Data. (2018).

Appendix:

Table A: The Effects of Intervention Economic Factors

	GNI per capita			GDP per capita			Growth Rate		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	-0.135	0.00657	0.243	0.0587	0.0429	0.299	-4.243*	-2.087	-6.930
	(0.349)	(0.335)	(0.392)	(0.103)	(0.149)	(0.242)	(2.482)	(2.929)	(4.833)
Middle East	0.350	0.529	-0.895**	-0.191	-0.182	-0.578**	-8.149**	-8.988*	-10.27**
	(0.501)	(0.469)	(0.445)	(0.131)	(0.187)	(0.235)	(3.693)	(4.669)	(4.936)
Africa	-1.673***	-1.935***	-2.874***	-0.245**	-0.415***	-0.829***	-5.671*	-6.456*	-5.298
	(0.368)	(0.384)	(0.394)	(0.0969)	(0.144)	(0.191)	(3.420)	(3.880)	(4.197)
Asia	-1.790***	-1.544***	-2.257***	-0.0921	-0.134	-0.415**	-5.183	-5.754	-7.426*
	(0.393)	(0.385)	(0.383)	(0.104)	(0.157)	(0.202)	(3.331)	(3.634)	(4.087)
Americas	-0.379	0.0693	-0.565	-0.0949	-0.121	-0.552**	-4.466	-7.789*	-7.706
	(0.533)	(0.494)	(0.441)	(0.152)	(0.188)	(0.216)	(3.964)	(4.577)	(4.802)
Length	4.96e-05*	-8.11e-06	9.17e-06	3.20e-06	1.49e-06	-1.38e-05	-9.20e-05	-8.37e-05	-0.000207
	(2.98e-05)	(2.45e-05)	(3.32e-05)	(8.69e-06)	(1.14e-05)	(1.48e-05)	(0.000183)	(0.000227)	(0.000264)
Cold War	-0.171	-0.311	0.142	-0.0555	-0.248*	0.00232	0.885	1.508	-1.412
	(0.423)	(0.368)	(0.518)	(0.0828)	(0.127)	(0.234)	(2.760)	(2.927)	(4.270)
Intensity	-0.190	-0.294	-0.685*	-0.0595	-0.196	-0.307	6.451*	7.443**	0.363
	(0.349)	(0.370)	(0.358)	(0.0968)	(0.126)	(0.200)	(3.458)	(3.688)	(4.739)
Cumulative Intensity	-0.125	0.325	0.175	0.113	0.200*	0.294*	-0.689	-1.336	2.063
	(0.247)	(0.227)	(0.329)	(0.0831)	(0.116)	(0.176)	(1.524)	(2.049)	(2.551)
War in Five	-0.277	-0.0543	-0.387	-0.0137	-0.00544	-0.163	2.403	3.746*	3.280
	(0.268)	(0.213)	(0.252)	(0.0540)	(0.0819)	(0.135)	(1.565)	(2.149)	(2.529)
Incompatibility	-0.545**	-0.267	-0.252	-0.0305	-0.0669	-0.00147	3.980**	6.228***	4.792**
	(0.261)	(0.223)	(0.239)	(0.0566)	(0.0849)	(0.126)	(1.543)	(1.958)	(2.133)
Democracy	0.124	0.347*	0.439*	-0.0227	0.0136	0.154	2.092	2.649	2.105
	(0.230)	(0.194)	(0.233)	(0.0574)	(0.0834)	(0.115)	(1.465)	(1.974)	(1.942)
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	6.802***	6.621***	8.979***	0.418**	0.812***	1.995***	-3.531	-1.988	9.136
	(0.722)	(0.646)	(0.565)	(0.197)	(0.274)	(0.387)	(6.347)	(6.331)	(8.245)
Observations	198	184	140	267	233	167	291	257	198
R-squared	0.612	0.680	0.755	0.494	0.627	0.659	0.298	0.272	0.279

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B: The Effects of Intervention Political Factors

	Democracy Level			Autocracy Level		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	-0.571	0.0447	-1.171	-0.149	-0.0697	-0.461
	(0.457)	(0.768)	(1.174)	(0.382)	(0.530)	(1.034)
middle East	-1.722***	-2.181***	-2.129*	0.653	1.023	0.439
	(0.599)	(0.771)	(1.117)	(0.587)	(0.726)	(1.025)
Africa	-1.395**	-1.186	-2.095*	-0.0424	-0.204	-0.501
	(0.614)	(0.851)	(1.118)	(0.542)	(0.672)	(0.800)
Asia	-1.459***	-2.117***	-1.367	0.342	0.891	-0.403
	(0.498)	(0.720)	(0.994)	(0.428)	(0.566)	(0.717)
Americas	0.574	0.640	0.635	-0.215	-0.377	-0.725
	(0.708)	(0.855)	(1.197)	(0.630)	(0.645)	(0.917)
Length	-4.79e-05	-6.36e-05	-0.000181**	4.58e-05	4.89e-05	7.56e-05
	(4.08e-05)	(5.45e-05)	(7.64e-05)	(3.67e-05)	(4.84e-05)	(6.21e-05)
Cold War	1.392**	0.841	0.848	-1.287***	-1.064*	-1.261
	(0.537)	(0.688)	(1.045)	(0.475)	(0.578)	(0.843)
Intensity	-0.00116	-0.517	-1.036	-0.147	-0.0690	0.113
	(0.405)	(0.681)	(0.880)	(0.419)	(0.601)	(0.789)
Cumulative Intensity	0.552*	0.689	0.820	-0.423	-0.472	-0.179
	(0.309)	(0.524)	(0.900)	(0.265)	(0.419)	(0.718)
War in Five	0.403	0.0272	0.448	-0.148	-0.0475	-0.253

	(0.316)	(0.487)	(0.603)	(0.296)	(0.377)	(0.537)
Incompatibility	-0.225	-0.904*	-0.437	0.157	0.479	0.133
	(0.344)	(0.473)	(0.610)	(0.310)	(0.419)	(0.575)
Democracy	-1.596***	-2.417***	-3.217***	1.209***	1.510***	2.950***
	(0.336)	(0.419)	(0.552)	(0.288)	(0.337)	(0.441)
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	1.165	-0.582	0.875	0.502	0.522	-0.0732
	(1.396)	(1.872)	(1.663)	(1.015)	(0.993)	(1.385)
Observations	275	234	174	275	234	174
R-squared	0.331	0.403	0.435	0.283	0.395	0.466

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C: Interaction Terms- Social Factors

	Mortality Rate			Life Expectancy		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	1.494	0.670	-18.89	-0.509	-0.303	2.409
	(6.433)	(11.15)	(16.88)	(0.853)	(1.132)	(1.632)
Middle East	-10.76***	-21.57***	-50.68***	2.007***	3.808***	5.600***
	(3.395)	(6.275)	(11.88)	(0.520)	(0.857)	(1.752)
Africa	-15.67***	-33.00***	-72.96***	1.348***	2.602***	5.045***
	(3.092)	(5.718)	(11.41)	(0.466)	(0.667)	(1.332)
Asia	-10.95***	-22.43***	-48.64***	1.118**	2.196***	4.261***
	(2.638)	(4.918)	(9.926)	(0.442)	(0.638)	(1.246)
Americas	-11.49***	-23.16***	-40.21***	1.161**	2.468***	3.971**
	(3.317)	(6.673)	(11.91)	(0.470)	(0.736)	(1.614)
Length	0.000340	0.00106**	0.00164**	-2.48e-05	-7.87e-05	-0.000208*
	(0.000224)	(0.000410)	(0.000723)	(3.80e-05)	(5.59e-05)	(0.000124)
Cold War	0.464	-1.442	-1.882	-0.218	-0.395	1.675
	(3.745)	(6.862)	(14.88)	(0.640)	(0.985)	(2.195)
Intensity	-3.519	-4.387	-6.485	0.0692	-0.0805	-0.396
	(3.370)	(6.333)	(10.57)	(0.591)	(0.945)	(1.648)
Cumint	-2.627	-5.202	-0.355	0.540**	0.931**	1.196
	(1.847)	(3.647)	(7.010)	(0.225)	(0.401)	(1.066)
War in Five	-2.761	-7.188*	-10.63	0.163	0.409	-0.366
	(1.938)	(3.732)	(6.744)	(0.274)	(0.477)	(0.862)
Incompatibility	-0.887	-0.749	2.142	0.177	-0.0618	-0.614
	(1.970)	(3.851)	(7.363)	(0.250)	(0.439)	(0.970)
Democracy	1.635	1.757	-1.595	-0.169	-0.0825	-0.00335
	(1.970)	(3.732)	(6.444)	(0.288)	(0.449)	(0.974)
Length X intervention	0.000376	0.000111	0.00249	9.14e-05	0.000132	0.000506
	(0.000860)	(0.00177)	(0.00616)	(8.16e-05)	(0.000139)	(0.000383)
Cumulative Intensity X Intervention	-12.86	-18.09	-34.82	0.0918	0.377	-4.912*
	(10.27)	(17.78)	(41.70)	(0.850)	(1.474)	(2.704)
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-18.63**	-18.22	2.668	1.817*	2.779**	0.0845
	(8.185)	(14.32)	(21.29)	(0.959)	(1.403)	(2.581)
Observations	308	275	204	307	280	216
R-squared	0.418	0.412	0.454	0.271	0.302	0.934

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D: Interaction Terms- Political Factors

	Democracy Level	Autocracy Level

VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	-0.164	0.716	-1.600	-0.147	-0.279	0.328
	(0.739)	(1.127)	(2.005)	(0.526)	(0.720)	(1.699)
Middle East	-1.756***	-2.211***	-2.141*	0.637	0.963	0.326
	(0.603)	(0.771)	(1.138)	(0.591)	(0.731)	(1.045)
Africa	-1.418**	-1.197	-2.146*	-0.0258	-0.246	-0.441
	(0.618)	(0.848)	(1.137)	(0.547)	(0.678)	(0.825)
Asia	-1.515***	-2.145***	-1.384	0.377	0.871	-0.415
	(0.503)	(0.720)	(1.005)	(0.436)	(0.574)	(0.724)
Americas	0.520	0.616	0.596	-0.152	-0.328	-0.652
	(0.714)	(0.862)	(1.204)	(0.622)	(0.641)	(0.902)
Length	-4.49e-05	-6.21e-05	-0.000183**	4.01e-05	4.47e-05	7.29e-05
	(4.10e-05)	(5.50e-05)	(7.71e-05)	(3.69e-05)	(4.89e-05)	(6.26e-05)
Cold War	1.480***	0.856	0.866	-1.410***	-1.161*	-1.277
	(0.545)	(0.711)	(1.053)	(0.484)	(0.592)	(0.845)
Intensity	0.0319	-0.489	-1.080	-0.218	-0.0941	-0.0198
	(0.404)	(0.691)	(0.905)	(0.402)	(0.605)	(0.799)
Cumint	0.503	0.732	0.785	-0.265	-0.376	0.0228
	(0.332)	(0.540)	(0.922)	(0.285)	(0.443)	(0.732)
War in Five	0.457	0.0612	0.431	-0.181	-0.0654	-0.260
	(0.325)	(0.491)	(0.609)	(0.305)	(0.385)	(0.546)
Incompatibility	-0.183	-0.863*	-0.435	0.125	0.425	0.181
	(0.342)	(0.478)	(0.614)	(0.310)	(0.419)	(0.577)
Democracy	-1.590***	-2.416***	-3.208***	1.189***	1.506***	2.913***
	(0.337)	(0.419)	(0.559)	(0.289)	(0.338)	(0.442)
Length X intervention	-0.000209	-0.000150	0.000194	0.000281**	0.000370*	0.000324
	(0.000139)	(0.000330)	(0.000399)	(0.000110)	(0.000217)	(0.000352)
Cumulative Intensity X Intervention	0.773	-0.378	-0.148	-2.021**	-1.773	-4.148**
	(1.162)	(2.180)	(1.766)	(1.014)	(1.162)	(1.683)
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.937	-0.903	1.017	0.527	0.648	-0.654
	(1.383)	(2.084)	(1.778)	(1.114)	(1.042)	(1.548)
Observations	275	234	174	275	234	174
R-squared	0.337	0.405	0.436	0.300	0.402	0.476

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table E: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Social Factors – Regime-Type

	Mortality Rate			Life Expectancy		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	-13.89	-25.25	-9.639	-0.738	-1.234	5.130
	(12.77)	(22.95)	(31.99)	(1.212)	(1.841)	(3.831)
Middle East	-9.291***	-19.34***	-50.04***	2.019***	3.867***	5.723***
	(3.470)	(6.387)	(11.99)	(0.558)	(0.880)	(1.729)
Africa	-15.22***	-32.17***	-74.51***	1.335**	2.612***	5.085***
	(3.137)	(5.759)	(11.41)	(0.518)	(0.702)	(1.326)
Asia	-10.30***	-21.28***	-50.97***	1.085**	2.175***	4.189***
	(2.650)	(4.905)	(9.965)	(0.481)	(0.648)	(1.248)
Americas	-10.71***	-21.68***	-39.65***	1.141**	2.430***	3.909**
	(3.281)	(6.588)	(11.75)	(0.480)	(0.735)	(1.619)
Length	0.000377*	0.00109***	0.00174**	-2.15e-05	-7.22e-05	-0.000199
	(0.000229)	(0.000416)	(0.000723)	(3.74e-05)	(5.50e-05)	(0.000123)
Cold War	0.104	-1.931	-1.644	-0.190	-0.339	1.719
	(3.718)	(6.866)	(14.78)	(0.655)	(1.007)	(2.193)
Intensity	-3.474	-4.714	-5.898	0.0914	0.0344	-0.204

	(3.429)	(6.494)	(10.60)	(0.620)	(0.995)	(1.739)
Cumulative Intensity	-3.751**	-6.549*	-2.633	0.540**	0.879**	0.991
	(1.826)	(3.646)	(6.818)	(0.236)	(0.413)	(1.065)
War in Five	-3.133	-7.251*	-9.899	0.172	0.375	-0.272
	(1.929)	(3.814)	(6.802)	(0.279)	(0.485)	(0.862)
Incompatibility	-1.243	-1.188	1.721	0.180	-0.0516	-0.598
	(1.982)	(3.907)	(7.514)	(0.256)	(0.447)	(0.974)
Democracy	1.791	1.684	-2.425	-0.163	-0.0490	0.0582
	(1.963)	(3.746)	(6.585)	(0.293)	(0.451)	(0.998)
Democratic Intervener X Intervention	8.204	15.64	24.65	-0.211	-0.992	-2.361
	(7.149)	(12.31)	(25.61)	(0.655)	(1.109)	(2.985)
Autocratic Intervener X Intervention	3.251	-2.610	-8.043	0.648	3.141***	1.334
	(6.893)	(11.63)	(24.71)	(0.857)	(0.991)	(2.374)
Democratic intervener	-3.347	0.744	-27.59	-0.0938	-1.350	-4.196
	(6.518)	(13.93)	(25.76)	(1.045)	(1.589)	(2.985)
Autocratic intervener	9.399	13.15		0.825	2.657**	
	(10.54)	(17.49)		(0.880)	(1.235)	
o.autocraticintervener			-			-
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-20.62**	-21.15	-25.63	1.650	2.410*	0.0168
	(8.259)	(15.51)	(23.16)	(1.020)	(1.423)	(2.728)
Observations	308	275	204	307	280	216
R-squared	0.423	0.419	0.463	0.269	0.305	0.934

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table F: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Political Factors – Regime-Type

	Democracy Level			Autocracy Level		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	-0.112	-0.598	-0.0638	2.771**	4.958*	-2.716
	(1.630)	(2.867)	(2.492)	(1.309)	(2.533)	(2.195)
Middle East	-1.713***	-2.269***	-2.053*	0.657	1.087	0.366
	(0.621)	(0.775)	(1.110)	(0.604)	(0.732)	(1.051)
Africa	-1.397**	-1.219	-2.020*	0.0436	-0.111	-0.604
	(0.641)	(0.852)	(1.116)	(0.574)	(0.682)	(0.811)
Asia	-1.456***	-2.137***	-1.354	0.405	0.967*	-0.323
	(0.514)	(0.707)	(0.981)	(0.447)	(0.568)	(0.717)
Americas	0.612	0.699	0.437	-0.203	-0.341	-0.530
	(0.721)	(0.846)	(1.190)	(0.638)	(0.643)	(0.894)
Length	-4.84e-05	-6.71e-05	-0.000189**	4.40e-05	4.59e-05	7.91e-05
	(4.14e-05)	(5.49e-05)	(7.80e-05)	(3.69e-05)	(4.87e-05)	(6.29e-05)
Cold War	1.358**	0.767	0.968	-1.245**	-1.023*	-1.364
	(0.546)	(0.697)	(1.058)	(0.485)	(0.588)	(0.857)
Intensity	-0.0925	-0.874	-1.238	-0.0176	0.201	0.209
	(0.389)	(0.663)	(0.887)	(0.384)	(0.613)	(0.791)
Cumulative Intensity	0.607*	0.844	0.756	-0.435	-0.481	-0.0732
	(0.314)	(0.540)	(0.919)	(0.268)	(0.433)	(0.730)
War in Five	0.460	0.237	0.280	-0.189	-0.156	-0.208
	(0.330)	(0.499)	(0.629)	(0.311)	(0.395)	(0.563)
Incompatibility	-0.245	-0.877*	-0.249	0.220	0.479	-0.00253
	(0.351)	(0.476)	(0.605)	(0.317)	(0.425)	(0.575)
Democracy	-1.598***	-2.391***	-3.011***	1.229***	1.518***	2.810***
	(0.337)	(0.418)	(0.545)	(0.290)	(0.342)	(0.426)
Democratic Intervener X Intervention	0.123	1.976	-1.323	-1.210	-2.789**	0.895
	(1.016)	(1.460)	(2.353)	(0.902)	(1.088)	(1.834)
Autocratic Intervener X	-2.484**	-3.917***	10.74***	-0.0830	-0.524	-9.070***

Intervention						
	(1.137)	(1.251)	(2.634)	(1.069)	(0.910)	(1.716)
Democratic intervener	1.574	4.050**	-9.346***	-1.451	-2.788***	10.37***
	(1.471)	(1.818)	(2.970)	(1.377)	(0.962)	(2.419)
Autocratic intervener	-0.832	-1.986		-2.005**	-2.422	
	(0.961)	(1.876)		(0.828)	(1.762)	
o.autocraticintervener			-			-
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	1.316	-0.299	0.616	0.482	0.539	0.901
	(1.560)	(1.744)	(1.616)	(1.033)	(1.059)	(1.531)
Observations	275	234	174	275	234	174
R-squared	0.339	0.420	0.471	0.297	0.409	0.503

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table G: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Economic Factors – Recipient

	GNI per capita			GDP per capita			Growth Rate		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	-0.681	-0.766**	-0.0399	0.253*	0.0236	0.686*	-2.928	-0.246	-2.313
	(0.552)	(0.309)	(0.446)	(0.149)	(0.114)	(0.372)	(4.079)	(3.800)	(9.275)
Middle East	0.291	0.447	-0.889**	-0.239*	-0.178	-0.574**	-8.179**	-9.781**	-10.29**
	(0.552)	(0.497)	(0.445)	(0.137)	(0.195)	(0.235)	(4.051)	(4.848)	(4.940)
Africa	-1.722***	-2.013***	-2.871***	-0.294***	-0.411***	-0.836***	-5.722	-7.227*	-5.406
	(0.445)	(0.423)	(0.397)	(0.108)	(0.152)	(0.193)	(3.954)	(4.272)	(4.218)
Asia	-1.851***	-1.633***	-2.258***	-0.135	-0.131	-0.410**	-5.201	-6.463*	-7.408*
	(0.442)	(0.413)	(0.385)	(0.114)	(0.166)	(0.205)	(3.776)	(3.903)	(4.091)
Americas	-0.399	0.0303	-0.555	-0.123	-0.119	-0.560**	-4.500	-8.247*	-7.862
	(0.556)	(0.509)	(0.443)	(0.157)	(0.193)	(0.219)	(4.188)	(4.708)	(4.845)
Length	4.85e-05	-6.96e-06	8.87e-06	2.91e-06	1.55e-06	-1.41e-05	-9.40e-05	-9.23e-05	-0.000206
	(2.97e-05)	(2.42e-05)	(3.35e-05)	(8.67e-06)	(1.16e-05)	(1.49e-05)	(0.000183)	(0.000230)	(0.000265)
Cold War	-0.136	-0.269	0.154	-0.0666	-0.247*	-0.0107	0.840	1.311	-1.576
	(0.432)	(0.377)	(0.524)	(0.0839)	(0.128)	(0.235)	(2.829)	(3.006)	(4.333)
Intensity	-0.151	-0.284	-0.651*	-0.0649	-0.196	-0.349*	6.386*	7.379*	-0.0336
	(0.348)	(0.367)	(0.372)	(0.0939)	(0.128)	(0.201)	(3.525)	(3.783)	(4.956)
Cumulative Intensity	-0.129	0.328	0.167	0.121	0.199*	0.312*	-0.669	-1.081	2.210
	(0.247)	(0.229)	(0.329)	(0.0830)	(0.116)	(0.177)	(1.537)	(2.098)	(2.583)
War in Five	-0.271	-0.0538	-0.363	-0.0154	-0.00506	-0.177	2.397	3.722*	3.115
	(0.268)	(0.211)	(0.255)	(0.0541)	(0.0825)	(0.138)	(1.564)	(2.134)	(2.511)
Incompatibility	-0.549**	-0.292	-0.239	-0.0446	-0.0655	-0.0125	3.973**	6.010***	4.687**
	(0.267)	(0.228)	(0.239)	(0.0579)	(0.0876)	(0.128)	(1.573)	(2.009)	(2.167)
Democracy	0.107	0.316	0.430*	-0.0356	0.0148	0.162	2.077	2.458	2.164
	(0.248)	(0.203)	(0.236)	(0.0574)	(0.0850)	(0.115)	(1.441)	(1.983)	(1.947)
Side A X Intervention	0.323	0.414	2.443***	-0.473**	0.0530	0.327	-1.545	-8.123	-1.954
	(0.911)	(0.561)	(0.659)	(0.224)	(0.428)	(0.488)	(7.947)	(9.247)	(10.46)
Side B X Intervention	0.813	1.008*	0.464	-0.161	0.0178	-0.595	-1.650	-1.078	-7.211
	(0.751)	(0.536)	(0.689)	(0.211)	(0.243)	(0.471)	(5.170)	(5.291)	(10.80)
o.SideA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
o.SideB	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	6.582***	6.488***	8.784***	0.465**	0.807**	2.216***	-3.429	-0.961	9.516
	(0.806)	(0.676)	(0.705)	(0.220)	(0.317)	(0.437)	(6.823)	(6.754)	(8.312)
Observations	198	184	140	267	233	167	291	257	198
R-squared	0.615	0.683	0.755	0.502	0.627	0.663	0.298	0.275	0.281

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table H: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Social Factors – Recipient

	Mortality Rate			Life Expectancy		

VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	2.317	-3.243	-15.79	-0.121	0.000667	-0.846
	(8.349)	(12.33)	(20.44)	(0.701)	(1.199)	(2.114)
Middle East	-12.02***	-22.78***	-50.31***	2.144***	3.996***	5.856***
	(3.589)	(6.517)	(11.98)	(0.525)	(0.853)	(1.738)
Africa	-17.27***	-34.35***	-73.91***	1.471***	2.779***	5.174***
	(3.423)	(6.017)	(11.39)	(0.483)	(0.671)	(1.330)
Asia	-12.19***	-23.27***	-49.13***	1.220***	2.320***	4.317***
	(2.946)	(5.177)	(9.958)	(0.456)	(0.632)	(1.237)
Americas	-12.10***	-23.28***	-39.91***	1.188**	2.451***	3.897**
	(3.433)	(6.735)	(11.88)	(0.469)	(0.731)	(1.607)
Length	0.000350	0.00105**	0.00169**	-2.14e-05	-7.07e-05	-0.000198
	(0.000223)	(0.000407)	(0.000719)	(3.71e-05)	(5.49e-05)	(0.000122)
Cold War	0.217	-1.774	-1.913	-0.202	-0.348	1.697
	(3.646)	(6.778)	(14.75)	(0.644)	(0.989)	(2.180)
Intensity	-3.110	-3.692	-6.855	0.0908	-0.00721	-0.177
	(3.289)	(6.275)	(10.46)	(0.615)	(0.978)	(1.715)
Cumulative Intensity	-3.465*	-6.261*	-1.821	0.538**	0.922**	1.019
	(1.779)	(3.548)	(6.907)	(0.225)	(0.394)	(1.057)
War in Five	-3.234*	-7.785**	-11.26*	0.169	0.426	-0.323
	(1.912)	(3.712)	(6.707)	(0.273)	(0.475)	(0.849)
Incompatibility	-1.696	-1.858	0.877	0.218	0.0193	-0.617
	(1.995)	(3.912)	(7.538)	(0.250)	(0.440)	(0.966)
Democracy	1.315	1.193	-1.844	-0.123	0.00570	0.0936
	(1.986)	(3.747)	(6.408)	(0.279)	(0.441)	(0.992)
Side A X Intervention	-17.81	-23.57	-21.12	0.867	2.269	5.241
	(13.43)	(20.83)	(37.32)	(0.945)	(1.542)	(3.576)
Side B X Intervention	-4.091	-2.788	-14.15	-0.264	0.0423	2.526
	(9.388)	(14.87)	(29.00)	(0.951)	(1.480)	(2.638)
o.SideA	-	-	-	-	-	-
o.SideB	-	-	-	-	-	-
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-12.41*	-8.543	18.05	1.601*	2.333*	0.502
	(6.615)	(12.25)	(25.02)	(0.891)	(1.311)	(2.631)
Observations	308	275	204	307	280	216
R-squared	0.422	0.413	0.452	0.273	0.304	0.934

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table I: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Political Factors – Recipient

	Democracy Level			Autocracy Level		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	-0.983*	-0.791	0.0351	-0.413	-0.606	-0.537
	(0.512)	(1.018)	(1.126)	(0.783)	(1.125)	(1.237)
Middle East	-1.716***	-2.045***	-2.000*	0.596	0.921	0.356
	(0.623)	(0.777)	(1.097)	(0.609)	(0.747)	(1.043)
Africa	-1.390**	-1.060	-1.942*	-0.108	-0.290	-0.589
	(0.653)	(0.859)	(1.095)	(0.583)	(0.695)	(0.807)
Asia	-1.460***	-2.001***	-1.183	0.280	0.782	-0.491
	(0.528)	(0.728)	(0.976)	(0.459)	(0.593)	(0.722)
Americas	0.578	0.680	0.603	-0.238	-0.410	-0.714
	(0.715)	(0.857)	(1.173)	(0.634)	(0.644)	(0.902)
Length	-4.76e-05	-6.26e-05	-0.000184**	4.56e-05	4.94e-05	7.60e-05
	(4.10e-05)	(5.51e-05)	(7.59e-05)	(3.69e-05)	(4.88e-05)	(6.21e-05)

Cold War	1.395**	0.846	0.805	-1.285***	-1.048*	-1.240
	(0.540)	(0.695)	(1.040)	(0.479)	(0.584)	(0.844)
Intensity	0.0261	-0.452	-1.184	-0.121	-0.0458	0.141
	(0.422)	(0.711)	(0.900)	(0.426)	(0.616)	(0.802)
Cumulative Intensity	0.548*	0.666	0.947	-0.422	-0.468	-0.223
	(0.312)	(0.533)	(0.902)	(0.268)	(0.426)	(0.727)
War in Five	0.399	0.0125	0.425	-0.149	-0.0436	-0.240
	(0.318)	(0.492)	(0.604)	(0.298)	(0.381)	(0.542)
Incompatibility	-0.227	-0.877*	-0.537	0.141	0.453	0.170
	(0.351)	(0.476)	(0.610)	(0.314)	(0.424)	(0.593)
Democracy	-1.601***	-2.387***	-2.992***	1.187***	1.471***	2.859***
	(0.340)	(0.428)	(0.526)	(0.294)	(0.343)	(0.428)
Side A X Intervention	0.401	1.574	1.840	-0.0609	-0.0970	-1.365
	(1.142)	(2.003)	(2.103)	(1.289)	(1.573)	(1.958)
Side B X Intervention	0.478	0.626	-3.194*	0.475	0.962	0.854
	(0.762)	(1.338)	(1.804)	(0.880)	(1.261)	(2.063)
o.SideA	-	-	-	-	-	-
o.SideB	-	-	-	-	-	-
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	1.133	-0.640	1.744	0.487	0.435	-0.394
	(1.399)	(1.848)	(1.749)	(1.081)	(1.061)	(1.566)
Observations	275	234	174	275	234	174
R-squared	0.331	0.405	0.455	0.284	0.398	0.470

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table J: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Economic Factors – Number of Interveners

	GNI per capita			GDP per capita			Growth Rate		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	-0.0101	0.0767	0.608	0.106	0.113	0.113	-6.415**	-2.926	-5.491
	(0.380)	(0.387)	(0.787)	(0.118)	(0.172)	(0.459)	(2.744)	(3.355)	(8.516)
Middle East	0.313	0.509	-0.879*	-0.200	-0.196	-0.582**	-7.815**	-8.832*	-10.24**
	(0.505)	(0.475)	(0.446)	(0.131)	(0.188)	(0.236)	(3.671)	(4.696)	(4.995)
Africa	-1.704***	-1.949***	-2.872***	-0.252**	-0.428***	-0.831***	-5.360	-6.291	-5.275
	(0.373)	(0.390)	(0.397)	(0.0975)	(0.146)	(0.192)	(3.413)	(3.944)	(4.226)
Asia	-1.818***	-1.559***	-2.256***	-0.0995	-0.147	-0.413**	-4.847	-5.593	-7.430*
	(0.396)	(0.389)	(0.385)	(0.105)	(0.159)	(0.204)	(3.323)	(3.691)	(4.100)
Americas	-0.403	0.0585	-0.555	-0.0995	-0.129	-0.556**	-4.236	-7.674*	-7.665
	(0.536)	(0.498)	(0.443)	(0.153)	(0.190)	(0.218)	(3.967)	(4.611)	(4.835)
Length	4.97e-05*	-7.40e-06	8.70e-06	3.37e-06	1.85e-06	-1.39e-05	-9.60e-05	-8.58e-05	-0.000207
	(2.98e-05)	(2.46e-05)	(3.36e-05)	(8.72e-06)	(1.15e-05)	(1.49e-05)	(0.000183)	(0.000227)	(0.000265)
Cold War	-0.155	-0.305	0.153	-0.0529	-0.245*	-0.00235	0.778	1.475	-1.370
	(0.423)	(0.370)	(0.525)	(0.0827)	(0.127)	(0.235)	(2.792)	(2.942)	(4.324)
Intensity	-0.127	-0.260	-0.653*	-0.0427	-0.171	-0.323	5.791	7.193*	0.468
	(0.364)	(0.391)	(0.371)	(0.0983)	(0.127)	(0.202)	(3.543)	(3.798)	(4.940)
Cumulative Intensity	-0.134	0.318	0.166	0.110	0.194	0.302*	-0.610	-1.304	2.013
	(0.248)	(0.229)	(0.329)	(0.0839)	(0.118)	(0.177)	(1.523)	(2.049)	(2.593)
War in Five	-0.284	-0.0621	-0.371	-0.0160	-0.0111	-0.166	2.504	3.810*	3.296
	(0.268)	(0.215)	(0.253)	(0.0543)	(0.0833)	(0.136)	(1.562)	(2.156)	(2.535)
Incompatibility	-0.546**	-0.273	-0.245	-0.0327	-0.0726	-0.00337	4.095***	6.297***	4.801**
	(0.262)	(0.224)	(0.239)	(0.0566)	(0.0854)	(0.127)	(1.536)	(1.967)	(2.150)
Democracy	0.109	0.338*	0.423*	-0.0261	0.00742	0.161	2.233	2.713	2.063
	(0.231)	(0.198)	(0.241)	(0.0573)	(0.0840)	(0.117)	(1.468)	(1.989)	(1.982)
Number of Interveners X Intervention	-0.0498	-0.0270	-0.208	-0.0197	-0.0279*	0.112	0.907***	0.338	-0.858
	(0.0502)	(0.0356)	(0.305)	(0.0123)	(0.0157)	(0.254)	(0.297)	(0.364)	(4.180)
o.Number of interveners	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	6.854***	6.656***	9.237***	0.439**	0.847***	1.845***	-3.764	-2.161	9.086
	(0.723)	(0.641)	(0.587)	(0.195)	(0.272)	(0.528)	(6.267)	(6.326)	(8.334)
Observations				267	233	167	291	257	198
R-squared	-0.0101	0.0767	0.608	0.497	0.629	0.660	0.304	0.273	0.279

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table K: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Social Factors – Number of Interveners

	Mortality Rate			Life Expectancy		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	-5.997	-12.39	-32.37	0.329	0.834	2.150
	(4.218)	(7.734)	(26.10)	(0.624)	(1.054)	(2.361)
Middle East	-9.729***	-19.80***	-50.06***	2.019***	3.792***	5.726***
	(3.480)	(6.353)	(11.89)	(0.521)	(0.854)	(1.727)
Africa	-15.05***	-31.66***	-73.57***	1.361***	2.606***	5.018***
	(3.074)	(5.755)	(11.34)	(0.470)	(0.673)	(1.323)
Asia	-10.23***	-20.90***	-49.11***	1.097**	2.132***	4.208***
	(2.609)	(4.924)	(9.928)	(0.446)	(0.633)	(1.246)
Americas	-10.86***	-21.84***	-39.85***	1.142**	2.424***	3.962**
	(3.257)	(6.589)	(11.84)	(0.469)	(0.732)	(1.608)
Length	0.000364	0.00107***	0.00169**	-2.09e-05	-7.24e-05	-0.000200
	(0.000224)	(0.000408)	(0.000721)	(3.72e-05)	(5.51e-05)	(0.000122)
Cold War	0.352	-1.682	-1.801	-0.188	-0.350	1.675
	(3.662)	(6.798)	(14.75)	(0.643)	(0.986)	(2.196)
Intensity	-3.877	-5.128	-6.758	0.0958	-0.0594	-0.354
	(3.535)	(6.565)	(10.46)	(0.602)	(0.966)	(1.723)
Cumulative Intensity	-3.746**	-6.709*	-1.831	0.548**	0.962**	1.032
	(1.864)	(3.649)	(6.897)	(0.225)	(0.398)	(1.062)
War in Five	-3.137	-7.565**	-11.07*	0.180	0.442	-0.351
	(1.903)	(3.725)	(6.691)	(0.272)	(0.475)	(0.861)
Incompatibility	-1.154	-1.092	1.085	0.196	-0.0264	-0.680
	(1.931)	(3.837)	(7.463)	(0.245)	(0.435)	(0.959)
Democracy	1.910	2.019	-1.692	-0.151	-0.0677	-0.0154
	(1.972)	(3.749)	(6.412)	(0.282)	(0.445)	(0.969)
Number of Interveners X Intervention	0.768	1.297*	3.287	-0.259	-0.230	-0.374
	(0.525)	(0.783)	(13.20)	(0.417)	(0.601)	(1.253)
o.Number of interveners	-	-	-	-	-	-
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-13.73**	-10.15	10.13	1.765**	2.541**	1.114
	(5.878)	(10.76)	(26.95)	(0.860)	(1.241)	(2.573)
Observations	308	275	204	307	280	216
R-squared	0.412	0.408	0.451	0.269	0.299	0.934

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table L: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Political Factors – Number of Interveners

	Democracy Level			Autocracy Level		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	-1.062**	-0.783	-1.516	0.481	0.496	-0.657
	(0.460)	(0.796)	(2.187)	(0.356)	(0.553)	(1.962)
Middle East	-1.654***	-2.053***	-2.165*	0.566	0.935	0.418
	(0.594)	(0.756)	(1.138)	(0.580)	(0.723)	(1.054)
Africa	-1.329**	-1.042	-2.108*	-0.126	-0.302	-0.508
	(0.609)	(0.839)	(1.121)	(0.537)	(0.671)	(0.804)

Asia	-1.389***		-1.991***	-1.380	0.253	0.805	-0.411
	(0.491)		(0.706)	(0.996)	(0.422)	(0.566)	(0.719)
Americas	0.636		0.765	0.634	-0.294	-0.462	-0.725
	(0.709)		(0.849)	(1.202)	(0.630)	(0.644)	(0.920)
Length	-4.94e-05		-6.51e-05	-0.000182**	4.78e-05	4.99e-05	7.53e-05
	(4.08e-05)		(5.44e-05)	(7.67e-05)	(3.65e-05)	(4.83e-05)	(6.24e-05)
Cold War	1.375**		0.812	0.850	-1.267***	-1.044*	-1.260
	(0.539)		(0.689)	(1.048)	(0.477)	(0.582)	(0.846)
Intensity	-0.217		-0.832	-1.072	0.130	0.147	0.0930
	(0.367)		(0.634)	(0.894)	(0.366)	(0.597)	(0.796)
Cumulative Intensity	0.577*		0.717	0.836	-0.454*	-0.492	-0.170
	(0.308)		(0.526)	(0.915)	(0.264)	(0.422)	(0.729)
War in Five	0.427		0.0841	0.458	-0.179	-0.0864	-0.247
	(0.315)		(0.483)	(0.609)	(0.295)	(0.378)	(0.544)
Incompatibility	-0.209		-0.863*	-0.442	0.136	0.451	0.130
	(0.344)		(0.470)	(0.613)	(0.308)	(0.418)	(0.581)
Democracy	-1.576***		-2.377***	-3.211***	1.182***	1.483***	2.953***
	(0.338)		(0.422)	(0.555)	(0.290)	(0.339)	(0.440)
Number of Interveners X Intervention	0.221***		0.337***	0.222	-0.284***	-0.230***	0.126
	(0.0562)		(0.0788)	(0.770)	(0.0433)	(0.0520)	(0.699)
o.Number of interveners	-		-	-	-	-	-
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.342		-0.870	0.722	0.728	0.718	-0.160
			(1.921)	(1.653)	(0.972)	(0.988)	(1.299)
Observations			234	174	275	234	174
R-squared			0.419	0.435	0.305	0.405	0.466

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table M: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Economic Factors- Neighboring Intervener

	GNI per Capita			GDP per Capita			Growth Rate		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	0.0401	-0.0188	0.465	-0.151*	-0.208	-0.146	-5.525*	2.300	-4.426
	(0.526)	(0.617)	(0.720)	(0.0860)	(0.190)	(0.239)	(3.151)	(2.556)	(3.299)
Middle East	0.338	0.530	-0.865*	-0.179	-0.176	-0.611***	-8.073**	-9.120*	-10.06**
	(0.505)	(0.471)	(0.447)	(0.131)	(0.184)	(0.232)	(3.728)	(4.671)	(5.046)
Africa	-1.698***	-1.932***	-2.874***	-0.225**	-0.397***	-0.833***	-5.546	-6.747*	-5.241
	(0.373)	(0.390)	(0.398)	(0.0990)	(0.143)	(0.192)	(3.464)	(3.893)	(4.227)
Asia	-1.819***	-1.540***	-2.259***	-0.0681	-0.110	-0.398*	-5.046	-6.127*	-7.443*
	(0.397)	(0.390)	(0.386)	(0.107)	(0.157)	(0.203)	(3.376)	(3.682)	(4.109)
Americas	-0.399	0.0711	-0.563	-0.0797	-0.106	-0.552**	-4.375	-8.045*	-7.669
	(0.535)	(0.498)	(0.443)	(0.153)	(0.188)	(0.218)	(4.000)	(4.607)	(4.817)
Length	5.02e-05*	-8.31e-06	9.77e-06	2.24e-06	3.08e-08	-1.64e-05	-9.63e-05	-6.46e-05	-0.000196
	(2.99e-05)	(2.47e-05)	(3.33e-05)	(8.69e-06)	(1.15e-05)	(1.50e-05)	(0.000184)	(0.000226)	(0.000264)
Cold War	-0.158	-0.311	0.144	-0.0626	-0.255**	-0.00253	0.845	1.620	-1.402
	(0.425)	(0.369)	(0.522)	(0.0826)	(0.127)	(0.236)	(2.753)	(2.949)	(4.278)
Intensity	-0.170	-0.297	-0.655*	-0.0811	-0.228*	-0.374*	6.347*	7.894**	0.662
	(0.353)	(0.378)	(0.375)	(0.0976)	(0.130)	(0.199)	(3.496)	(3.756)	(4.927)
Cumulative Intensity	-0.138	0.327	0.165	0.126	0.218*	0.330*	-0.621	-1.617	1.901
	(0.250)	(0.234)	(0.328)	(0.0846)	(0.119)	(0.177)	(1.548)	(2.066)	(2.636)
War in Five	-0.271	-0.0549	-0.369	-0.0197	-0.0106	-0.181	2.375	3.774*	3.345
	(0.268)	(0.213)	(0.252)	(0.0550)	(0.0823)	(0.137)	(1.562)	(2.142)	(2.549)
Incompatibility	-0.537**	-0.267	-0.234	-0.0361	-0.0755	-0.0313	3.951**	6.339***	4.919**
	(0.260)	(0.224)	(0.240)	(0.0565)	(0.0843)	(0.129)	(1.546)	(1.970)	(2.192)
Democracy	0.125	0.347*	0.438*	-0.0232	0.0106	0.153	2.084	2.709	2.127
	(0.231)	(0.195)	(0.234)	(0.0572)	(0.0833)	(0.113)	(1.473)	(1.970)	(1.946)
Neighboring Intervener X Intervention	-0.254	0.0404	-0.403	0.307**	0.398	0.905**	1.855	-6.843	-4.951
	(0.638)	(0.658)	(0.805)	(0.150)	(0.251)	(0.355)	(4.577)	(4.423)	(10.28)
o.Neighboring Intervener	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Constant	6.633***	6.644***	8.741***	0.617***	1.058***	2.462***	-3.582	-1.885	8.962
	(0.798)	(0.786)	(0.858)	(0.176)	(0.298)	(0.422)	(6.346)	(6.407)	(8.363)
Observations	198	184	140	267	233	167	291	257	198
R-squared	0.612	0.680	0.755	0.502	0.632	0.670	0.298	0.276	0.280

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table N: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Social Factors- Neighboring Intervener

	Mortality Rate			Life Expectancy		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	-4.073	-10.59	-40.12*	0.588*	1.561**	3.374**
	(4.785)	(9.583)	(22.35)	(0.329)	(0.705)	(1.683)
Middle East	-10.02***	-20.27***	-50.05***	1.948***	3.741***	5.804***
	(3.506)	(6.332)	(11.79)	(0.533)	(0.864)	(1.734)
Africa	-15.32***	-32.13***	-73.40***	1.269***	2.548***	5.033***
	(3.172)	(5.809)	(11.27)	(0.480)	(0.671)	(1.311)
Asia	-10.56***	-21.38***	-48.66***	1.001**	2.045***	4.163***
	(2.765)	(5.073)	(9.947)	(0.461)	(0.643)	(1.240)
Americas	-11.09***	-22.20***	-39.68***	1.047**	2.317***	3.832**
	(3.349)	(6.686)	(11.88)	(0.485)	(0.739)	(1.609)
Length	0.000370	0.00107**	0.00166**	-1.94e-05	-6.85e-05	-0.000191
	(0.000227)	(0.000415)	(0.000724)	(3.73e-05)	(5.50e-05)	(0.000122)
Cold War	0.457	-1.576	-1.591	-0.189	-0.350	1.640
	(3.656)	(6.786)	(14.72)	(0.641)	(0.981)	(2.177)
Intensity	-3.357	-4.384	-8.253	0.154	0.0844	-0.0111
	(3.319)	(6.265)	(10.33)	(0.596)	(0.962)	(1.710)
Cumulative Intensity	-3.823**	-6.781*	-1.450	0.518**	0.884**	0.879
	(1.888)	(3.683)	(6.948)	(0.228)	(0.399)	(1.065)
War in Five	-3.219*	-7.796**	-11.31*	0.191	0.448	-0.327
	(1.897)	(3.709)	(6.693)	(0.273)	(0.473)	(0.852)
Incompatibility	-1.220	-1.300	0.682	0.202	-0.00141	-0.607
	(1.940)	(3.852)	(7.485)	(0.242)	(0.433)	(0.954)
Democracy	1.784	1.770	-1.740	-0.152	-0.0615	0.0270
	(1.967)	(3.724)	(6.366)	(0.284)	(0.446)	(0.968)
Neighboring Intervener X Intervention	-0.399	1.753	26.02	-1.133*	-1.893*	-3.964*
	(6.227)	(12.26)	(29.23)	(0.622)	(1.018)	(2.193)
o.Neighboring Intervener	-	-	-	-	-	-
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-12.94**	-7.235	27.57	1.329*	1.872	-0.119
	(6.484)	(12.54)	(26.58)	(0.736)	(1.142)	(2.481)
Observations	308	275	204	307	280	216
R-squared	0.409	0.406	0.454	0.276	0.306	0.935

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table O: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Political Factors- Neighboring Intervener

	Democracy Level			Autocracy Level		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	-0.206	-0.323	-2.518**	-0.225	0.266	0.131
	(0.586)	(1.005)	(1.144)	(0.465)	(0.655)	(1.296)
Middle East	-1.814***	-2.111***	-2.201**	0.672	0.959	0.471
	(0.611)	(0.766)	(1.079)	(0.596)	(0.733)	(1.023)
Africa	-1.486**	-1.123	-2.122**	-0.0232	-0.261	-0.489
	(0.630)	(0.843)	(1.070)	(0.557)	(0.685)	(0.793)
Asia	-1.554***	-2.052***	-1.304	0.362	0.832	-0.431
	(0.515)	(0.714)	(0.958)	(0.444)	(0.580)	(0.716)

Americas	0.496	0.701	0.713	-0.198	-0.433	-0.759
	(0.714)	(0.853)	(1.182)	(0.634)	(0.653)	(0.922)
Length	-4.78e-05	-6.40e-05	-0.000191**	4.58e-05	4.92e-05	7.99e-05
	(4.07e-05)	(5.47e-05)	(7.59e-05)	(3.67e-05)	(4.85e-05)	(6.20e-05)
Cold War	1.424***	0.814	0.925	-1.294***	-1.040*	-1.295
	(0.540)	(0.694)	(1.028)	(0.479)	(0.585)	(0.847)
Intensity	0.0615	-0.578	-1.358	-0.160	-0.0135	0.255
	(0.408)	(0.672)	(0.881)	(0.410)	(0.595)	(0.797)
Cumulative Intensity	0.535*	0.705	1.017	-0.420	-0.487	-0.265
	(0.308)	(0.528)	(0.900)	(0.262)	(0.422)	(0.727)
War in Five	0.415	0.0213	0.478	-0.150	-0.0422	-0.266
	(0.317)	(0.488)	(0.595)	(0.298)	(0.381)	(0.539)
Incompatibility	-0.225	-0.901*	-0.453	0.157	0.476	0.140
	(0.345)	(0.472)	(0.603)	(0.310)	(0.419)	(0.574)
Democracy	-1.630***	-2.383***	-3.054***	1.216***	1.479***	2.878***
	(0.343)	(0.434)	(0.538)	(0.295)	(0.347)	(0.436)
Neighboring Intervener X Intervention	-0.764	0.769	4.535**	0.160	-0.702	-1.995
	(0.879)	(1.514)	(1.947)	(0.774)	(0.979)	(1.745)
o.Neighboring Intervener	-	-	-	-	-	-
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	1.055	-0.452	1.379	0.525	0.404	-0.295
	(1.301)	(1.802)	(1.639)	(1.001)	(1.039)	(1.435)
Observations	275	234	174	275	234	174
R-squared	0.333	0.404	0.452	0.283	0.396	0.470

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table P: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Economic Factors- Regional Intervener

	GNI per Capita			GDP per Capita			Growth Rate		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	-0.484	-0.875	1.192*	-0.212***	-0.484***	-0.292	-5.949*	3.371	-6.304
	(0.593)	(0.912)	(0.636)	(0.0805)	(0.154)	(0.259)	(3.346)	(3.252)	(3.812)
Middle East	0.355	0.513	-0.799*	-0.187	-0.185	-0.618***	-8.114**	-9.008*	-10.23**
	(0.501)	(0.472)	(0.444)	(0.131)	(0.183)	(0.233)	(3.713)	(4.669)	(5.030)
Africa	-1.648***	-1.910***	-2.868***	-0.233**	-0.401***	-0.835***	-5.602	-6.574*	-5.286
	(0.373)	(0.389)	(0.399)	(0.0983)	(0.144)	(0.191)	(3.444)	(3.887)	(4.225)
Asia	-1.759***	-1.492***	-2.307***	-0.0752	-0.106	-0.382*	-5.093	-5.972	-7.436*
	(0.397)	(0.390)	(0.388)	(0.106)	(0.156)	(0.202)	(3.363)	(3.666)	(4.099)
Americas	-0.358	0.0823	-0.560	-0.0854	-0.106	-0.547**	-4.418	-7.899*	-7.702
	(0.534)	(0.499)	(0.441)	(0.153)	(0.188)	(0.217)	(3.985)	(4.591)	(4.817)
Length	4.95e-05*	-7.71e-06	6.21e-06	3.28e-06	1.81e-06	-1.36e-05	-9.21e-05	-8.24e-05	-0.000206
	(2.97e-05)	(2.43e-05)	(3.32e-05)	(8.69e-06)	(1.15e-05)	(1.49e-05)	(0.000183)	(0.000227)	(0.000264)
Cold War	-0.176	-0.310	0.187	-0.0599	-0.253**	-0.0227	0.868	1.529	-1.395
	(0.423)	(0.364)	(0.520)	(0.0828)	(0.126)	(0.236)	(2.765)	(2.934)	(4.310)
Intensity	-0.208	-0.306	-0.628*	-0.0668	-0.212*	-0.353*	6.405*	7.621**	0.412
	(0.351)	(0.365)	(0.370)	(0.0964)	(0.126)	(0.196)	(3.478)	(3.714)	(4.880)
Cumulative Intensity	-0.125	0.308	0.157	0.114	0.200*	0.328*	-0.676	-1.377	2.026
	(0.246)	(0.218)	(0.327)	(0.0835)	(0.117)	(0.176)	(1.532)	(2.050)	(2.646)
War in Five	-0.292	-0.0937	-0.329	-0.0203	-0.0180	-0.169	2.369	3.827*	3.287
	(0.270)	(0.214)	(0.246)	(0.0545)	(0.0818)	(0.136)	(1.567)	(2.151)	(2.534)
Incompatibility	-0.568**	-0.311	-0.186	-0.0420	-0.0948	-0.0389	3.926**	6.430***	4.819**
	(0.259)	(0.224)	(0.237)	(0.0568)	(0.0847)	(0.130)	(1.553)	(1.992)	(2.199)
Democracy	0.121	0.326*	0.454*	-0.0267	0.000415	0.137	2.073	2.744	2.116
	(0.231)	(0.191)	(0.235)	(0.0573)	(0.0825)	(0.114)	(1.474)	(1.978)	(1.948)
Regional Intervener X Intervention	0.454	1.116	-1.413*	0.337**	0.686***	0.958***	2.105	-7.018	-0.995
	(0.679)	(0.931)	(0.775)	(0.140)	(0.221)	(0.349)	(4.333)	(4.691)	(9.099)
o.Regional Intervener	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
F.E	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	7.152***	7.514***	7.958***	0.691***	1.356***	2.633***	-3.525	-2.080	9.102
	(0.854)	(1.078)	(0.792)	(0.175)	(0.285)	(0.446)	(6.350)	(6.389)	(8.322)

Observations	198	184	140	267	233	167	291	257	198
R-squared	0.613	0.685	0.760	0.500	0.638	0.670	0.298	0.275	0.279

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table Q: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Social Factors- Regional Intervener

	Mortality Rate			Life Expectancy		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	3.540	2.827	-7.027	0.427	0.621	2.913
	(3.728)	(7.330)	(15.44)	(0.376)	(0.864)	(2.149)
Middle East	-10.18***	-20.42***	-49.00***	1.987***	3.776***	5.762***
	(3.455)	(6.281)	(11.83)	(0.526)	(0.857)	(1.729)
Africa	-15.71***	-32.65***	-73.84***	1.308***	2.581***	4.992***
	(3.133)	(5.770)	(11.39)	(0.475)	(0.672)	(1.318)
Asia	-10.98***	-22.05***	-50.03***	1.043**	2.113***	4.124***
	(2.701)	(4.985)	(9.942)	(0.456)	(0.642)	(1.252)
Americas	-11.45***	-22.77***	-40.58***	1.115**	2.420***	3.936**
	(3.329)	(6.637)	(11.82)	(0.475)	(0.735)	(1.611)
Length	0.000371	0.00108***	0.00172**	-2.17e-05	-7.35e-05	-0.000197
	(0.000226)	(0.000411)	(0.000719)	(3.75e-05)	(5.55e-05)	(0.000122)
Cold War	0.492	-1.601	-1.626	-0.201	-0.362	1.673
	(3.656)	(6.790)	(14.77)	(0.640)	(0.979)	(2.191)
Intensity	-3.227	-3.942	-5.402	0.0718	-0.0868	-0.325
	(3.358)	(6.347)	(10.60)	(0.590)	(0.946)	(1.667)
Cumulative Intensity	-3.884**	-6.930*	-3.154	0.557**	0.973**	0.972
	(1.871)	(3.650)	(6.841)	(0.229)	(0.399)	(1.059)
War in Five	-3.109	-7.646**	-11.05*	0.190	0.448	-0.349
	(1.890)	(3.689)	(6.655)	(0.272)	(0.474)	(0.856)
Incompatibility	-0.878	-0.650	2.394	0.206	-0.0265	-0.624
	(1.958)	(3.871)	(7.471)	(0.243)	(0.436)	(0.959)
Democracy	1.862	1.985	-1.648	-0.160	-0.0762	-0.00413
	(1.960)	(3.722)	(6.427)	(0.287)	(0.449)	(0.967)
Regional Intervener X Intervention	-9.908*	-16.15	-31.76	-0.665	-0.206	-2.088
	(5.649)	(10.86)	(27.05)	(0.602)	(1.108)	(2.512)
o.Regional Intervener	-	-	-	-	-	-
F.E	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-20.59***	-20.83*	-5.988	1.384*	2.338*	0.166
	(5.801)	(10.97)	(21.13)	(0.731)	(1.234)	(2.604)
Observations	308	275	204	307	280	216
R-squared	0.414	0.409	0.455	0.270	0.298	0.934

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table R: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Political Factors- Regional Intervener

	Democracy Level			Autocracy Level		
VARIABLES	Five	Ten	Twenty	Five	Ten	Twenty
Intervention	-0.695	0.170	-1.365*	0.309	0.459	-0.869
	(0.797)	(2.017)	(0.701)	(0.680)	(1.067)	(0.918)
Middle East	-1.711***	-2.187***	-2.131*	0.614	0.995	0.434
	(0.598)	(0.770)	(1.119)	(0.588)	(0.728)	(1.033)
Africa	-1.383**	-1.192	-2.096*	-0.0855	-0.228	-0.502
	(0.618)	(0.849)	(1.118)	(0.544)	(0.677)	(0.808)
Asia	-1.445***	-2.126***	-1.353	0.291	0.852	-0.375
	(0.497)	(0.720)	(0.995)	(0.431)	(0.581)	(0.721)
Americas	0.583	0.633	0.632	-0.246	-0.404	-0.730
	(0.709)	(0.856)	(1.202)	(0.633)	(0.648)	(0.927)

Length	-4.77e-05	-6.38e-05	-0.000182**	4.52e-05	4.81e-05	7.52e-05
	(4.09e-05)	(5.48e-05)	(7.66e-05)	(3.69e-05)	(4.88e-05)	(6.27e-05)
Cold War	1.389**	0.843	0.845	-1.276***	-1.055*	-1.268
	(0.538)	(0.691)	(1.048)	(0.478)	(0.582)	(0.848)
Intensity	-0.00240	-0.519	-1.049	-0.142	-0.0797	0.0866
	(0.405)	(0.684)	(0.897)	(0.415)	(0.603)	(0.802)
Cumulative Intensity	0.552*	0.694	0.834	-0.420	-0.452	-0.149
	(0.311)	(0.522)	(0.902)	(0.266)	(0.427)	(0.724)
War in Five	0.401	0.0304	0.454	-0.140	-0.0339	-0.240
	(0.317)	(0.486)	(0.603)	(0.298)	(0.383)	(0.538)
Incompatibility	-0.229	-0.900*	-0.442	0.173	0.499	0.123
	(0.343)	(0.480)	(0.612)	(0.311)	(0.422)	(0.578)
Democracy	-1.592***	-2.420***	-3.204***	1.194***	1.499***	2.977***
	(0.336)	(0.428)	(0.564)	(0.289)	(0.341)	(0.458)
Regional Intervener X Intervention	0.177	-0.162	0.392	-0.653	-0.683	0.824
	(0.925)	(2.236)	(2.432)	(0.809)	(1.243)	(2.156)
o.Regional Intervener	-	-	-	-	-	-
F.E	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	1.220	-0.644	0.965	0.298	0.259	0.114
	(1.461)	(2.133)	(1.604)	(1.175)	(1.170)	(1.358)
Observations	275	234	174	275	234	174
R-squared	0.331	0.403	0.435	0.284	0.396	0.467

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1